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Preface

IN 1981 I EDITED a collection of essays entitled Exploring the Johnson
Years, in which seven scholars surveyed major issues of the 1960s,
ranging from the Vietnam War to the civil-rights movement, to
demonstrate the rich veins of previously untapped material available
in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library. Although the essays dealt with
many of the important themes that concerned the Johnson administration, they could not cover all areas of historical interest.
The present volume is designed to broaden and extend the
coverage of the Johnson years by treating topics that were not included
in the first collection. Once again, with generous support from the
Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation and with close cooperation from the
staff of the Johnson Library, the authors have searched through the
files in Austin that are relevant to their subjects and then have related
their archival findings to the existing literature. They have written
both to extend our present understanding of significant aspects of the
sixties and to point the way to topics and resources that scholars could
profitably develop in the future.
Rather than force the authors into a standard format, I encouraged them to write their essays along whatever lines seemed most
appropriate. As a result, their contributions fall into three categories.
First, several have chosen to offer a general survey of the Johnson
Library's holdings on a broad issue of national policy. Thus, in dealing with the opposition to the Vietnam War and environmental policy,
Charles DeBenedetti and Martin Melosi have sketched out the larger
issues of national policy and have pointed out the types of material
available in the library for more detailed studies of these topics. Lewis
Gould, Donald Kettl, and Clarence Lasby, on the other hand, have written much more intensive essays on more limited subjects to show how
the library's holdings can be used to bring little-known but important aspects of national policy in the 1960s into focus. Finally, Burton Kaufman and I have combined these two approaches in writing
essays that survey broad areas but also include some detailed coverage
of selected portions. Despite the difference in method, the resulting
essays all strive for the same goal-to demonstrate the wide variety
of materials available and to encourage other scholars to join in ex-
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ploring the Johnson Library so as to enhance our understanding of
a stormy and controversial decade of the recent past.
While by design there is no single theme to the essays, two
elements tend to appear with great frequency. The first is the Vietnam War. From the time of the escalation in 1965, it casts an evergreater shadow over nearly all aspects of national policy, from the
debate over tax policy to the funding of such areas dear to Lyndon
Johnson's heart as health and space. Although only Charles
DeBenedetti's essay on the antiwar movement deals directly with
the Vietnam experience, nearly all reflect the growing absorption of
Johnson and his staff with the war in Southeast Asia. By the late 1960s,
Vietnam not only was creating a budget squeeze that hurt nearly every
other administrative program; it also was distracting the White House
from all other issues and was poisoning the administration's relations
with Congress and the press.
The other unifying element in the essays is the elusive presence
of Lyndon Johnson. He is the central figure in nearly all the essays,
dominating his administration and setting priorities by the sheer force
of his personality as well as the power of his office. At the same time,
it is almost impossible to be sure what LBJ really felt and thought
about the issues of his administration. The common dilemma facing
all the author~ is the absence of material in the library by Johnson
himself. Vast numbers of memos and reports reflect the advice from
the bureaucracy and his aides, but very few documents reveal
Johnson's own personal reaction. Occasionally there is a scrawled
handwritten comment at the bottom of a memorandum, indicating
the president's pleasure or disfavor; usually, however, there is only
a terse yes or no or a cryptic comment, such as "See me about this."
The difficulty lies with Johnson's personal style. Secretive by
nature, he hated to reveal his innermost thoughts on paper. Instead,
he favored oral communication, either by telephone or, preferably, in
person, where he could question, cajole, flatter, or intimidate
whomever he was dealing with. The scholar is thus forced to rely on
the recollections of others, either in oral histories or in contemporary
memoranda, on what Johnson told them and what they thought he
really meant. Only very rarely does one find a document that indicates
LBJ's private feelings and thoughts.
Yet despite this handicap, the essays in this collection do offer
new insight into the character and leadership qualities of Lyndon
Johnson. In particular, they cast doubt on the usual stereotypes of LBJ
as the opportunistic wheeler-dealer, intent on building a legislative
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record though not caring about the issues, or the super hawk, ruthlessly pursuing a belligerent foreign policy. Instead, these essays reveal
the complexity of Johnson as president and his genuine commitment
to such diverse causes as the conquest of disease, the protection of
the environment, and the exploration of outer space. The LBJ in these
pages is a very human figure who understands the corrosive impact
of the Vietnam War on his administration and who struggles to try
to preserve the domestic programs that he fought so long and hard
to achieve. By suggesting the contradictions that undercut so many
of the positive aspects of Johnson's actions, the contrib..itors to this
volume add greatly to our knowledge of this deceptively elusive president. The ultimate success of these essays, however, will depend on
the degree to which they challenge other historians to join in the effort to arrive at a fuller understanding of Johnson's vital but flawed
legacy to the nation.

Contents

Preface

vii

Introduction
1. The Johnson Revival: A Bibliographical Appraisal

3

ROBERT A. DIVINE

Part 1. The Impact of Vietnam
2. Lyndon Johnson and the Antiwar Opposition

23

CHARLES DEBENEDETTI

3. The Economic Education of Lyndon Johnson:
Guns, Butter, and Taxes 54
DONALD F. KETTL

4. Foreign Aid and the Balance-of-Payments Problem:
Vietnam and Johnson's Foreign Economic Policy 79
BURTON I. KAUFMAN

Part 2. Protecting the Environment
5. Lyndon Johnson and Environmental Policy

113

MARTIN V. MELOSI

6. Lady Bird Johnson and Beautification

150

LEWIS L. GOULD

Part 3. Science and Public Policy
7. The War on Disease 183
CLARENCE G . LASBY

8. Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space
ROBERT A. DIVINE

About the Contributors
Index

257

255

217

Introduction

1 I The Johnson Revival:
A Bibliographical Appraisal
Robert A. Divine
IN THE FIRST DECADE after the death of Lyndon Baines Johnson,
there were surprisingly few books published about this controversial
president. Both biographers and historians seemed to share in the
public's desire not to be reminded of a figure who had presided over
such a stormy and disruptive period in American life. In the "me
decade" of the 1970s, Johnson faded from memory, along with his
Great Society and the trauma associated with the Vietnam War. The
only book on LBJ to attract much attention was Doris Keams's Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, but even this well-written account achieved only brief popularity.1
The growing historical blackout came to an abrupt end in the
early 1980s with a marked revival of interest in Johnson and his
policies. The election of Ronald Reagan and the subsequent assault
on many of the Great Society programs of the sixties led to new
scholarly attention on Johnson's legislative program and its subsequent impact on American life. Even more dramatic was the renewal
of interest in Vietnam, which was manifested in the striking popularity of the PBS series ar.d Stanley Karnow's accompanying book,
Vietnam: A History. As the American people began to come to terms
with a war they had tried to forget, Johnson once again became a
central figure. And finally, biographers began to take up the challenge inherent in chronicling Johnson's remarkable rise to power
and his equally dramatic fall from grace. The realization that so
little was known about a man who had played such a major role in
recent American history helped to stimulate a new wave of Johnson
literature.
The result was to subject Lyndon Johnson and his policies to a
critical scrutiny that was long overdue. Most of these biographies
and historical studies were hostile toward LBJ, portraying him in
an nnfriendly light and subjecting his motives and actions to very
painstaking analysis. Yet, even Johnson partisans could take some
comfort in the fact that the long years of neglect were finally over;
their hero was at last getting the historical attention he had always craved and was no longer the victim of a collective scholarly
amnesia.
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The publication in 1982 of three books on LBJ's political career
marked the beginning of the Johnson revival. Two were biographies
that focused on his early career, primarily in Texas and in the House;
the third was a memoir that concentrated on his Senate years. All three
were by journalists who painted a bleak picture of Johnson as a scheming and unlikable politician, but there were notable differences in their
approaches and conclusions.
By far the most ambitious work, and clearly the best written and
most absorbing, was the first volume of Robert A. Caro's planned threevolume biography of Lyndon Johnson, The Path to Power. Using his
skills as an investigative journalist, he combined extensive research
in the materials at the Johnson Library with exhaustive interviews
with everyone he could find who had known or worked with Johnson,
including many who had never been interviewed before and were eager
to tell their stories, which were often very critical of LBJ, to a sympathetic listener. The result was a book that offered a great deal of
new information on Johnson's life and career through his first, unsuccessful Senate race in 1941 and that presented Johnson in a
uniformly negative light.
Bothered at first by the secrecy with which LBJ surrounded
himself, Caro finally found the theme that illuminated his entire
political career, and then proceeded, in nearly 800 pages, to elaborate
on it. The "dark thread" that Caro uncovered was Johnson's vaunting ambition, "a hunger for power in its most naked form, for power
not to improve the lives of others, but to manipulate and dominate
them, to bend them to his will." Caro discovered that once the secret
was out, the mystery of Lyndon Johnson disappeared: LBJ was a man
of great political skill who used his talents solely to advance his own
career without regard to ideas, principles, or friendships. By the end
of the 1930s Johnson had "displayed a genius for discerning a path
to power, an utter ruthlessness in destroying obstacles in that path,
and a seemingly bottomless capacity for deceit, deception and betrayal
in moving along it.112
The key to understanding Johnson, Caro argues, is to focus on
his extraordinary ambition, which he hid so carefully from contemporaries. Yet it is the revealing observations of some of those around
Johnson who confided in Caro that he relies on so heavily. Thus,
several times the reader is reminded of the comment of a childhood
playmate that Johnson as a boy was already a "natural born leader,"
but "if he couldn't lead, he didn't care much about playing.113 And
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the statement by a secretary in the 1930s, when LBJ was a congressional assistant, that Johnson possessed "a burning ambition to be
somebody," is repeated later, along with the added comment, "He
couldn't stand not being somebody-just could not stand it." "He
wanted to be somebody. " 4 Caro uses such observations to conclude
that from the time LBJ first arrived in Washington as a powerless young
congressional aide, he was bent on a secret plan to advance through
the House and the Senate to become president.
Caro uses the various incidents in Johnson's early career to plot
out the methods and techniques that LBJ used to fulfill his hidden
agenda. From his first plunge into political maneuvering in college
through his first great setback in the 1941 Senate race, Johnson is portrayed as a ruthless, deceitful, and utterly immoral man, intent only
on his own advancement. Asserting that LBJ cared nothing about
ideology, Caro argues that he supported the New Deal purely out of
expediency and repudiated it after 1941, when it no longer suited his
political purposes. Friendships were equally dispensable; people, from
worshipful aides such as Gene Latimer, who was driven to drink by
working overtime for Johnson, to powerful patrons such as Sam
Rayburn, were cast aside or subtly undermined when their usefulness
was at an end.
The difficulty with this interpretation of Johnson is Caro's failure
to explain LBJ's success. The reader is left to wonder why only Robert
Caro, years later, could discern so clearly the evil nature of Lyndon
Johnson and why so many contemporaries were taken in by Johnson's
apparent duplicity. Nor does Caro succ~ed in explaining how LBJ was
able to build up such a network of loyal and hard-working associates,
men who stayed with him despite bad treatment and few tangible
rewards and were crucial elements in his political advancement. The
suggestion that some men like to be bullied or dominated hardly explains Johnson's appeal to the talented band of associates he gathered
about him from his college days and his service as director of the
National Youth Administration (NYA) in Texas. The failure to consider any more-human qualities that Johnson may have possessed,
aside from naked ambition and the power to manipulate, casts considerable doubt on the dark portrait that Caro paints.
The second biography that appeared in 1982, Ronnie Dugger's The
Politician, offers an equally critical view of LBJ, but one that differs
considerably from Caro's account. Dugger is also a journalist but,
unlike Caro, a crusading one who had opposed Johnson in the 1950s
and was fascinated by what made his adversary tick. Relying on Texas
newspapers, selected files in the Johnson Library, some interviews,
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including key ones with the president himself in late 1967 and early
1968, and the existing Johnson literature, Dugger writes a critical account of Johnson's career through the early fifties, with a few flashes
ahead to Vietnam, which he explains as a result of LBJ's embodiment
of such frontier values as pride and false courage. Dugger's main concern, however, is with ideology as he attempts to explain why Johnson
did not live up to Dugger's own liberal principles.
In contrast to Caro, Dugger views Johnson as a genuine New
Dealer, a man with principles who abandoned them under the spur
of ambition. Thus he portrays LBJ as a "true crusader" in his days
as director of the NYA in Texas and, unlike Caro, not simply as using
his NYA position for a stepping stone to Congress. 5 Dugger is particularly impressed that during the thirties, Johnson was willing to
aid blacks with educational support and public housing at a time when
it was not politically advantageous, a topic that is reserved for a later
volume in Caro's biography.
The tragedy, as Dugger sees it, is that Johnson's commitment to
the New Deal and to humanitarian reform was not strong enough to
withstand the pull of ambition. Claiming that Johnson had no longrange goals but, rather, that he was a man of impulse who reacted
instinctively to opportunity, Dugger traces LBJ's fortuitous partnership with Herman and George Brown and his subsequent corruption
as a "back-sliding liberal" who became enmeshed in helping Brown
and Root become a huge government contractor by giving them inside information and assistance. 6 Caro, aided by a key interview
with George Brown, had traced this same development; but Caro
saw it as a predictable part of the larger pattern of LBJ's path to
power.
Thus, though both Dugger and Caro view Johnson as an opportunistic politician who had abandoned the New Deal by the 1940s,
their interpretations are quite different. Dugger regrets that LBJ had
become an ardent Cold Warrior, engaging in Red-baiting and antiunion activities, while Caro finds it perfectly understandable. Dugger
sees Johnson as a flawed but potentially decent political leader, a complex man who was both vindictive and compassionate, both charming and vicious, both selfish and generous-a man who, he says, "was
everything that is human." And his great regret is that Johnson had
not chosen a different course, "one that lay latent in him," and thus
turned against the New Deal and the peaceful world that Dugger hoped
would be possible after World War II. 7 In other words, Dugger writes
more out of sorrow than out of anger as he describes a Johnson who
betrayed his own best instincts.
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The third 1982 book on LBJ was George Reedy's Lyndon B.
Johnson: A Memoir. Less ambitious than either Caro or Dugger, Reedy
was content to try to think through his own ambivalent feelings
toward a man he had served as a Senate aide and presidential press
secretary. Reedy agreed with many of the negative aspects of Johnson's
character, but he also found in LBJ some redeeming qualities. Trying
to explain how he could work so long and hard for a man he often
detested, Reedy said it was Johnson's occasional acts of courage and
genuine legislative achievement that made it all worthwhile. In the
1950s, Reedy explained, several times he was ready to leave his vulgar
and insensitive boss when LBJ "would do something so magnificent
that all of his nasty characteristics would fade. 118 In particular, Reedy
cites Johnson's role in arranging for the censure of Joe McCarthy and
LBJ's skillful maneuvering in behalf of the 1957 Civil Rights Act as
examples of genuine statesmanship.
The key to Johnson's appeal, according to Reedy, was his dynamic
personality and his many-sided nature. LBJ's contradictions fascinated
Reedy: "He was a tremendous figure-a combination of complexities
and simplicities that bewildered all observers." At times very shrewd,
he could also be "astoundingly gullible in the selection of his personal advisers." 9 As one who worked for him, Reedy admits that LBJ
was "a miserable person-a bully, sadist, lout, and egotist"-who took
"special delight in humiliating those who had cast in their lot with
him." But most of all Reedy was impressed by the sheer audacity and
force of Johnson's personality: "He may have been a son of a bitch
but he was a colossal son of a bitch.1110
Unlike both Caro and Dugger, however, Reedy does view Johnson
as a man who cared about issues. He admits that Johnson did not formulate any coherent ideology and that he preferred always to talk tactics rather than strategy, but he senses in him a profound kinship for
the underdog in society. Rebutting the charge that LBJ cared only about
his own political fortunes, Reedy said such a feeling was not "shared
by blacks or Appalachians or Chicanos or by poor people generally.
They could see much of themselves in him." 11 For all of LBJ's concern with mastering the political currents of his time, Reedy believes,
"he usually tried to ride them in the direction of uplift for the poor
and downtrodden." Unpleasant as he was in his dealings with individuals, he genuinely tried "to do something for the masses." 12
But even Reedy does not try to suggest that Johnson espoused any
definable ideology beyond a vague desire to " 'be for the peoplespelled pee-pul.' " 13 For all LBJ's skill at political maneuvering, he
lacked any clear sense of purpose or a vision of what he hoped to
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achieve. Reedy echoes Dugger, who notes that Johnson was so caught
up in the present that he never speculated about the future. One reason
for his cultivation of political patrons such as Alvin Wirtz, Sam
Rayburn, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, beyond immediate political opportunism, Reedy suggests, may have been to share in their larger vision of what was desirable. Without dreams of his own, LBJ had to
borrow those of the men he admired most. Yet, even though he lacked
the ability to chart a course for the nation to follow, he possessed
remarkable skills in making government work effectively, skills that
led Reedy to conclude that of all our presidents, Johnson "should be
rated as the master tactician of all times." 14
II

Historians as well as journalists have taken part in the Johnson
revival. Interested more in LBJ's record in the White House than in
his earlier political career, they have focused on two broad areasthe Great Society and the Vietnam War. Scholars have probed both
into Johnson's attempts to carry out a broad program of domestic
reform and into his flawed efforts to contain communism in Southeast
Asia. Like the biographers, they have adopted a critical stance that
has led to some very hostile judgments.
There has been one major effort to assess the entire sweep of the
Johnson administration at home and abroad-Vaughn Davis Bornet's
The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson. Bornet's book, part of a series
on individual American presidencies, is based on both the body of
Johnson literature and on research in the files of the Johnson Library.
Written before much of the newer work on Johnson had appeared, it
is an uneven book that does not reach any coherent or persuasive conclusions. Yet Bornet's survey does succeed in capturing the breadth
of the Johnson administration's efforts to bring about change in
American life; it is particularly helpful on the various Great Society
programs.
The book's main weakness is the author's ambivalence toward
Johnson. Bornet leans over backwards in his effort to be fair, but the
result is an awkward balancing of positive and negative judgments.
Thus, on the Great Society, Bornet credits Johnson with good intentions, along with substantial achievements in a few areas, notably
education and civil rights. But he thinks that the Great Society failed
because Johnson promised far more than he could deliver. Even the
record of legislative output is misleading, Bornet argues, because as
a result, "so many impractical and/or untested laws emerged, laws
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that much later would require modification, amendment, abandonment, or repeal." He thinks LBJ was guilty of "overpromising of
utopia," but at the same time he credits him with "at least trying to
strike effective blows against injustice, extremes of poverty, and the
failure to educate the young." 15
Similarly, Bomet sees "great virtue" in LBJ's attempt to halt communism in Southeast Asia, calling the effort in Vietnam "definitely
worth trying." But Bomet faults Johnson for not doing enough and for
failing to be honest with the American people. According to Bomet, Johnson "was unwilling to use much of the power the nation had and .. .
would not take risks that real escalation of the war seemed to entail." 16
Once more LBJ is praised for his good intentions but damned for his
failure to follow through. "Johnson cautiously avoided full commitment
of his and the nation's resources," Bomet charges, "to any of the expensive causes he espoused, at home or abroad." 17 Yet it can be argued that
it was not Johnson's caution and restraint that were at fault but that
it was his more fundamental failure to think through both his sweeping
legislative programs and his foreign-policy adventures.
Johnson's greatest difficulty, it would appear, was the absence of
a definable ideology. Intent on passing bills in Congress and on fighting
communism, he lacked a set of principles to guide him in these activities. Yet Bomet dodges this whole question, commenting only that
LBJ's ideology "is not easy to capsulize." 18 In failing to probe into the
impact of Johnson's ideological weakness, Bomet is unable to offer
a consistent explanation of why, despite his good intentions, LBJ could
not either sustain his Great Society or win in Vietnam. Bornet's long
chapter on Johnson's concern over the state of his health dictating
his decision to step down in 1968, while interesting, still does not
offset the fact that Johnson had lost the confidence of the American
people on both domestic and foreign-policy issues. The contrast between the initial success of a new president stepping in to restore the
nation's faith after the tragic Kennedy assassination and the scorn
heaped on a failed leader rejected by a disillusioned nation calls for
a more incisive explanation than poor health. Instead, Bornet concludes with the contradictory observation that the Johnson presidency
was a "brilliant tour de force" yet one that "saw the nation in turmoil, with loss of faith in the system itself." 19
III

The Great Society, which is often viewed as Johnson's most
substantial achievement as president, came under critical fire in the
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early 1980s. Two assessments, one by a historian and one by a social
scientist, challenged the traditional belief that LBJ had presided over
a period of remarkable social progress at home.
Allen J. Matusow, writing from a New Left perspective yet also
drawing upon conservative attacks on liberalism, has offered a broadranging critique of the Great Society and of LBJ's War on Poverty in
particular in The Unraveling of America. Although his conclusions
were damaging to Johnson, Matusow's main target was mainstream
American liberalism, not LBJ. Indeed, unlike Caro, Matusow was willing to concede that despite past inconsistency in ideology, President
Johnson was a sincere advocate of reform who was out to "confound
his critics by doing good" and to prove that he could be a more effective occupant of the White House than either Kennedy or Roosevelt. 20
Matusow gives LBJ especially high marks in the area of civil rights,
calling his actions in passing the 1964 and 1965 Civil Rights Acts "the
greatest achievement of his tenure." 21 LBJ's only failure in this area,
the author contends, was wheri he failed to support the effort to end
educational and economic discrimination in the North.
It is liberalism, not Johnson's character, that Matusow sees as
fatally flawed. LBJ, like Kennedy, was a "corporate liberal"-one who
"unashamedly asserted the benevolence of large corporations and
defended the existing distribution of wealth and power in America."
The clearest example of this devotion to bolstering the existing corporate structure of America was the tax cut proposed by Kennedy and
enacted by Johnson in 1964. This measure, Matusow argues, "sought
no redistribution of wealth and power"; its sole purpose was "lubrication of the system, nc,t its reform." 22
Matusow's primary concern is with the War on Poverty. The problem, he contends, lay not in Johnson's excessive rhetoric but in a faulty
concept of the nature of poverty in America. Democratic liberals saw
it as a fixed condition, defined in 1963 as any family with an income
below $3,000. In reality, poverty was a relative state that embraced
20 percent of the population-the one in five American families who
did not share fully in the nation's abundance. By 1968 the poverty
line had moved up to $7,500, but 20 percent of the population fell
below that mark of "relative deprivation." The only way to eradicate
poverty, according to Matusow, was to move against its sourcenamely, inequality of income. "It followed that, to attack poverty, the
government would have to reduce inequality, to redistribute income,
in short, to raise up the poor by casting down the rich." "By American
standards," Matusow concludes, "this was radicalism, and nobody in
the Johnson White House ever considered it." 23
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Instead of a genuine onslaught involving income transfers to ensure that the lowest 20 percent of the population would receive more
than 5 percent of the national income, Johnson engaged in
ameliorative programs to train poor youth, to provide better educational opportunities, to furnish health care for the aged and the poor,
and to improve housing in the slums. None of these programs proved
successful, according to Matusow, because none was aimed at the fundamental problem of income redistribution. Unwilling to take risks
or to anger important interest groups, LBJ waged a crusade without
casualties and therefore without victories. "This then," Matusow concludes, "may serve as the epitaph of the famous War on Poverty16eclared but Never Fought.' 1124
Contrary to the conventional view that the Vietnam War doomed
the poverty effort, Matusow believes that Vietnam proved to be "an
inefficient but highly successful antipoverty program, the only one
in the Johnson years that actually worked.1125 The military effort
helped the poor by stimulating a demand for labor that particularly
helped unskilled workers and blacks. Unfortunately, the resulting inflationary pressures eventually eroded the short-term benefits and contributed to the economic malaise of the 1970s, which proved to be
equally hard on the poor and on the well-to-do.
Long before then, however, the triumph of liberalism had led to
its demise. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey received almost 12 million
fewer votes than Johnson had in 1964. The repudiation of the
Democrats was due to far more than an unpopular war or a failed president, Matusow contends. It represented the "massive defection of the
electorate from the liberalism that had guided the country since 1960.
Liberals had once promised to manage the economy, solve the race
problem, reduce poverty, and keep the peace. These promises not only
remained unfulfilled; each of them would be mocked by the traumatic
events of this election year." 26
Powerful as is Matusow's indictment of the liberal failure in the
1960s, it is lacking in a realistic understanding of what was possible.
His arguments for more sweeping reform and the large-scale redistribution of income ignore the nature of the American political system.
Much like the similar New Left critique of Franklin Roosevelt's New
Deal, Matusow's commitment to a more radical agenda, one that called for structural change rather than piecemeal reform, clashes with
what was historically feasible. Yet his indictment of liberalism and
of LBJ's faithful devotion to it helps to explain the tragedy that overcame both the nation and Lyndon Johnson during this tumultuous
decade.
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An equally provocative critique of Johnson's domestic social program has come from the opposite end of the political spectrum. In
Losing Ground, Charles Murray, a neoconservative, contends that it
was precisely the policies that Matusow advocates-attempts to
transfer income-that interrupted slow but steady progress in the
lessening of poverty. Surveying social policy from 1950 to 1980, Murray contends that the percentage of Americans who were mired in
poverty had declined from 30 percent in 1950 to 13 percent by 1968.
But then changes in the welfare program that began under Johnson
led to a leveling off in the poverty level, so that by 1980, 13 percent
of all Americans were still below the poverty line. 27
Unlike Matusow, Murray focuses, not on the familiar Great Society legislation, but on changes in social policy that began during the
last years of the Johnson administration and reached their full impact during the 1970s. He blames, not LBJ, but the intelligentsia,
primarily academics and journalists, for fostering an "elite wisdom,"
which called for changes in social programs that made welfare more
attractive than low-paying jobs. The greatest shift, however, was in
favor of transfer payments, such as supplemental security income, food
stamps, and other forms of welfare for working people. The changes
that began under LBJ were often small in scale, but they would
snowball in the future. Thus the number of people who were eligible
for food stamps, which had increased from less than 0.5 million in
1963 to 2.1 million by 1968, had reached 21.1 million by 1980.2 8
Murray has relatively little to say about Johnson's impact on
social policy. He glides over most of the Great Society programs, not
even mentioning the historic changes in health care that were brought
about by Medicare and Medicaid. He is equally vague on precisely
who was responsible for the change in rules that he claims made it
"profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in ways that were
destructive in the long term." 29 And he fails to show how and why
welfare policies that were designed to alleviate poverty suddenly included the kind of transfer payments that Matusow found so alien
to Johnson's Great Society approach.
Despite their sharp ideological differences, Murray and Matusow
agree that the War on Poverty failed. Neither author blames Johnson
personally for this failure; rather, both see it as the product of flawed
ideology. For Murray; the villains are "the upper echelons of academia,
journalism, publishing, and the vast network of foundations, institutes, and research centers" who in the late 1960s reached agreement on a new social policy that "represented an abrupt shift with
the past." Matusow is much more precise in assigning responsibility,
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stating that "the War on Poverty was destined to be one of the great
failures of twentieth-century liberalism." 30
The irony is that Lyndon Johnson, the man whom Robert Caro
and many others have accused of lacking any ideology, is now seen
as the man whose reform program floundered because of the liberal
ideas that he followed as president. In waging war on poverty and in
trying to use the power of government to create a Great Society, LBJ
failed, not because of compromise or manipulation, but solely out
of devotion to ideas and principles that proved to be fatally flawed.
IV

The revival of interest in Johnson reached its peak on the most
controversial of all his policies-the Vietnam War. In the early 1980s,
scholars began a careful reconsideration of Johnson's decisions in
regard to Vietnam, one based on an examination of the evidence rather
than on the emotional reaction that had colored so many of the earlier
studies. Although nearly all the authors were still critical of Johnson,
holding him responsible for America's failure in Vietnam, he began
to be seen, not as the villain, but as yet another victim of this great
tragedy.
Larry Berman, a political scientist, offered the most revealing new
assessment of Johnson's Vietnam policy in his 1982 book, Planning
a Tragedy. Using recently opened materials at the Johnson Library,
Berman narrowed his focus to the critical decision in July, 1965, to
commit the United States to full participation in the ground fighting
in South Vietnam by authorizing the dispatch of another fifty thousand troops. Berman was particularly intent on examining the advisory
process that Johnson had employed in reaching this critical decision,
notably the dialogue between Undersecretary of State George W. Ball,
who advocated a "tactical withdrawal," and Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara, who favored open-ended military escalation. 31
Berman concluded that the president had used the advisory process
to reach a prearranged decision for the controlled escalation of the conflict. Convinced that Johnson sincerely believed that South Vietnam
was of vital strategic interest to the United States, Berman believes that
LBJ never had any intention of pulling out of Vietnam. During the debate, the entire burden of proof was placed on those like Ball, who argued for withdrawal, and not on those who favored staying on, thereby
preventing any fair weighing of the alternatives. At the same time, however, LBJ signaled to his national-security adviser, McGeorge Bundy,
his desire to avoid an all-out military commitment in Vietnam. 32
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The picture of Johnson that Berman paints is one of a "master
of consensus," a leader who was gifted in manipulation engaged in
a "delicate exercise of political juggling." The whole elaborate process of meetings and discussions raised crucial questions, including
the likelihood of a war that would last at least five years and might
involve as many as six hundred thousand troops. But the purpose of
the advisory process was not to consider these possible consequences,
Berman explains, but "to legitimize a previously selected option by
creating the illusion that other views were being considered." 33
Johnson's most difficult task was putting a rein on the military.
In a crucial meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he had to secure
their agreement to his concept of a controlled and limited American
military effort in Vietnam. One by one he turned down the suggestions of the service chiefs for calling up the reserves, for putting the
nation on a wartime footing, for making extensive air and naval attacks on North Vietnam. Johnson finally asked each of the military
leaders if he agreed with the policy of limited escalation, and each
reluctantly nodded agreement. Calling this scene "an extraordinary
moment," Berman likens Johnson to a "lion tamer dealing with some
of the great lions." 34 This virtuoso performance led to disaster. "The
president committed the United States to fight a limited war against
an enemy totally committed to revolutionary war," Berman points out.
"He had weighed all the costs and then used his great talents to forge
a marginal consensus-enough to get the United States into war, but
insufficient for war termination." 35
The reason for this grave misjudgment, Berman thinks, is LBJ's
devotion to the Great Society. In July, 1965, Congress had alreadv
passed thirty-six major pieces of legislation, but twenty-six others,
including Medicare and civil rights, were still awaiting action. Reluctant to withdraw from Vietnam, LBJ was also unwilling to sacrifice
his domestic reforms for victory abroad. So he opted for a middle
course in Vietnam, one that he thought he could pursue without
destroying the Great Society. "In holding back from total commitment," Berman observes, "Johnson was juggling the Great Society,
the war in Vietnam, and his hopes for the future." The result, Berman concludes, was inevitable: "the Great Society would crumble,"
and he would lose in Vietnam to an enemy that was waging "a total,
not limited war." Lyndon Johnson "was the cause of his ultimate undoing"; the master manipulator had finally undertaken a political juggling act that was beyond even his great skill. 36
Berman's critical but sympathetic analysis of Johnson's failure
in Vietnam provided a basis for another, a more ideological, interpreta-
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tion of that conflict. Beginning in 1978 with Guenther Lewy'sAmerica
in Vietnam, a group of revisionist writers had been defending the
American involvement in Vietnam in reaction to the prevailing
historical condemnation. Now they could develop the argument that
the American defeat in Vietnam was self-inflicted, and thus did not
prove that the effort was wrong from the outset.
Military strategist Harry Summers was one of the first to argue
that the United States could have prevailed in Vietnam. Challenging
the conventional view that the American army unwisely used traditional methods in an antiguerrilla war calling for new counterinsurgency tactics, Summers claimed that the real enemy had been the
North Vietnamese regulars, not the Vietcong guerrillas. Had the
United States used World War II-type tactics and taken the strategic
initiative, he claims, America could have prevailed in Vietnam. 37
Summers blamed Johnson for imposing political restraints that
forced the army to fight a defensive war that was bound to end in
failure. Johnson's attempt to wage a limited war, his refusal to ask
Congress to declare war, and, above all, his decision to "commit the
Army without first committing the American people" -all led to
disaster. In trying to protect the Great Society, he neglected his major responsibility. "The failure to invoke the national will," Summers
wrote, "was one of the major strategic failures of the Vietnam war."
But he claimed that the fault was not Johnson's alone. The refusal
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insist on taking the strategic offensive
in Vietnam, even to the point of threatening to resign and to challenge
the president in a public debate, was equally unfortunate.38
Other Vietnam revisionist writers were more solicitous of Johnson
in making the same basic point. Herbert Y . Schandler, a retired colonel whose earlier book had offered a dispassionate analysis of
Johnson's 1968 decision not to seek reelection, added to the revisionist
analysis in a contribution to a symposium on the Vietnam War in
1984. Drawing on the work of both Summers and Berman, Schandler
analyzed the impact of "the Johnsonian compromise" on the conduct
of the war. Schandler depicts Johnson as being caught between the
hawks in the military, who wanted to wage unlimited war, and the
doves in the peace movement at home, who were calling for American
withdrawal; this resulted in a gradual military escalation that led, not
to victory, but to a prolonged stalemate. Far from being a villain,
Johnson became the victim of his own policies of moderation, "a
careful President who weighed the alternatives as he saw them,
limited each response, and took into account the opinion of the
public." 39
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Neoconservative Norman Podhoretz defended Johnson's decision
to fight to contain communism in Southeast Asia, but he regretted
the fact that LBJ "was trying to save Vietnam on the political cheap."
Johnson's refusal to jeopardize the Great Society by asking for a tax
increase hurt, but even more damaging was his failure to use his
powers of persuasion on the American people. "To be fought successfully," Podhoretz wrote, "the war had to have a convincing moral
justification, and the failure to provide one doomed the entire
enterprise." 40
A specialist in communications theory, who was not associated
with the Vietnam revisionists, provided the most acute analysis of
LBJ's dilemma in waging a limited war. In Lyndon Johnson's Dual War:
Vietnam and the Press, Kathleen J. Turner used the extensive files
in the LBJ Library to trace the president's concern with the way in
which the media treated the war. At first, LBJ hoped the press would
ignore the war and concentrate on the Great Society; after the escalation began in 1965, however, he was caught in what she describes as
a "double bind-an inability to convince a large portion of the population that America was doing enough for Vietnam coupled with an
inability to convince another large element that America was not doing too much." Trying to hew to a middle path in Vietnam, she argues,
"Johnson's statements were neither sufficiently aggressive nor sufficiently conciliatory." 41
The result was the emergence of the "credibility gap." Reporters
thought that Johnson was deliberately holding back on the extent of
the American involvement in Vietnam, when in reality he was trying to restrain public opinion in order to avoid a call for an all-out
effort there. Thus he downplayed his July, 1965, decision to send an
additional fifty thousand troops to Vietnam, vetoing an evening
televised speech to the nation and instead announcing it at the opening of an afternoon press conference. "I think we can get our people
to support us without having to be too provocative and warlike," he
told his aides. As Turner points out, this policy led only to confusion
and dissent. "The United States was engaged in military conflict, but
hadn't declared war; . . . there was a wartime economy, but little
austerity or sacrifice was required," she observes. "It simply didn't
make sense to a growing proportion of the population." 42
The most recent book on Johnson's Vietnam policy, Intervention,
by George Kahin, a political scientist who specializes in Southeast
Asian affairs, is surprisingly sympathetic to LBJ. Although Kahin is
highly critical of the decision to escalate in 1965, he blames Johnson's
predecessors in the White House, especially Dwight D. Eisenhower
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and John F. Kennedy, for making commitments that LBJ felt forced
to honor. In addition, Kahin accuses the advisers Johnson inherited,
notably McGeorge Bundy, Maxwell D. Taylor, and Robert S.
McNamara, for failing to give him alternatives other than escalation
or withdrawal, usually labeled as "bugging out." Kahin even accuses
these men of deliberate deception, such as holding back the true facts
on the Gulf of Tonkin incident and not giving the president George
Ball's initial proposal for a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam. Kahin
suggests that the advisers may well have confused what was best for
the United States with what was best for their own careers. "It was
usually not too difficult for these men to equate the U.S. national interest with their own reputations." 43
Instead of the bloodthirsty hawk of legend, Johnson emerges from
Kahin's book as a prudent, even cautious, leader who has grave doubts
about escalation. Told that it is necessary to bomb North Vietnam
to save a tottering government in the South, LBJ objects, informing
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he "did not wish to enter
the patient in a 10-round bout, when he was in no shape to hold out
for one round." And in the July, 1965, debate over troop commitment,
it was the president, not his advisers, who kept raising the critical
questions, asking at one point, "Are we starting something that in
two or three years we simply can't finish?" 44 Thus Kahin portrays
Johnson as the last dove in his own administration, the man who
raised the right questions but received the wrong answers.
V

The portrait of Lyndon Johnson that is emerging from the recent
literature is a very confused one. Unsympathetic biographers portray
LBJ as an ambitious and amoral politician who either ignored or
betrayed ideological concerns in advancing his career. Yet those who
focus on the Great Society see in Johnson a genuine attempt to carry
out the liberal program of his party and of such predecessors as Kennedy and Roosevelt. The failure that they document comes much more
from flaws in the ideas than from defects in Johnson's character.
The new interpretation of Johnson's mistakes in Vietnam is even
a greater departure from the conventional wisdom. Rather than being seen as a bloodthirsty and unrepentant war hawk, Johnson comes
across as a reluctant warrior, a president who tried to find a middle
path between all-out war and surrender in an area that he believed
was vital for American security. Yet his efforts at modera.ti.::m proved
disastrous both for himself and for the nation. As Larry Berman com-
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ments, "Lyndon Johnson's greatest fault as a political leader was that

he chose not to choose between the Great Society and the war in
Vietnam." 45
Even though Johnson's stature as a human being and as a
statesman has not risen with the new scholarship, his failure takes
on a more tragic dimension. The harder he tried to carry out what
he perceived to be his mission in the White House-reform legislation to improve the quality of life at home and an active foreign policy
to protect the national security abroad-the more he met with scorn
and rejection. LBJ must have sensed the underlying irony of the dilemma in which he found himself, saying to a journalist in 1967, "If
history indicts us for Vietnam, I think it will be for fighting a war
without trying to stir up patriotism." 46 Had Johnson abandoned the
Great Society and had he embraced the war in Vietnam as a great national crusade, much as Wilson and Roosevelt had done with domestic
reform during the two world wars, then he might have saved his
presidency, and perhaps even his historical reputation. But driven on
by his enormous ego, he tried to triumph both at home and abroad,
and he lost out in both endeavors, thereby jeopardizing his place in
history.
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Part 1 I The Impact of Vietnam

2 I Lyndon Johnson and
the Antiwar Opposition
Charles DeBenedetti
FOR AMERICANS, the Vietnam War was most extraordinary in that
it was not so much a fight against enemies abroad as it was an internal struggle over their own national identity. Vietnam in American
history meant-and still means-a struggle among Americans over
the nature of their interests, their values, and the very meaning of
their country and their purpose. If ethnocentric, this understanding
of the war is consistent with the fact that the Vietnam question in
the United States turned recurrently around three realities: first, Vietnam existed as a vital American national interest because-and as
long as-Washington policy makers said that it was; second, the nature
and the cost of the U.S. commitment in Vietnam were always arguable
issues in the United States after 1963; and, third, the domestic debate
over Vietnam embraced more a cluster of historical, geopolitical, and
moral symbols than any question of America's literal survival.
Americans argued about Vietnam in historical terms drawn from the
meaning of Munich and Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, and the
Nuremberg war-crimes trials. They argued in geopolitical terms about
the meaning of dominoes, enclaves, and wars of national liberation.
And most of all, they argued in moral terms over the significance of
Vietnam to perceptions of American perseverance and reliability and
to substantive matters of correct policy formation, the proportion between ends and means, and the proper bounds of individual conscience, democratic debate, and official accountability. For ten years,
Americans waged over Vietnam a war by metaphor for the sake of symbols of meaning to themselves. They saw Vietnam as a "proving
ground," a "showcase," an "experiment," and, most especially, a "test"
of what the American people could and should do. They believed that
the real stakes in the war centered upon the question, as Dean Rusk
once put it, of "what kind of people we are." 1
From beginning to end, Lyndon Johnson tried to steer the United
States down what he conceived to be a middle course of involvement
in Vietnam. Claiming an inherited national commitment, the president sought to maintain an anti-Communist regime in Saigon at the
same time as he shunted aside demands either to carry the war beyond
Vietnam or to undertake military de-escalation and early peace
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negotiations. Inevitably, Johnson's course produced domestic discontent. On the Right, a powerful constellation of critics urged the president to unleash the U.S. military to conduct more massive bombing
campaigns throughout Indochina, a blockade of North Vietnam, an
invasion of the North, and, if necessary, war against China and Russia.
On the Left, a less powerful but surprisingly vocal combination of
critics called for decreased U.S. military involvement and a greater
effort toward a negotiated peace, if not immediate U.S. withdrawal,
on the grounds that the American intervention was morally unjustifiable, corrupting of American democracy, and grossly disproportionate in cost to the peoples of Indochina and to America's broader
security interests. This was the antiwar opposition. Too diverse and
fractious to sustain an ongoing movement, antiwar critics improvised
an opposition that involved an unusually broad range of disaffected
citizens on two levels of action. They made up a political force that
questioned the workability and morality of U.S. policy; and they
galvanized a cultural rebellion that joined dissatisfied blacks, women,
students, and undifferentiated others in attacking the assumptions
and priorities of Cold War life in the United States. The purpose of
this paper is to review the origin, dimensions, and workings of this
opposition and then to consider how Lyndon Johnson and his administration tried to come to terms with it during the course of the
president's struggle to vindicate the value of the U.S. intervention and
to emphasize the unbreakability of his determination to prevail in
Vietnam.
I

The antiwar oppos1t10n was a multilayered, many-sided
phenomenon that originated in dissent against Washington's deepening involvement in Vietnam from 1962 to 1964, crystallized in protest against the initiation of the U.S. air war against North Vietnam
in 1965, and proliferated with the escalation over the next four years
of U.S. involvement in ground combat. Politically informed and highly
articulate, this opposition began first among tiny bases of policy dissent seeded throughout American public life. One base existed among
such dissident members of the nation's policy-shaping elite as journalist Walter Lippmann and Senate Foreign Relations Committee
chairman J. William Fulbright. European 'i n their orientation and conservative in temperament, these elite critics believed that the U.S.
involvement in Vietnam was marginal to our true security interests,
subversive of improved Soviet-American relations, and needlessly pro-
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vocative to China. They favored multilateral negotiations toward the
neutralization of all Indochina, a more modest enunciation of claimed
U.S. commitments in Asia, and a strengthened American naval presence in the Western Pacific. Fundamentally, they saw Vietnam as irrelevant to America; and they tried to change U.S. policy by winning
the president to their ways by means of their words and influence.
A second base of antiwar opposition gathered across a broad range
of internationalists, liberals, and pacifists who were ordinarily identified as Adlai E. Stevenson Democrats, eastern establishment Republicans, or Democratic Socialists in the style of Norman M. Thomas.
Some, such as the Catholic Worker's Dorothy Day, were religious
pacifists who were committed in conscience to the ways of active nonviolence. Others, such as the editor Norman Cousins, were wellknown advocates of a strengthened United Nations. Many, such as
the pediatrician Benjamin M. Spock and the housewife Dagmar Wilson, were concerned citizens who had first participated through such
new-fashioned organizations as SANE (National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy) and Women Strike for Peace in more recent publicpolicy debates over a treaty to ban atmospheric nuclear tests and over
the possibilities of a Soviet-American detente.2 Terrified by the Cuban
missile crisis and then encouraged by the 1963 Partial Test-ban Treaty, this collection of peace liberals had rallied to support Lyndon
Johnson against the anti-Communist crusade of Barry M. Goldwater
in 1964 and had looked, with Johnson's victory, toward a real improvement in cold-war tensions. Instead they got Vietnam. Outraged by the
initiation of Johnson's war against North Vietnam, this melange of
housewives, businessmen, intellectuals, clergy, and students condemned the U.S. military escalation for having diverted the country
from America's preeminent interest in eased cold-war tensions and
in progress toward real disarmament. Peace liberals generally accepted
the president's claim that the United States had both a national commitment and a moral right to intervene in Vietnamese affairs. But
they wanted the president to subordinate American military power
to social and political attempts that would effect a reformed pluralist
South Vietnam that could successfully negotiate its own peace with
the Communists. Fundamentally, they saw Vietnam as a distraction
from America's larger interests in detente and disarmament; they tried
to change U.S. policy by lobbying, letter writing, and demonstrating
until Washington would see the rightness of their way.
A third base of antiwar opposition collected about a tiny but influential band of war resisters who looked to A. J. Muste and groups
such as the War Resisters for direction in their personal commitment
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to overturn the war system and to promote social justice. Steeped in
an individualistic ethic of nonviolent civil disobedience, war resisters
such as the Catholic priests Philip and Daniel Berrigan saw no essential moral difference between the American and the Soviet power
states; they assailed great-power interventionism in the Third World
for containing the necessary advance there of revolutionary social
change. Convinced that the United States had no moral right to intervene in Vietnamese life, they ignored demands for negotiations and
called instead for an immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam.
Fundamentally, they saw Vietnam as a crime and a sin; and they
tried-as political moralists who believed that means determined the
ends-to change U.S. policy by inspiring a revolution in national values
through nonviolent acts of resistance and through disruption that
would tum people away from war and toward the pursuit of justice.3
A fourth base of antiwar opposition centered about a radical Left
that gained force at the beginning of the 1960s with the spreading
southern civil-rights movement, increased student dissidence, and
deepening impatience with the cost at home and abroad of continuing the cold war. In large measure, this renascent Left operated
organizationally through Old Left sectarian Marxist groupings such
as the pro-Soviet Communist party, the pro-Peking Progressive Labor
party, the Trotskyist Socialist Workers party, and their various youth
affiliates. In practice, however, the rising Left was identified with more
eclectic action-oriented inventions of the New Left, such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Students for a Democratic Society, which combined a propensity for nonviolent direct
action with a commitment to free the American people from racism
and corporate bureaucratization for the sake of genuine participatory
democracy. Advocates of radical domestic change who supported
revolutionary Third-World socialist regimes such as Castro's Cuba,
these leftists naturally attacked the U.S. involvement in Vietnam as
an evasion of the need for domestic change and as a typical capitalistic
attack upon impoverished colored peoples in rebellion. Fundamentally, they saw Vietnam as a mirror of American life; and they tried
to change U.S. policy by fomenting, through local organizing, mass
demonstrations, and the politics of provocation, a social revolution
that would overturn the prevailing order of power and privilege in
American life and, with it, the whole of the country's policy-making
structure. 4
Finally, beyond the active bases of antiwar discontent, there existed in the United States a sizable reservoir of unorganized but
popular antiwar sentiment. Throughout the war years, public-opinion
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pollsters reported consistently high levels of support for peace negotiations, the one demand that was supported by the broadest range of
antiwar critics. In addition, a number of other factors-including the
general expectation that the war only would end in a compromise settlement anyway, contempt for America's South Vietnamese allies, and
confusion over the very purposes of the war-aggravated the popular
dislike for the war in ways that provided a large working space for
vigorous expressions of antiwar opposition. Yet the general tolerance
for dissent that was bred by popular distaste for the war never suggested popular approval of antiwar activism. On the contrary, poll data
repeatedly indicated that if anything was more unpopular than the
war, it was antiwar protesters. 5 Identified in the popular mind with
discontented blacks and rowdy students, antiwar protesters were
viewed as troublemaking deviants who took to the streets either
because they were Communist dupes or because they simply wanted
to let off steam. At worst, antiwar activists succeeded in provoking
otherwise passive Americans into rallying in support of the president.
At best, their efforts appeared irrelevant to the job of re-forming
popular attitudes toward the war. 6
In the light of widespread popular contempt for antiwar protesters,
it seems reasonable to wonder why the opposition was never overwhelmed in a wave of popular antagonism. Certainly Lyndon Johnson
wondered. Partly, it appears, the very social diffuseness of the opposition allowed it to survive the broad and abiding popular resentment
that it encountered. Despite the popular stereotypes of protesting hippie youths, public-opinion analysts determined that the most
remarkable feature of antiwar disaffection was the way in which it
spread so evenly throughout the American political and social order,
with noticeable strength only among women and blacks. 7 This
democratic character of the dissent gave it a fluidity that frustrated
antiwar activists in their attempts to organize a coherent mass opposition. Yet it also frustrated prowar nationalists in their attempts
to single out and crush an identifiable opposition.
In a connected way, the irrepressibility of antiwar activism arose
from the fact that it seethed with a greater popular rebellion against
prevailing social codes and orthodoxies that caught up diverse people
in protracted struggles over questions of rights and power in matters
of race, sex, age, and class. From the local to the national level,
Americans during the 1960s argued bitterly over such issues as welfare
rights, dormitory regulations, equal employment opportunities, and
beauty pageants. Inevitably, antiwar activists became identified in the
popular mind with other demonstrating deviants in a development
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that both strengthened and contained the force of their dissent.
"Beards are beards. Marches are marches," wrote one reporter; and
both beards and marches were detested by most of the population.8
Yet the very popular identification and detestation of deviant antiwar
activists allowed them to swim with other social dissidents in a larger
sea of "pluralistic intolerance." 9 Because popular antagonism toward
all deviants was sharp but diffuse, antiwar dissidents managed to avoid
any devastating concentrated attack until significant chunks of elitist
sentiment had turned against the war and had thus granted them fuller
legitimacy and even protection.
In practice, members of the antiwar opposition manifested their
differences with the administration's policies through tactics that
ranged from individual letter writing to nationally coordinated mass
protests. At first their efforts were mostly educational or attentiongrabbing attempts to demonstrate the existence of other ways of resolving the American predicament in Indochina. In 1965, critics wrote
protest letters, gathered at teach-ins, or joined in a few mass marches
that were sponsored by young radicals in the Students for a Democratic
Society or by older liberals in SANE. Some critics tried to communicate their horror with U.S. war policy more graphically. At least
three pacifists immolated themselves in 1965 to demonstrate symbolic unity with Vietnamese Buddhist protest suicides. A number of
American intellectuals, inspired by a similar action taken by French
intellectuals during the Algerian War, circulated a public letter denouncing the U.S. war effort and pledging to withhold their support
from that effort. Housewives and students in the San Francisco Bay
area tried, by means of nonviolent direct action, to block the movement of troop trains to the Oakland Army Terminal. Bands of radical
pacifists and war resisters organized well-publicized rituals to burn
draft cards.
Early in 1966 the opposition's educational impetus received a
powerful boost when Senator Fulbright led the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a nationally televised inquiry into U.S. policy in
Asia that broadcast the antiescalation sentiments of elitist policy
critics such as George F. Kennan and retired army General James M.
Gavin. The Fulbright hearings made dissent all the more legitimate
and the public questioning of U.S. war policy all the more acceptable.
Shortly afterwards, a New York-based coalition of antiwar activists
collected in the Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in
Vietnam, which poured fifty thousand people into a one-day street
protest against administration policy and established a pattern of seasonal antiwar rallies in different cities from New York to the Bay area.
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Meanwhile, on different college campuses, local antiwar dissidents
worked to convert visceral antidraft resentment into antiwar activism;
and young white radicals, who were being shoved out of the civil-rights
movement by the exclusionary drive of black-power nationalism,
pressed forward in their attempts to adapt the spirit of the country's
spreading ghetto uprisings to American universities and to antiwar
dissent. Overwhelmingly, however, antiwar opponents persisted during 1966 in the ordinary work of education, witness, and conversion.
They collected protest petitions, conducted public vigils in open expression of their concerns, and tried to encourage congressional antiwar critics, mostly in the liberal wing of the Democratic party.
Early in 1967, radicals within the antiwar opposition talked of
moving "from protest to resistance," while liberals worked to preserve
the opposition's tactical nonviolence and to prepare for the 1968
presidential election. Cheered by the rise of a white hippie counterculture, which gathered in defiance of all authority, and convinced
that ghetto uprisings were producing a revolutionary black guerrilla
movement in the United States, radical leftists such as David Dellinger and Jerry Rubin tried to rally individual resistance to the war
in disruptive antidraft actions, campus sit-ins against corporate and
military recruiters, and, in October, a climactic March on the Pentagon to Confront the Warmakers. Partly theatrics and partly a cri de
coeur, the confrontation at the Pentagon between some thirty-five
thousand protesters and some three thousand U.S. troops and marshals featured many speeches, more confusion, and some sporadic
clashes between radical adventurers and baton-wielding officials. The
Pentagon was saved. But the mood of the country became more sour,
and fear of greater social convulsions became more palpable.
Distressed over intensifying domestic tensions, peace liberals
struggled in their attempts to organize a political challenge to the
president until early December, when Minnesota's Senator Eugene
McCarthy announced his intention to contest Johnson and his war
policies in the Democratic presidential primaries. Aside from some
speculation as to its relationship to Robert Kennedy's intentions,
McCarthy's candidacy made little impression upon top party planners and pundits who were involved in serious thinking about the 1968
campaign. But it lent a new dimension-and a sharper polarity-to
the country's organized antiwar opposition. While peace liberals
rushed to the senator's support, radical activists denounced McCarthy's candidacy as a trap and a diversion from the prior need for disruptive direct action in the streets. It was time, they said, for politics of
deeds, not words. Angry and divided, antiwar dissidents thus raced
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into the winter of 1968 with a sense of fresh hope that was swathed
in fear and desperation. After thirty months of struggle, they had won
neither concentrated popular sentiment nor significant partisan support to their side. But they had survived; and they did stand ready
to make and exploit new opportunities of the kind that came rushing
across the country with unexpected ferodty in 1968.10

n
Lyndon Johnson and other members of his administration contended with the antiwar opposition in light of their conception of the
opposition, which derived, in turn, from their conception of the war.
For all practical purposes, these conceptions were defined by the president, who approached the matter of war and peace in accordance with
a number of axioms drawn from his Texas upbringing and from a
generation of experience in national politics. First among these axioms was Johnson's faith in the American national mission to secure
world peace through military strength and demonstrated toughness.
An intense nationalist whose pride in his country bordered on
nativism, Johnson not only believed that the United States possessed
a redemptive mission in the world but also that individual Americans
drew the literal possibility for eternal life from the blessing of their
nationality. The" 'only thing'" that an ordinary person has, he once
told Bill Moyers, "'that gives him immortality other than his beliefhe may be an atheist-is his citizenship.'" When" 'you say I am an
American, you're saying I'm as immortal as this Republic.' " 11
Most commonly, Johnson's vision of peace through American national success expressed itself in his reverence for America's armed
forces and in his more personal commitment to stand tough. A martial Texan who took such pride in his own military service that he
always wore the emblem of his World War II Silver Star on his suit
lapel, the president believed that American military forces represented
the real instrument of peace in his time.12 He was an ardent proponent of the need for peace through superior armed strength; and in
a,reciprocal way, he had a deep fear of showing any sign of irresolution or weakness. "If there was anything that Johnson feared during
his White House residence," wrote reporter Hugh Sidey, "it was that
the historians might say he was not a brave leader." He worried incessantly that if he did not lead his country to victory in Vietnam,
he would be revealed as " 'a coward. An unmanly man. A man without
a spine.'" If Johnson was sure of anything, it was that he was not" 'go-
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ing to go down in history as the first American President who lost
a war.' " He would never be "an appeaser President." 13
In Johnson's mind, American national pride, as manifested in
military strength and personal toughness, was the historically proven
prerequisite for international peace. As a New Deal loyalist during
the 1930s, the president believed th:1t Washington's prewar attempts
at the diplomatic appeasement of nazism had only encouraged the
totalitarian aggressors, postponed the coming of World War II, and
made it more costly because of the delay. He was not about to let the
history of the thirties begin again in Vietnam. "The central lesson
of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied," he
once declared; "to withdraw from one battlefield means only to
prepare for the next." 14 Determined to stand tough on one battlefield,
Johnson insisted that the United States must fight on in Vietnam,
not only to repel totalitarian aggression but also to preclude any sign
of weakness that might mistakenly tempt the aggressors into further
adventures, rouse a wrathful America, and set off World War ill.
A second axiom that was basic to the president's thinking on
questions of war and peace involved his fear of right-wing power in
American politics and his own limited faith in popular democracy.
As a Texas Democrat who had observed first-hand the sweep of McCarthyism, the crazed partisan quarrel over who had "lost" China, and
the subsequent rise of the Sun Belt Right of Barry Goldwater, Johnson
properly appreciated the power of right-wing forces in national politics,
particularly in Congress and the Republican party. He had, conversely, little respect for the political effectiveness of the American Left.
In fact, Johnson insisted throughout his presidency that any American
failure in Vietnam would unleash a right-wing backlash that would
destroy the Left and thereby any standing hopes for domestic reform
in the United States. In part, his repeated warnings of the danger of
right-wing frustration was a tactic designed to undercut left-wing antiwar sentiment. In part, too, however, Johnson believed it. He believed
that American democracy was vulnerable to destructive divisions that
were being worked by political extremists; and he believed that
rightists overwhelmingly possessed the necessary means to do the job.
In a related way, Johnson loved democracy with an intensity that
was offset only by distrust in its good sense. The president felt real
compassion for social underdogs and weaker people, whether at home
or abroad; nevertheless, he felt an equally powerful skepticism toward
the practical implications of popular rule. Remembering his early hero,
Louisiana's Democratic Senator Huey P. Long, Johnson craved the
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chance to do good for the sake of the little people. But with Huey
still in mind, Johnson feared that uncontrolled democratic rule would
produce the kind of demagoguery that would foment mob irrationality
and the worst threats to orderly constitutional democracy. Johnson
preferred to let America's sleeping democracy lie. He did not, however,
want it to lie too soundly. Convinced that the American people were
vacillating between ethnocentric passivity and exploitable aggressiveness, the president feared that if left to its own instincts,
American democracy would revert to the kind of dangerous isolationism that had misled the dictators and had brought on World War
II. At the same time he worried that if excited too much, the
democracy would become inflamed by right-wing nationalists in a
neo-McCarthyite crusade that would wreck the Democratic party and
the American system itself. He therefore intended, once more, to steer
the middle course. He intended to fight a war for peace in Vietnam
that would rouse the American people from their instinct for isolationism at the same time that he was containing any demagogic rightwing attempt to rally popular blood lust against domestic enemies.
There were only three requirements for success in such an effort: the
war would have to be short, victorious, and undisturbed by complaints
from left-wing critics.15
Johnson's fear of the Right and his distrust of democracy combined with his established success as a legislative operator to fashion
the third axiom that governed his attitude toward the antiwar opposition: the belief that what happened in public life was the result of
hidden scheming, elitist manipulation, or malevolent conspirators.
As a man who had grown up in a political family and who had spent
most of his life in legislative wrangling, Johnson had little reason to
believe that political issues sprang fully clothed from the breast of
the people. Shrewd and suspicious, he rather assumed that politics
was the realm of shakers and movers, who operated through fronts,
agents, and dupes. Temperamentally disinclined to consider the
possibility of historical accident or ambiguity, Johnson could not
believe that political events and developments took place without an
identifiable (if well hidden) cause. Instead, he was prone toward
suspecting that conspiratorial forces commonly worked their effects
in everyday life; and his own working habits reinforced this mind set.
As a Senate leader who understood that knowledge was power, Johnson
had a notorious appetite for information relating to politicians' private
lives, which he used to good advantage; and he carried this habit into
the White House for the same purposes. Hubert Humphrey once
observed that Johnson was "'a walking FBI,'" with a preference for
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more salacious and salable gossip.16 Politics, for this president, was
a highly personal, ill-regulated arena of bartering and bashing that
blended naked self-interest with loyalty to the larger system. It was
no place-unless inspired by craven elitist factions or Communist
manipulation and direction-for the serious questioning of life-anddeath matters such as the war in Vietnam.
Johnson never developed any coherent understanding of the antiwar opposition. His attitudes and approaches toward critics of the administration were rather fragmented, inconsistent, and sometimes
hallucinatory; and they varied in their expression according to precisely who was issuing the criticisms and, therefore, who, according
to Johnson, was really behind the attack. Within his official family
the president brooked no serious opposition to policies. Johnson accepted dissenting views among his advisers during the months prior
to the Americanization of the war in summer 1965. But once U.S.
air power and ground troops had been committed, he steam-rolled any
internal expressions of doubt or disaffection. Undersecretary of State
George Ball, a policy adviser who had distinguished himself during
administration policy debates by his opposition to the Americanization of the war, tried quietly to advance his "heretical views within
a limited circle" at the White House.17 But publicly he avowed his
loyalty to the president's ways by attacking antiwar critics and by insisting that "'the one thing we have to do is to win this damned
war.' 111s
While Johnson demanded loyalty within his administration, he
felt and acted toward other expressions of opposition in a surprisingly
wide variety of ways. Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield sent
stacks of memoranda that were critical of administration policy to
the White House; but his criticisms were customarily cast aside
because he was personally withdrawn and politically inoffensive.
Oregon's Democratic Senator Wayne Morse freely excoriated the president for his Vietnam policies. Yet Johnson treated Morse as a highminded maverick and worked comfortably with him on other matters of mutual interest. Senator Fulbright, however, presented a special
case. A former Rhodes scholar who had meshed his cosmopolitan interests with the crude provincialism of Arkansas politics, Fulbright
figured in Johnson's eyes as the lead running dog on Capitol Hill for
the dissident eastern establishment elite, which was centered around
Walter Lippmann, the New York Times, and the Georgetown crowd
of diplomatic professionals. According to Johnson, these eastern uppercrust dissenters were chronic complainers who looked up to Europe
in awe and down on Asia with racist contempt. Fixing his anger upon
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Fulbright, the president dismissed him as Senator Halfbright, the
"stud duck of the opposition," and a "frustrated old woman" who
gossiped with the elite while voting in the Senate for the "sweatshop
and racism." 19 Johnson professed to expect nothing better from the
country's foreign-policy establishment. Justly or not, the president
believed that because of its prejudices against his southern birth and
his mediocre schooling, the northeastern elite would never approve
of him, his presidency, or his policies. They opposed him in Vietnam
because they wanted him to lose.
Sometimes Johnson's resentment toward dissenters in the northeastern elite would spread into wholesale attacks upon the communications media. More commonly, however, the president's suspicions of antiwar media critics were limited to certain columnists, such
as Joseph Kraft or Mary McCrory, who were identified as being sympathetic to Johnson's real bete noire and most feared antiwar critic,
Robert F. Kennedy. Sniped at after 1966 by Kennedy loyalists such as
Richard Goodwin and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and·always anxious
over latent pro-Kennedy sentiment within the Democratic party, the
president showed acute apprehension after 1966 with the softly critical
views of New York's junior senator (or, as he was commonly called
around the White House, "'The Little Shit' "); 20 and he deeply feared
that Kennedy's emergence as an antiwar candidate would fracture the
party and interfere with the administration's prosecution of a successful war effort.
Johnson expected criticism from members of the country's policyshaping elite and from ambitious figures such as Robert Kennedy. The
president did not expect, however, an irrepressible rash of antiwar
street protests, and he was temperamentally unprepared to cope with
the anger and frustrations that boiled through various public
demonstrations, especially among radical college students. He
resented antiwar street demonstrations mounted by older Americans,
who should have known as well as he the history lessons of the 1930s.
But he was amazingly tolerant of youthful protesters, partly because
he attributed their opposition to ignorance born of generational differences and partly because of simple bafflement with their behavior.
" 'The young people that my daughters bring around are not like
that,' he told one friend. "'I just can't believe it.' " 21 On one occasion the president asked national-security adviser Walt Rostow how
one generation could simultaneously yield brave fighting marines and
hippie protesters; and Rostow, characteristically enough, came up with
a comforting answer: "If many of the dissidents actually were in Vietnam and faced the reality of the problem, they would change.'' 22
11
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Mostly, however, Johnson accepted youth protest as an inexplicable
fact of his presidential life. When the subject came up at the family
dinner table, his brother remembered, "Lyndon would wearily nod
his head and look away with a baffled expression in his eyes." 23
Johnson's tolerance of youth protest was all the more remarkable
in view of his fundamental hatred of open and serious dissent over
policy. The president abhorred the public airing of disagreements over
major policies. According to Senator Frank Church, Johnson's primary
objection to the 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings
on Vietnam was that they were being conducted under media klieg
lights that generated wide public attention. He could not "understand
why Americans who dissent can't do their dissenting in private,"
where they could be brushed off with kind words and claims to having superior intelligence information. 24 "If all these people," the president once said in reference to congressional and clerical dissidents,
"wanted to help their President they would come in here and say to
me privately what they are saying to the press" and would not broadcast their criticisms "'through my intelligence bulletin via Peking,
or Hanoi, or Moscow.' 1125 Periodically, Johnson's fundamental loathing
and suspicion of antiwar dissent erupted into wild charges that his
critics were really active instruments of Communist subversion. In
the gentler versions of these harangues, the president declared that
his domestic enemies went on" 'jags' which pretty much originate
in the Communist world" and then "find their way to American
dissidents.1126 On other occasions, his attacks would degenerate into
fantastic conspiratorial claims that it was "'the Russians who are
behind the whole thing.' 11 Soviet agents were in " 'constant touch with
anti-war senators,' 11 he confided at one White House meeting, and
" 'think up things for the senators to say.' 11 Wasn't it funny, he said
to another listener, that the Soviet ambassador's car was always in
front of the home of New York Times columnist James Reston " 'the
night before Reston delivered a blast on Vietnam?' 112 7 Johnson always
claimed that he, the FBI, and the CIA knew what was " 'really going
on.' 11 But his claims and charges only aggravated the concern, among
attentive listeners, over his grip on reality and his capacity to deal
with the real strength of the dissent.28
In practice, Johnson's attempts to deal with the antiwar opposition changed between 1963 and 1969 from grudging tolerance to
outright attacks and then to pained acceptance. In the process, the
president's reaction to the opposition careened unpredictably between
his proud contention, on the one side, that domestic dissent was the
price of working democracy and his dark suggestions, on the other
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side, that the opposition was a Communist plot. In the beginning,
the president appeared patient and generous. During 1963 the Johnson
White House politely dismissed expressions of opposition that were
voiced by such elitist critics as Lippmann and such peace liberals as
Norman Thomas, and it ignored altogether the few scattered street
protests that were mounted by radical pacifists and leftists. In August
1964, shortly after the Tonkin Gulf raids, national-security adviser
McGeorge Bundy warned the president of "mutterings around the
edges" that the administration was not "doing as well as we should
with the very first team of businessmen, bankers, et al. " 29 Otherwise,
the administration did not expect any serious expressions of domestic
opposition that could not be managed with the right combination of
intimidation and moderation.
Early in 1965, after the inauguration of the U.S. air war against
North Vietnam, the administration continued to treat its domestic
critics more as a nuisance than as a serious factor in policy. The State
Department dispatched a "truth team" to different university campuses to offset the criticisms that had been generated by different antiwar teach-ins; and it lent covert support, in "a major agit-prop effort,"
to a prowar citizens group called the American Friends of Vietnam,
which was headed by Wesley Fishel, a former CIA station chief in
Saigon and now a professor at Michigan State University. 30 The State
Department paid deference to prominent antiwar critics such as Walter
Lippmann and Norman Cousins; and it politely met with petitioning pacifists whom White House aides privately dismissed as "very
limp young men." 31 Altogether, the administration played its response
to the domestic opposition in a very low key. Expecting quick military
success in Vietnam, the White House left the management of antiwar
critics in 1965 to local prowar enthusiasts, such as New York State's
VFW commander, Vincent DiMattina, who tried to make a citizen's
arrest of a draft-card-burning pacifist, and to Connecticut's Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd, who led the Senate Internal Security
Committee in arguing that the teach-in movement was manufactured
in Moscow. 32
The president himself stood calmly above the fray, even though
he privately champed at the bit for the chance to lash back at his
critics. In the White House, he systematically strong-armed congressional skeptics with the renowned "Johnson treatment," nagging and
cajoling them to withhold their criticisms for the sake of a united
domestic front . In meetings with the press, he declined to describe
his critics as appeasers, and he expressed doubt that domestic dissent
was injuring the U.S. war effort. Instead, he defended dissent as one
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of the values that America was fighting for in Vietnam; and he refused to comment on charges that insofar as the opposition hinted
of domestic disunity and a fatal lack of will, it falsely encouraged
Hanoi to resist and thereby prolonged the war. Privately, however, the
president complained that he could not act upon his deeper suspicion that the opposition was, at least, a source of false encouragement
to the North Vietnamese or, at most, a Communist plot. He said at
a cabinet meeting in June, 1965:
We are confronted with a dilemma, unquestionably, that is
difficult to face up to, as a result of the extremes of McCarthyism
and the extremes of Goldwaterism. The people have more or less
put the Communist menace on the back burner. You immediately
become a dangerous character or suspect if you express strong
feelings about the system and some question about the activities
of Communists as a result of these other two extremes.
I don't want us to get into that dangerous position. I love this
system, and I don't want us to either be addicts of some other
system or tools of some other system. The thing that troubles
me more about our government than nearly anything else is that
they will see a line from Peking, Hanoi and Moscow about a
month ahead of the time I see it there. I see it being openly
espoused by so-called devotees of our system. It is almost taken
in text. 33
Yet, for all his doubts about the sources of the opposition, the
president declined at first to attack his critics more frontally, and with
good reason. For one thing, he did not want to incite the Right and
to jeopardize domestic gains in civil rights in building the Great Society. For another, he wanted to "be careful not to get the country on
an anti-communist binge because it would tear up what we had gained" with the Soviets in arms-control negotiations and in prospects
for detente. 34 It was "hard to wage a major war against one communist
group without having the public oppose all communists." As it was,
the president thought it was "amazing" that the American people were
so willing to fight Communists in Vietnam without clamoring for
war against Communists everywhere. 35 Finally, Johnson did not want
to lead a popular crusade against an antiwar opposition that was
already the object of general scorn and contempt, for fear of inflaming domestic politics beyond his own management and control.
Johnson aimed to fight and win at home and abroad on his own terms.
Like his personalized handling of the war, in which he refused to allow
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the Joint Chiefs of Staff full rein or even to establish a central directorate for strategic planning and operations, the president refused to
attack his domestic critics with the kind of unrestrained force that
might escape from his direction. He intended to lose control neither
of the American position in Southeast Asia nor of American politics
at home.
The American people in the meantime rallied impressively to
support the war effort. Yet neither their numbers nor their enthusiasm
slowed the growth of the war or the spread of antiwar opposition. Instead, the many illogical claims and unanswered questions that the
White House raised during the 1965 U.S. intervention in the
Dominican Republic and that it accentuated during the winter 1966
bombing pause over North Vietnam helped to broaden the "credibility gap" that dogged the president in his attempts to quiet dissent
and to fashion a united domestic front behind his policies. Persisting
attacks from elitist figures such as Fulbright, demonstrated antidraft
resentment on different campuses, and popular apprehensions over
a great war with China only aggravated suspicions about the wisdom
of Johnson's war and prompted the president into making more aggressive attacks on antiwar critics. In March, 1966, the president lambasted his critics as "Nervous Nellies" who were turning "on their
leaders, and on their country, and on our own fighting men." 36 He
lent support to the popular suspicion that dissenters were actually
prolonging and working to help the failing Communists to "victory
on a silver platter in Southeast Asia." 37 Then he abruptly pulled back
from the attack, urging only that his critics "do their dissenting in
private" and declaiming: "I am not angry; I am not even sorrowful.
I sometimes think of the words, 'God forgive them, for they know
not what they do.' as
Johnson's zigzag approach toward the antiwar opposition during
1966 reflected differences within the administration over how to deal
with White House critics. Some stf1{f aides, such as Jack Valenti,
wanted more aggressive attacks upon the diverse "doves, the [Yale
University historian Staughton] Lynd-liners and the [New York]
Times," whose criticisms were "all of a piece." "Slowly," he warned
the president, "but like lava pouring over a volcano, the flow is
resistless-first, one concession then another, and then another, and
as we adjust to each new position, the Lynd-liners go onto the next
retreat point" until Fulbright and his allies picked up "the new line"
and cut deeper into the American position. 39 Other aides, however,
feared that the opposition only indicated a problem that was far
broader and more dangerous: namely, antiwar disaffection among "the
11
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relatively well-informed internationalist middle class," who had been
the "strongest supporters" of every major U.S. foreign-policy initiative
since 1940 and who were not convinced of the wisdom of Vietnam.4 0
Indiscriminate attacks upon antiwar critics only aggravated the suspicion and uneasiness that was being felt among all those "'suburban
families with college-age kids' 11 who were " 'getting to be troubled
about the war' 11 and who certainly did not like being called traitors.4 1
In the eyes of public-opinion pollsters, 1967 was "the year of the
hawk." Popular support for a larger U.S. military effort rose so sharply
that at one point during the spring, one out of four Americans favored a nuclear attack upon North Vietnam if that were what would
be necessary for victory.42 Popular resentment toward militant expressions of antiwar protest increased proportionately. Yet neither growing popular support for the war nor hostility toward its opponents
cleared the way for Washington's success in Vietnam. On the contrary, for the Johnson administration, 1967 was the year of greatest
challenge, with rampant domestic disorders, especially in the country's black ghettoes, rising to new levels of destructiveness at the same
time as some of the president's key policy advisers were coming to
the conclusion that the United States might be tied down for another
five to ten years of war in Vietnam. With domestic turmoil spreading
and with the war mounting in cost with no end in sight, the Johnson
administration decided to persist in its prevailing war strategy in Indochina at the same time as it was opening a broader attack upon its
domestic critics while trying to contain any right-wing onslaught that
would only aggravate the country's racial and political crises and complicate Washington's plans for protracted war. It was a high-risk
strategy; but it was the only one that Johnson saw available to him
if he were to win at home and abroad.
During the first half of the year the president continued his zigzag
approach to the opposition, righteously affirming the importance of
"responsible" democratic dissent at the same time as he was blasting
his critics for encouraging the Communists and for undercutting the
Gis in Vietnam. Even as he zigzagged, however, Johnson shifted his
approach in a more repressive direction. In April, shortly after Martin Luther King had declared both his final break with Johnson and
his plans to connect the civil-rights movement and the antiwar opposition, a White House aide declared that King "has thrown in with
the commies" and insisted that "the Communist origins of this operation must be exposed, the leaders discredited and the flag-burners and
draft-card burners jailed." 43 Shortly after receiving a presidential summons to Washington, General William C. Westmoreland declared at
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a press conference that the enemy was on the verge of defeat in the
field and that it took hope of ultimate success only because of the
carping of antiwar critics. White House aide Robert Kintner received
Johnson's encouragement in asking Attorney General W. Ramsey
Clark to prepare a report "that would show that there was common
planning throughout the United States of public demonstrations, riots
in colleges," and related disorders, a report that might be shared with
friendly media allies such as the Washington Post's Benjamin C.
Bradlee. 44
During the second half of 1967 the administration launched its
most serious attempt to subvert its domestic opposition and to rally
popular sentiment behind its policies. The White House offensive advanced along several salients on two fronts. On the positive side, administration officials put together an interagency White House Vietnam Information Group, for the purpose of developing more favorable
news coverage of the war. With the help of former Illinois Senator Paul
H . Douglas, they also invented the prestigious Committee for Peace
with Freedom in Vietnam, which boasted former presidents Dwight
D. Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman as cochairmen and which purported to speak for the" 'silent center' " of prowar American opinion.45
General Westmoreland returned once more under White House orders
to tour the country, with hints that a victorious end to the war was
within sight. And the president pressed his supporters to the attack
on their critics. Gripped in the "sheer battering of emotions" in a
White House that was nearly possessed by "a feeling of being under
siege," Johnson told his cabinet that "it is time that this Administration stopped sitting back and taking it from the Vietnam critics."
"Every day," he complained, "Senators attack us and return to the attack encouraged by our silence," while "professional agitators in our
own party" were trying to wreck the party and others were spending
"huge sums to set Labor against us . .. [and] set up Martin Luther
King." 46 " 'We have got a psychological war as well as a military war
on our hands,'" the president declared, "'and the Communists are
winning the psychological war with our help.' " 4 7 All that was going
to change.
On the negative front, the administration also moved more aggressively to discredit and disrupt the opposition. In August, two years
after the FBI had first started to compile derogatory dossiers on different antiwar dissidents, the president instructed the director of the
CIA, Richard Helms, to begin monitoring the opposition in a program
of surveillance (and, later, disruption) that would become institutionalized shortly thereafter as Operation CHAOS. Although the agency
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failed to document Johnson's belief in the subversive sources of the
opposition, the president privately advised a group of congressmen
that a secret CIA report demonstrated irrefutably that the opposition
was Communist controlled. Led by House minority leader Gerald R.
Ford, the congressmen publicly urged the president to publish the CIA
report. But the administration declined to release the document, and
it dodged questions as to whether it really believed that the opposition was Communist manufactured.48 In the White House, however,
the president made no secret of his suspicions of the hidden sources
of increasingly disruptive antiwar activism. 11 'I'm not going to let the
Communists take this government and they're doing it right now,' 11
he said to his foreign-policy advisers in early November, 1967. "'I told
the Attorney General that I am not going to let 200,000 of these people ruin everything for the 200 million Americans. I've got my belly
full of seeing these people put on a Communist plane and shipped
all over this country. I want someone to carefully look at who leaves
this country, where they go, and why they are going, and if they're
going to Hanoi, how are we going to keep them from getting back into this country.' 1149 Shortly thereafter, the Justice Department indicted
Dr. Benjamin Spock and four other prominent protesters on charges
of conspiring to counsel and abet the defiance of draft laws.
Convinced that "the principal battleground is in domestic opinion," the president called together a number of eastern elitist figures,
known as the Wise Men, who had first met in July, 1965, in order to
counsel him on the effectiveness of U.S. war policy and on ways of
rallying stronger popular support. 50 A few, such as Robert D. Murphy,
declared that the country really needed "a hate complex directed at
Ho Chi Minh similar to Hitler." 51 Former Secretary of State Dean G.
Acheson proposed a nationwide network of prowar committees.
Although unable to agree on a common strategy for rallying domestic
support, the assembled advisers did agree that "one of the few things
that helps us right now is public distaste for the violent doves." 52 They
also agreed that "the most serious single cause of domestic disquiet
about the war" was in "the prospect of endless inconclusive fighting,"
which continued to be the core of prevailing administration strategy
and Washington's only current hope of success. 53 Unsure about how
to rally popular support to a two-year-old policy of frustration, the
Wise Men suggested that the president undertake two concurrent
strategies. In the short run, they proposed that the administration seize
the public-relations offensive by emphasizing U.S. military progress
and the 11 'light at the end of the tunnel' instead of the battles, deaths
and danger." 54 For the long haul, they suggested that "the only effec-
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tive way of changing public attitudes at home" was "a redirection of
strategy and emphasis" in the war, which would "make it plain that
we are over the hump" in Vietnam and would "establish a pattern of
gradually decreasing cost that would be endurable for the Five or Ten
Years in the long pull." 55 Paradoxically, the Wise Men endorsed the
prevailing administration war strategy; but they did not know how
to win the domestic struggle over that strategy except by radically
altering it.
With the Wise Men's support, the president pressed the administration's counteroffensive throughout the winter of 1967 I 68,
making the case for U.S. military progress while blasting antiwar
critics for their "storm trooper tactics" and for their craven willingness
to "surrender." 56 Public support for the president's position shot up
impressively. Then, starting in late January, a triphammer series of
incredible shocks-including the North Korean seizure of the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo and the Communist Tet offensive in Vietnamset off rocket fires of domestic anger and confusion. While U.S. and
South Vietnamese forces were fighting hard to deal the Communists
a costly military defeat, the political and psychological shocks of Tet,
combined with the Pueblo humiliation, a gathering international
economic crisis, the need for a tax increase to pay for the war without
increasing inflation, the country's ongoing racial strife, and the onrush
of presidential-year politics, had a shattering effect-among both elitist
policy shapers and the voting electorate. Early in March a rush of antiadministration resentment in New Hampshire handed Senator
McCarthy 42 percent of the Democratic primary vote and a striking
moral victory. Four days later, New York Senator Robert Kennedy,
whom Johnson most feared as his rival on the antiwar Left, announced
his entrance into the Democratic presidential sweepstakes. Along with
the country's other major presidential candidates, both McCarthy and
Kennedy disavowed the idea of unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. But for the first time in three years of war, two major political
figures presented themselves as advocates of military de-escalation
and of a more aggressive attempt at a negotiated peace. They made
the opposition into an electable commodity.
In Washington the president reacted to the crush of wintertime
shocks with an anger that was compounded by initial uncertainty over
the scope and meaning of the disastrous turn of events. At first,
Johnson feared that Tet and the seizure of the Pueblo indicated the
start of a world-wide Communist offensive. As these fears slowly
dissipated, however, he made clear his determination to stand tough
for the sake of success in Vietnam; and he launched expanded attacks
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upon his critics. While Secretary of State Dean Rusk scolded reporters
by saying that "there gets to be a point when the question is whose
side are you on," the president ripped away at "croakers and doubters"
and warned that "a lot of people are really ready to surrender without
knowing that they are following a party line." 57 Public sentiment
hardly indicated that. According to pollsters, public opinion at first
reacted to the Tet offensive with a belligerent eagerness for fuller
military action. Then it settled into a resigned mood of malleability,
waiting for presidential management and direction.
In practical terms, the administration's attention during the waning days of the Tet offensive came to center on General Westmoreland's
request for another 206,000 Gls for Vietnam. Confronted with a
planned escalation of such magnitude, incoming Secretary of Defense
Clark M. Clifford ordered an exhaustive review of U.S. policy and
strategy. When the Pentagon could not convince him of the need for
further escalation, Clifford and like-minded figures within the administration conducted an extended campaign to win the president
over in opposition to the military request and in favor of some kind
of unilateral bombing halt that might draw the North Vietnamese to
the negotiating table. To give fullest strength to his campaign, Clifford recalled the Wise Men to review the new situation. Pressed by
the tum of events in the war, the suspension of public confidence,
the need for a tax increase, and worries over the U.S. and international
economies, the Wise Men, after prolonged deliberations, advised
Johnson to place limits upon U.S. military involvement in Vietnam
and to attempt a bombing halt in the hopes of opening negotiations
and of bringing popular disaffection into more manageable proportions. "Unless we do something quick," declared Cyrus R. Vance, "the
mood in this country may lead us to withdrawal." 58 Johnson was so
shocked by their advice that he first insisted that they had been misled by State Department briefers. Then he caved in to the collective
wisdom. On March 31 the president announced that he was establishing a ceiling on the U.S. troop commitment while preparing the
South Vietnamese to take over their own defense and that he was
ordering a halt in bombing over most of North Vietnam in hopes of
bringing Hanoi to the conference table. He also announced that he
would refuse to seek his party's presidential renomination in the hope
that his withdrawal from office might bring an end to the country's
domestic divisions.
The president's address on March 31 brought the dreams of the
antiwar opposition for a major change in policy as close to reality as
they had been in three years. Yet, even as the North Vietnamese were
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responding positively to Johnson's initiative, American life was shuddering through additional spasms of violent dislocation and disorder
that shoved Vietnam to the background of national concerns. In early
April, Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in an attack that triggered massive uprisings in the ghetto. Two months later, Robert Kennedy was shot to death-a murder that also cut down the McCarthy
campaign.59 Reeling under the impact of these tragic events, peace
liberals stumbled into the Democratic National Convention in
Chicago in August, where they became caught up with antiwar
radicals in riotous clashes with city police and state authorities. The
conflict in Chicago proved to be the climax of a year that was marked
by rising hopes and larger failures. Early in November, President
Johnson announced a complete halt in bombing over North Vietnam
and, a few days later, the commencement of four-sided peace talks
in Paris in January. Shortly after Johnson's announcement, Richard
M . Nixon squeaked through to a presidential victory on the strength
of a narrow popular vote and upon the promise of ending the war in
Vietnam. By the end of the year, leading figures within the country's
antiwar opposition hobbled toward the sidelines of American life in
a spirit that was both discouraged and cautiously hopeful. The war
was far from over; yet their principal demands had either been effected
or had been set in motion: the bombing of North Vietnam had been
halted; formal peace negotiations were about to begin; and U.S.
military de-escalation and disengagement had commenced. At the
same time, Lyndon Johnson prepared to leave the White House feeling both dispirited and determinedly optimistic. Doggedly, Johnson
reiterated his abiding opposition to a Communist success in Vietnam.
Indeed, he declared, in his very last public pronouncement upon leaving Washington in January, 1969, that "an honorable peace is possible if we here at home remain steady.1160
In the end, strangely enough, Lyndon Johnson had both lost and
won. He had lost the presidency to the worsening domestic divisions
that had been caused by his commitment to an escalating American
involvement in a war of attrition on mainland Asia. But he had won
out in his determination to stand by the presidential commitment
to the maintenance of an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam.
When he left the White House, major violence continued to tear across
Indochina, and Richard Nixon came to power with every intention
of salvaging the executive commitment in Saigon. Yet the antiwar opposition stood quiescent and confused, while many critics started,
for the first time, seriously to confront-as Johnson always warned
that they must do eventually- the full logic of their position. They
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began to realize that their earlier demand for negotiations begged the
question of what was to be negotiated. Slowly they came to the conclusion that the fundamental point of the negotiations was America's
earliest possible-if not immediate-withdrawal from Vietnam. But
that meant a naked acknowledgment of failure; and it took the opposition another eighteen months to accept the enormity of that
realization and to act from it.
III

In history books, the debate over the relationship between the
Johnson administration and the antiwar opposition began early in the
1970s, long before the end of U.S. intervention. Inevitably, the early
onset of this debate tended to obscure the fact that both the nature
of the U.S. war effort and of the antiwar opposition were changing,
even as both were continuing to course through the Nixon-Ford
presidencies. Basically, however, the lines of historiographical debate
had been set down even before Lyndon Johnson's death in January,
1973; they tended to crystallize, predictably enough, around arguments
as to whether the opposition had been a benign or a malignant force
in recent American history.
For the makers and executors of U.S. policy, the opposition was
plainly a most damaging development. According to the memoirs of
Johnson and his associates, the antiwar opposition subverted national
morale and self-confidence, hindered the proper application of
American power, and encouraged the Communists to hold out for a
collapse on the American home front that would allow them to gain
the kind of victory that U.S. fighting forces had denied them on the
battlefield. Antiwar dissidents had helped to deliver "a self-inflicted
wound" upon America on its way toward victory, declared General
Maxwell D. Taylor. "Every war critic capable of producing a headline
contributed, in proportion to his eminence, some comfort if not aid
to the enemy." 61 Lyndon Johnson ventured that "there is not the
slightest doubt in my mind that this dissension prolonged the war,
prevented a peaceful settlement on reasonable terms, encouraged our
enemies, disheartened our friends, and weakened us as a nation." 62
Even the vaunted White House dove George Ball had little use for open
expressions of antiwar opposition. How could anyone "publicly attack the war without giving aid and comfort to the enemy?" he asked
in his autobiography. For his part, he was "repelled by the hysteria
and crudity" of antiwar activists and "disgusted" by the protests of
"fatuous intellectuals" and "muddle-headed instructors." 63
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Writing with a sense of even sharper moral urgency, other proadministration partisans have assailed the antiwar opposition for having eroded America's moral fiber and the country's necessary selfconfidence in the rightful deployment of its global power. Centering
their resentment on American liberals, engaged intellectuals such as
Norman Podhoretz and Robert Scalapino have attacked the naivete
and cynicism that allowed so many Americans "to side with the
enemy with complete impunity" in a war that was fundamentally
right for the United States. 64 Podhoretz, especially, criticizes the
Johnson White House for having allowed antiwar dissidents to
dominate "the moral field" and for failing, because of its desire to
fight the war on "the political cheap," to make the moral cause that
might have neutralized or overcome the arguments of the antiwar
movement. 65 Some former antiwar activists have joined in these attacks. The sociologist Peter Berger, an early leader of Clergy and Laity
Concerned about Vietnam, has condemned "the hatred of America"
that he has decided was "intrinsic" to the opposition and that contributed to "a widespread malaise" about America and "a broad-scale
attack on the whole of American power." 66 The antiwar opposition
caused America, in the minds of these moralists, to lose its way; and
its work and legacy would best be purged through "a reaffirmation
of American patriotism" and reinvested faith in the moral superiority of American power. 67
From another direction, a number of writers view the antiwar opposition as a positive force in recent history that helped to allow the
future of Vietnam to be determined among the Vietnamese and that
worked in America to set limits "to what governments can do and
to what men must bear." 68 Many of the defenders of the antiwar opposition were formerly active in its operation; most lend it value according to their particular political perspective. Antiwar socialists such
as James O'Brien and Fred Halstead, for instance, have applauded the
opposition as an exercise in political radicalization and popular empowerment. Populists such as Paul Joseph similarly value the opposition as a democratic exhibition of the fact that "people do make
history." 69 The radical pacifist David Dellinger sees the opposition
as an example of what ordinary people can do through the force of
conscience and mass civil disobedience. The liberal Peter Marin
praises the opposition for having injected moral vigor into a society
that was all too accustomed to acquiescence bred out of conformity.
Antiwar activism helped to make the 1960s, wrote Marin, "a decade
of genuine moral heroism, serious moral speech," and intense inner
debates over "the most serious questions human beings can face, those
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pertaining to obedience and rebellion, others' lives and deaths, the
pull of conflicting allegiances, and the nature and cost of moral life.11 70
It helped to cleanse a country that felt dirty without knowing why.
Strangely, however, defenders of the antiwar opposition are not
as confident as its critics are in characterizing it as a success. Some
sympathizers think that the opposition, by its very nature as a moralintellectual protest, were "condemned to powerlessness." 71 "The
dissenters really did not have a chance," thinks Leslie Gelb. "Given
the force of consensus in American history and the politics of foreign
policy, they were bound to be losers." 72 Most defenders of the opposition, however, contend that it was "a partial success" in the way that
it aggravated popular war-weariness, challenged the ruling mystique
of anticommunism, opened the way for emerging elitist dissenters,
and served to constrain Washington's interest in intensifying or expanding the war.7 3 The opposition did not stop the war, writes Thomas
Powers; but it did creat~ "the necessary conditions" that moved the
Johnson administration "to recognize the failure" of its war policies
and to cast about for other means of dealing with Vietnam.7 4 Lyndon
Johnson won the war at home over the question of whether to continue the U.S. struggle in Vietnam. As a result of the force of the antiwar opposition, however, he failed to establish in the war a cause that
would justify its escalating cost in Vietnam or America.
In the quarrel over the role of antiwar activism during the Johnson
years, both critics and defenders of the antiwar opposition look with
special interest on the role of the news media in shaping attitudes
toward the war and on the dissidents. According to proadministration
partisans, the media, both for institutional and for ideological reasons,
played a decisive role in magnifying the opposition and in turning
popular opinion against the U.S. war effort. In the best documented
expression of these suspicions, Peter Braestrup has argued that for
several reasons, American journalists mistakenly portrayed the Communist military disaster at Tet as a defeat for the United States and
consequently changed the very" 'climate' of public debate" in favor
of elitist antiwar dissidents. Braestrup concedes that no hard evidence
exists that might connect the media misconstruction of Tet with increasing popular antiwar sentiment. But he contends that "unmistakable reflections" of the negative media coverage cast a shadow
upon the elitist policy debate in favor of antiwar critics and precipitated Johnson's decision to restrict the U.S. commitment.7 5
Almost reciprocally, writers who are sympathetic to the antiwar
opposition complain that the media distorted the nature of citizen
dissent. Daniel C. Hallin has demonstrated how television network
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news consistently misportrayed the country's complex antiwar opposition as a deviant social force.7 6 In a provocative study of the interelationship between the media and of the rise and fall of the SOS,
former SOS leader Todd Gitlin has detailed how the media used different "framing devices" to portray radical antiwar activists as
politically marginal, numerically trivial, torn by internal dissension,
and provocative of right-wing extremism.77 The SOS grew significantly
under the glow of media attention. Its members, however, preferred
communication through media to strong internal organization; as the
war continued and as the media kept demanding newer and more
outrageous expressions of protest, SOS activists rushed through internal arguments toward ever-more-militant tactics that substituted
the cuh of the deed for the organization of a movement for change.
The SDS came to life under the lights of media attention, and it died
in the same way.
From all indications, the issue of media influences will long affect any attempts to assay the significance of the antiwar opposition
during the United States-Vietnamese War. Yet, in the end, any considered assessment of the role of the opposition rests upon the way
in which we address two interconnected questions: Was it the war or
a Communist success that posed the greater danger to Vietnamese
life? and Was it the war or the dissent that posed the greater danger
to life and democracy in the United States? However these questions
are answered, they must be considered once more in the light of the
essentially symbolic place of Vietnam in recent American life and
politics. Vietnam was a real place, with real people, real problems,
and real importance. But in American eyes it was essentially a bloody
backdrop against which people argued about American interests, identity, and purposes. An antiwar opposition formed and functioned in
the United States because the United States-Vietnamese War provoked
among Americans a struggle over the values and ends of their country. "The war was never worth fighting for Vietnam alone," Theodore
Draper has written, "it always had to be subsidiary to a larger
purpose." 78 For Americans that purpose was the meaning of their own
country. And that is why they fought-and continue to fight-over
the matter of Vietnam: so that they might recover from it some worth
for America.
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3 I The Economic Education
of Lyndon Johnson:
Guns, Butter, and Taxes
Donald F. Kettl
NO PRESIDENCY IN AMERICAN HIS1DRY had such exhilarating
economic highs or such devastating economic lows as the Johnson
administration. A generation of economists hailed the tax cut of 1964
as "the triumph of modern fiscal policy." 1 It was the high point of
the "new economics," the end of balancing the federal budget for
balance's sake, the rise of economists into unquestioned power in the
White House, the final volley of "the fiscal revolution in America." 2
That triumph, however, proved to be disastrously short-lived. United
States involvement in Vietnam grew enormously after June, 1965, but
not until two years later did Lyndon Johnson submit a plan to increase
taxes substantially, and not for another year after that did Congress
finally pass the tax surcharge. Bill Moyers later called the delay in
seeking the tax increase "the single most devastating decision in the
Johnson administration." By overruling his advisers, who argued for
a tax increase as early as December, 1965, while insisting on their
loyalty, Johnson helped to undercut the base of his internal support.
"It was the beginning of the end," Moyers said, "a time when he lost
control of the administration, lost control of events." 3
The three-year delay in getting a tax increase helped to fuel a
booming economic growth and to unleash inflation, which had been
relatively quiet since the Korean War. When the Federal Reserve Board
triggered tight money to slow the boom, the economy started on a
roller coaster that took another fifteen years to stop. The struggle over
the tax surcharge was the keystone of Lyndon Johnson's tragedy: great
hopes, a stormy struggle for consensus, and dashed dreams.
Perhaps no account of this struggle is better known-or more
harsh-than David Halberstam's article in the September, 1972, Atlantic Monthly, "How the Economy Went Haywire," which he repeated
in The Best and the Brightest. 4 To Halberstam, Johnson was "a magician who lied." Johnson's own economists, especially Gardner Ackley,
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), called for a tax
increase in December, 1965. But Johnson, fearing that if Congress had
a choice, it "would give him the war, but not the Great Society," de-
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cided to "hold back on the real estimates of the cost of the war for
a year," to weaken the otherwise obvious case for a tax increase. Robert
S. McNamara cleverly planned, for budgeting purposes, that the war
would be over by June 30, 1967, but he kept, according to Halberstam,
the real dimensions of the war secret-"secret, it turned out, even
to the President's own economists." 5
Halberstam delivered a tough indictment: Johnson had lied to
Congress, the American public, and his own staff about the real costs
of Vietnam. Johnson sought, instead, guns and butter-heavy Vietnam spending, coupled with an expansive Great Society. It was a "living lie" that in the end created "economic chaos.116 Halberstam's account has become the conventional wisdom of the period. Other
writers have repeated it, 7 and Newsweek cited the widely understood
knowledge that during the Vietnam build-up, "Lyndon Johnson actually hid the cost of the war from Ackley, thus blunting what could
have been an earlier call for a tax increase." 8
As the documents available at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library
show, however, these fateful events traveled a considerably more complex path. The documents cast great doubt on the Machiavellian image
of a deceitful Lyndon Johnson. His advisers were far more uneven in
their support for a tax increase than Halberstam has suggested, and
Johnson's reasons for not proposing an earlier tax increase were not
as simple as the guns-and-butter theory that Halberstam spins.
Johnson did indeed want his butter, as the documents show, and he
did fear that Congress would prefer to choose between them rather
than to grant a tax increase. But in the early stages, guns and butter
did not seem like incompatible choices. At the later stages of the
Johnson years, the explosion of American cities into flames and the
expansion of combat in Vietnam, combined with the great investment
of moral and political capital into both campaigns, made retreat on
either front unthinkable. Only as retreat became less possible,
however, did the economic costs become clear. This was the essential irony, the pivotal tragedy, of an administration that was rocked
to its foundation at the very zenith of its power.
I

Most of John F. Kennedy's cabinet, including Council of Economic
Advisers Chairman Walter Heller, were in a plane over the Pacific
when they heard the news of the president's assassination. The plane
immediately was turned around, and on the trip back to Washington
the conversation turned to the new president's grasp of economics.
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The cabinet members were not sure that Johnson understood the
Keynesian theory behind the proposed tax cut: lower federal taxation
to stimulate private expansion.9 "There was a great deal of apprehension" about Johnson, Heller later remembered.10 Heller went from the
plane to his office and worked all night on a memo to Johnson, in
which he outlined the state of the economy and the need for a tax cut.u
Kennedy's Keynesian advisers in the CEA had had a very difficult
time convincing the president to propose a cut in income taxes. Kennedy had come to office with a strong commitment to supporting the
sagging dollar abroad, and that stance argued against easier money.
He was fiscally conservative and hesitated to counter Eisenhower's
old-time balanced-budget religion. Federal Reserve Board Chairman
William McChesney Martin, Jr., furthermore, was preaching that the
country's unemployment problem was structural, based upon shifts
in the labor market, rather than cyclical, based upon the ups and
downs of the economy. Extra money pumped into the economy to increase demand would put few of the unemployed back to work if they
were unemployed because they lacked the skills a changing economy
needed or because they lived in an economically declining region.
Most of all, Kennedy was simply not convinced that the Keynesians
were right.
In August, 1962, Heller finally convinced Kennedy and Treasury
Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, and the president went on television to
announce a $10 billion tax cut, to be proposed in January's State of
the Union address. Once announced, however, the plan came under
attack from liberals and conservatives alike. From the Left came complaints that the tax cut unfairly benefited the rich and would, in the
long run, not stimulate economic growth. From the Right, some
economists complained that the tax cut might fuel inflation or create
deficits. The tax plan bogged down in the Senate and barely passed
in the House in September, just two months before the assassination.12
On the evening of the slain president's burial, Johnson surprised
his inherited economic advisers by enthusiastically embracing the tax
cut.13 But Ackley said later, "He frightened us at that first meeting":
to ensure the passage of the tax cut, Johnson announced that he
planned to keep the federal budget to less than $100 billion.14 The
budget ceiling, his advisers acknowledged, would help solidify conservative support for the tax cut, but it would greatly dilute its
stimulative effects. For Johnson, however, the tax cut served purposes
other than economic ones. It was to be a demonstration of who was
in charge and of the new president's skill in dealing with Congress.15
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Johnson quickly sealed his victory by signing the tax cut into law on
February 26, 1964, just three months after the assassination.
For economic advisers who at first had been leery about the new
president, the passage of the tax cut was the rite of passage into the
"new economics." Johnson proved to be an eager audience for his
economic advisers, and he relied on them more than Kennedy had.
Economic advice was built on the "Troika," an informal group of three
created during the Kennedy years and carried over into Johnson's administration. It consisted of the secretary of the Treasury (first, C.
Douglas Dillon and then, after 1965, Henry Fowler); the director of
the Bureau of the Budget (Kermit Gordon, until 1965; Charles L.
Schultze, from 1965 to 1968; and Charles J. Zwick, for the remainder
of the administration); and the chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers (Walter Heller, who was succeeded in 1965 by Gardner Ackley
and in 1968 by Arthur M. Okun). The Troika prepared regular forecasts
for the president and supplied him with recommendations, especially
during the intensive budget season in December.
Johnson developed an especially close relationship with the CEA.
For Heller, Ackley, and their colleagues on the council, the White
House was a seminar room, and Johnson was their only student. As
Ackley explained, "We considered this one of our main responsibilities: to try to teach him economics." And for the most part,
Johnson proved "a very good student, a very interested student," according to Ackley.16 The text for the seminar was the constant flood
of memos with which the CEA deluged him. Johnson voraciously consumed them, good and bad news alike, and he carried his favorites
around for days in his jacket pocket to show to those with whom he
spoke. The memos were unusual in form and much different from
the memos the CEA had prepared for Kennedy. They were more
outline than prose, and the key phrases were underlined, so they could
not be missed. "He wanted information that he didn't have to work
too hard to get," Ackley later explained.17 Johnson complimented the
CEA for the memos, and he even occasionally sent a dense Treasury
Department memo to the CEA and asked for an "English translation."
Johnson, the "new economics," and the new economists were
riding high in the saddle. Within recent memory the economy had
never been rosier. Heller bragged to Johnson that the economy was
"showing new vitality and promise," with "no inflation in sight." 18
It was a triumph of economic planning, the first conclusive demonstration of the federal government's ability to frame a fiscal policy to
stimulate the economy; it was also the foundation for Johnson's 1964
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victory over Barry Goldwater. With the passage of Kennedy's tax cut,
Johnson wrapped himself in the martyr's mantle. It marked, according to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, the "epitome of Lyndon
Johnson's early presidency." 19 As Johnson put it in his memoirs, he
became a candidate who promised "imaginative fiscal and monetary
policies that would eliminate the old cycles of boom and bust.1120 During the fall campaign, Goldwater, having opposed the tax cut, had
precious little room for maneuvering on the economic issue. Perhaps
most important, the successful passage of the tax cut was a central
symbol of political success and active attack on the nation's problems, and that made Johnson a formidable presidential candidate.
The tide stayed high until June 1, 1965, when Federal Reserve
Board Chairman William McChesney Martin surprised the financial
community and shocked the White House with a speech suggesting
"disquieting similarities between our present prosperity and the
fabulous twenties." 21 Martin apparently was attempting to warn about
the difficulty of keeping expansion within bounds, the need to apply
properly timed monetary and fiscal medicine to economic problems,
and the increasing interrelationship of the domestic and international
economies. The administration's economists, however, rejected the
implication that the boom in the economy might end in a 1929-style
bust. The CEA staff, in fact, was concerned mainly about the possibility of slower economic growth, rising unemployment, and the possible need for more economic stimulus late in 1966. Early projections
suggested that the economy might slow down and need more, not less,
governmental help, perhaps through another tax cut or through the
enactment of the revenue-sharing plan that Walter Heller had
championed. 22
On the same day, Lyndon Johnson requested a supplemental appropriation for Vietnam. The early months of the Vietnam build-up
did not worry the CEA; in fact, Ackley suggested that more military
spending might provide a much-needed stimulus. "Our economy has
lots of room to absorb a defense step-up," he told Johnson on July 30.
"Nobody can seriously expect that the kind of program you outlined
is going to overheat the economy, strain industrial capacity, or generate
a consumer buying boom." He concluded that the "overall effects are
most likely to be favorable to our prosperity" and to reduce the need
for a further tax cut. 23
As the fall went on, however, Johnson's economic advisers viewed
the step-up in military expenditures with growing alarm. In early
September, Ackley condemned a column by Evans and Novak that suggested Vietnam spending would bring inflation in 1966, 24 but in early
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November a special interagency committee warned that rising defense
expenditures might produce "a significant and undesirable acceleration in the pace of overall economic activity.112 5 The Federal Reserve,
in fact, was so worried that on December 6 it raised the discount
rate-the rate that banks pay on loans from the system-from 4 to
4.5 percent, to try to slow the economy. Johnson angrily disassociated
himself from the decision and said he regretted that the board had
decided to act before the administration had completed work on the
new budget.26 Administration officials had for weeks been putting
pressure on the Federal Reserve to delay any action until January, when
the budget picture would be clearer. Martin himself was scheduled
to meet with Johnson within a few days to discuss the economic
outlook. Some observers, in fact, speculated that Martin had acted
preemptively to prevent Johnson from using the meeting to apply the
"Johnson treatment." Johnson's economists were increasingly agreed
on the need to apply the brakes, but they were not sure just how, when,
or how strongly to do so. Martin had no such uncertainty; he pressed
ahead.
By mid December, Ackley, as Halberstam has suggested, was
vigorously arguing for a tax increase.27 After the first few months of
the war, Ackley said, "We were becoming pretty clear about what was
going on." 28 On December 17, Ackley sent Johnson a memo that put
the matter plainly: the economy was starting to heat up. If the budget
were in the $ll5 billion range, "there is little question in my mind
that a significant tax increase will be needed to prevent an intolerable
degree of inflationary pressure." If the budget were $ll0 billion, "the
question is more difficult," but Ackley suggested that a tax increase
would probably still be needed. Johnson was concerned that even a
hint of a possible tax increase not be leaked. He scrawled on Joseph
Califano's cover note over Ackley's memo, "Caution them not to go
into detail with staff & keep away from all reporters. 1129
Ten days later, Ackley was even more emphatic. He wrote to the
president: "The only conclusion I can reach is that an increase of individual and corporate income tax rates should be planned, whatever
the FY1967 budget may be (within the limits we have heard discussed).
Tactically, it may only be feasible to propose higher taxes later in the
year. From an economic standpoint, it needs to be done as soon as
possible.1130 Johnson, in fact, was getting the same advice from many
other members of his administration. Former CEA Chairman Heller,
who had returned to the University of Minnesota, joined Charles
Schultze, director of the Bureau of the Budget, in arguing for a tax
increase.31 Even Defense Secretary McNamara suggested the need for
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a tax increase and for estimating defense expenditures on the high
side. Administration budget officials were considering two different
estimates for the total defense budget: $5 7 and $60 billion. McNamara
argued that the administration ought to use the higher figure to help
preserve credibility on the budget.3 2
In December, 1965, no one had a clear idea of how much the Vietnam War would cost. That, of course, is characteristic of war: no one
knows in advance how big any war will be. The United States' last
major experience in wartime planning-Korea-had produced wildly
unrealistic defense budgets. Defense planners had overestimated the
cost of fighting the war: by almost 13 percent in fiscal 1953 and by
more than 11 percent in fiscal 1954.33 Johns,:m's economic advisers
were well aware of the past record and were therefore hesitant to take
too seriously the estimates for Vietnam. By the end of 1965, furthermore, actual defense spending was lagging far behind contracted
obligations. 34 The rapid expansion of the war was a firm possibility,
but it was a danger that lay in the future. McNamara, furthermore,
had struggled for almost five years to get military spending under control. He had brought the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
to the Defense Department to try to force the military chiefs out of
their old interservice rivalries. The Vietnam build-up now created
great pressures from the Pentagon for all sorts of military spending
under the guise of "We're in a war now." But having struggled to gain
some measure of control, McNamara was reluctant to hand the
generals a blank check, and he shied away from making long-term
predictions of a rapid military build-up. 35
Director Schultze of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) therefore
developed a two-pronged plan. 36 McNamara would assume that the
war would be over by June 30, 1967, the end of the fiscal year. The
planning assumption, Schultze said later, put "everybody on notice,
although nobody in the early stages paid much attention to it, that
this budget was understated simply on technical grounds, but
understated by an amount nobody knew." 37 Johnson was getting advice, especially from Congressman Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the
tax-writing House Ways and Means Committee, not to put the full
cost of the Vietnam War in the budget; "people will really be startled," he warned.38 Since nobody knew how much the war would cost,
the budget simply would state that fact and would warn that more
requests might be needed later.
The second prong of the plan was to request a supplemental Vietnam appropriation later in 1966, when the full picture would be
clearer, and at the same time to ask for the tax increase. Although
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Ackley pressed urgently in December for an immediate tax increase,
Treasury Secretary Fowler and BOB Director Schultze were less sure
about just when a tax increase would be needed. Coupling the tax
increase with the Vietnam supplemental appropriation would,
Schultze thought, improve the chances for congressional passage and
would help to minimize attack on the Great Society programs in the
meantime. Congressman Mills, Johnson was told, "clearly showed that
he had no appetite for a tax increase bill in 1966." If the issue were
opened then, Mills warned, both Democratic liberals and conservative
Republicans "would start tearing at the budget instead." 39
The tax increase in 1965 was therefore a tricky political matter.
Johnson estimated that he could get a tax increase to pay for a big
war, but if he asked for a tax increase, the Great Society would be
an inviting target for those who opposed the social programs. Johnson,
furthermore, wanted only a limited war. His problem at this stage
came more from hawks, who pressed for a wide war, than from doves,
who desired to reduce U.S. involvement. The president thus had a
dilemma: he could get a tax increase, he thought, only for a war bigger than the one he planned, and then only at the cost of his Great
Society. To keep the war limited and to save the social programs from
attack, Johnson decided to forestall the decision on a tax increase in
late 1965.40
The economic case, furthermore, was tricky. It was difficult to
predict just how big a problem inflation might become so long as the
full scale of Vietnam was unknown. Given the Korean experience and
the possibility that the war would indeed turn out to be limited,
Johnson's advisers were leery about jumping too quickly toward a large
tax increase, especially since the much-vaunted 4 percent "full
employment" goal was nearly at hand. The "new economics" offered
the possibility of relatively easy stabilization: the federal government
could pump up growth through increased spending and tax cuts; tax
increases could slow a booming economy. In the models, each side
of the stabilization equation worked with equal ease and accuracy.
In the political world, Johnson and his economic advisers
overestimated how easy it would be to apply fiscal stimulus-and
underestimated how difficult it would later be to apply restraint.
For the administration in late 1965, the central question was how
to restrain an overheating economy without disrupting the nation's
strong economic growth. Johnson's economic advisers saw the puzzle in terms of fine tuning the demand, rather than in terms of waging an all-out war against inflation.41 The Federal Reserve's preemptive strike helped to forestall the need for immediate action. Some
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administration officials believed that if the Federal Reserve had not
acted, there would have been a better chance for a tax increase early
in 1966, but others have suggested that the result probably still would
have been the same even if the Federal Reserve had been persuaded
to wait. Schultze argues that the administration, especially President
Johnson and Treasury Secretary Fowler, simply did not have the
stomach for a tax increase at the time.42
The budget that Johnson finally proposed in January, 1966, was
$112.8 billion, halfway between Ackley's $110 billion "probable" taxincrease level and his $115 billion "little question" level. The estimate
for defense spending, $58.3 billion, was also in the middle of the
$57- $60 billion range, with all estimates hinging on a projected end
of the war on June 30, 1967. Johnson made clear in his budget message
that the final budget would change as circumstances in Southeast Asia
shifted. And to slow down the economy a bit, he proposed a $4.8
billion tax package to accelerate the collection of corporation income
taxes, to change the withholding schedule for individual income taxes,
and to postpone the scheduled reduction in telephone and excise taxes.
Missing from the package was the major increase in corporate and
individual income taxes that Ackley had recommended. The administration secretly went with Schultze's two-pronged plan, with
a later tax-increase proposal to be tied to the Vietnam supplemental
appropriation. The January budget won congressional support, and
Congressman Mills agreed to back Johnson's small-tax-increase
package. 43 The package won speedy passage in March.
Johnson's advisers were hopeful that they could beat any inflation problem before it became a crisis. "If you can finance the Vietnam war with a minimum of stimulus," Schultze wrote to the president just after Christmas 1965, "this will be an accomplishment of
equal magnitude to the Great Society legislative program." 44 The decision to go with Schultze's strategy, however, laid the groundwork for
charges that Johnson had lied about the cost of the war. The fiscal
1967 budget, announced in January, 1966, underestimated the eventual expenditures for defense by 16 percent, largely because Vietnam
expenditures grew from $6 billion in fiscal 1966 to $20.6 billion in
1967. The administration later covered these extra costs through a
supplemental appropriation, as Schultze had suggested. As the war
wore on, however, the administration's budget requests came far closer
to the mark. The fiscal 1968 budget underestimated the total expenditures for defense by less than 7 percent, and in 1969 the
underestimate was less than 2 percent. By that time, however, the image of duplicity had already been formed.
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The Johnson administration's hopes that it could fine tune any
inflation quickly turned sour. The minor tax increase at the begin
ning of 1966 proved little more than a Band-Aid for the hemorrhage
of military spending. Congress voted a $13.8 billion supplemental appropriation for Vietnam in the spring of 1966 and followed that with
a fiscal year 1967 defense appropriation of $58 billion, the largest
defense bill since 1943. Inflation, meanwhile, heated up. The consumer price index rose by 5 percent in 1966, the largest increase since
the Korean War-a major shock after the relatively stable prices of
the early 1960s.
Ackley and his council continued to campaign, in the early spring,
for a tax increase. The CEA told the president that "a further tax increase is needed to counter inflation" because "the economy is breaking all reasonable speed limits." The council members continued: "We
are not facing an explosive situation. A little inflation won't be fatal.
But inflationary psychology and inflationary symptoms are taking
root. If they do get firmly established, it will be hard to uproot them,
and hard to resist pressure for overly-restrictive action." 45 But Johnson
again backed away from the tax increase, and he ordered his staff to
stop issuing any public warnings about the state of the economy and
the need for a tax increase.46
In his memoirs, Johnson explained that he simply could not
gather any support for the tax increase. His cabinet officers were opposed, and so were businessmen. At a meeting of one hundred and
fifty leading business officials on March 30, 1966, Johnson asked for
a show of hands: "How many of you would recommend tomorrow
a tax increase to the Congress for the purpose of restraining our
economy?" No one raised his hand. A similar question, posed to a
group of labor leaders, produced a similar result. The House leadership, meanwhile, reported that of the twenty-five members of the
House Ways and Means Committee, Johnson could expect no more
than four votes for a tax increase-and Wilbur Mills, the most crucial
vote, would not be among them. 47
Halberstam ascribes more sinister motives. Johnson, he said,
could get no support for a tax increase because he consciously chose
not to disclose the real cost of the war and the implications of not
raising taxes. Halberstam charged that members of Congress "were
asked to give estimates and projections on a step as important as a
tax increase based on totally erroneous information." It was "an extraordinary bit of manipulation," Halberstam wrote, and he quoted
a Washington reporter who said it was the "single most irresponsible
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act by an American President" in the fifteen years he had been observing capital politics.48 Halberstam suggests that a rousing call to arms,
if backed by a revelation of Vietnam's true financial costs, would have
created political support for a tax increase. But Johnson was firmly
committed to keeping Vietnam a limited venture, and the president's
soundings in December convinced him that on those grounds he could
not move the Congress and, especially, Wilbur Mills to action.
Ackley warned Johnson that without a tax increase, the Federal
Reserve would further tighten money.49 For his part, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Martin left no doubt about what he would do. "The
rise in prices has to be slowed down this year," he wrote to Treasury
Secretary Fowler. If the job were not done with fiscal policy, Martin
told Fowler that it would be done with monetary policy. He predicted
that tighter monetary policy would mean higher interest rates,
weakening of the savings-and-loan industry, harm to the municipalbond market, and slowing of housing construction. so
Martin proved to be a good prophet. In the spring the Federal
Reserve moved to slow the expansion, and by summer the growth in
the money stock had fallen almost to zero. Interest rates moved to
historic highs. Rates for prime commercial paper averaged 5.55 percent for the year, the highest by far in the postwar years and nearly
twice the 1961 level. Savings and loans became overextended, and
mortgage money almost dried up. Rates on state and local bonds
soared, and two leading bond houses, caught with large inventories
of unsold bonds, almost failed.51 The monetary tightening helped to
slow the boom, but it also produced a credit crunch, with high costs
to some sectors of the economy. Johnson's Populist blood curdled at
the high rates, but his advisers managed to keep him from denouncing the Federal Reserve by convincing him that some action had to
be taken. The Federal Reserve, meanwhile, enjoyed the active but quiet
support of the administration's economists. 52
As Johnson's advisers began in the fall of i966 to consider the
budget for the next fiscal year, they reached the first broad-based agreement on the need for a tax increase. On September 2, 1966, eight advisers sent a joint memo to Johnson, in which they called for immediate action to reduce spending and to ask "at an appropriate time
in the future" for "whatever tax measures are necessary" to pay for
Vietnam. 53 Backed by, among others, Treasury Secretary Fowler,
Defense Secretary McNamara, BOB Director Schultze, CEA Chairman Ackley, and presidential adviser Califano, the memo represented
a remarkable meeting of the minds on a question that before had
proven so difficult.
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Johnson agreed, and on September 8 he sent a special economic
message to Congress. He announced an immediate cut in spending
of $1.5 billion and the suspension of the 7 percent investment tax
credit. While he said he would not know the full budget situation until
the implications of Vietnam were clearer and until Congress had completed its work on other appropriations bills, he did pledge, "This Administration is prepared to recommend whatever action is necessary
to maintain stable growth and prosperity of the past five and one-half
years and to pay for current expenditures out of current revenues, as
we are doing." 5 4 Indeed, at that point, the budget was not far out of
balance; the deficit for fiscal 1966, just ended, was less than $4 billion.
Having finally joined forces on the tax increase, however,
Johnson's advisers began to get cold feet three months later. The
Federal Reserve's tight money had at least temporarily blunted the
inflation, and the Federal Reserve had begun to back off. The administration's background studies had meanwhile begun to show "persistent and pervasive softening" in-the economy. Housing starts had
plunged, business investment had slowed, and automobile sales had
dropped. "The economy clearly does not need additional total
restraint," one staff report argued; "in fact, some modest additional
stimulus is in order." 55 It was easy to make an "old economics" case
for a tax increase to balance the budget. If a tax increase were to be
passed, however, the president's advisers feared that the slowdown in
late 1966 might develop into a full-scale recession in 1967.56
Just as in the debate over the previous year's budget, the president's advisers were unsure about what problems they faced. Some
suggested that he request from Congress the authority to invoke a
stand-by tax quickly if needed. 57 Johnson's appointees to the Federal
Reserve Board believed that the economy had been slowed down
enough and opposed a tax increase, but Budget Director Schultze,
Treasury Secretary Fowler, and the members of the Council of
Economic Advisers favored a small tax increase, to go into effect
no earlier than July 1, 1967. 58 The economy would be too soft during the first half of the year, and they worried that a tax increase
might weaken it further. In fact, Treasury Secretary Fowler suggested
that a modest deficit, spurred by increases in defense spending, might
nicely complement the Federal Reserve's easier monetary policy.
Later, a moderate tax increase would start to soak up some of the
economic growth before it could unloose inflation. To the advisers, however, the question was a close one, and former CEA Chairman Heller, in his Christmas message to Johnson, hoped that "you
will get Divine guidance on the question of a 1967 tax increase,
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since economic guidance gives you no very firm answer at the
moment." 59
In the next week, as the deadline for preparing the budget approached, Johnson's advisers decided that the economy would need
a stimulus in the first half of 1967 and that any tax increase should
wait until the second half of the year. By that point, they thought,
the danger of inflation might be growing quickly enough to justify
a small tax increase. "But," Fowler, Schultze, and Ackley wrote
Johnson, "we need to keep the maximum degree of flexibility to back
away from a tax increase-and even to release impounded spending-if
the economy appears even weaker than we expect in the first half,
or if prospects for a second half revival do not seem promising." 60 This
led to the plan that Johnson proposed in his fiscal 1968 budget
message: a 6 percent surtax on individual and corporate income taxes,
effective July 1. 61 To keep flexibility, however, the administration did
not send a formal proposal to Capitol Hill. That would come later,
when the economic advisers had determined that the danger of recession had passed and that inflation was reigniting.
The proposal was certainly not popular with the American people. A Harris poll in February, 1967, which circulated at the White
House, showed that 65 percent of those questioned opposed the surtax, while only 24 percent approved, compared with a much smaller
split of 49 to 44 percent a year before. Worries about inflation had
cooled off considerably from the previous year; in 1967, 68 percent
thought that inflation was heading up, compared with 92 percent the
year before. Because the public saw inflation as a less serious problem, the urgency for the tax increase lessened; and given the choice,
75 percent of those polled would rather cut spending than increase
taxes. To at least one White House adviser, the case was clear: Johnson
had waited one year too long to propose a tax increase. 62 For his part,
Johnson was finally convinced of the need for a tax increase and said
so in a May press conference. He exploded when one wire-service
report said the administration was still not decided on the need for
a tax increase. He ordered an aide to uncover the source for the story:
"Find out who this is. This is not right. Wire me a report fast." 63
In June, Johnson's economic advisers were convinced that the
time had come to revive the surtax. The dip in the economy that they
.had sensed in the late fall of 1966 had proved to be very shallow and
short-lived, and by early summer the economy was heating up again
alarmingly. Budget deficits were growing to levels unprecedented except in times of a major war. Inflation had started to rise, bringing
the prospect of tighter money from the Federal Reserve and a renewal
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of the previous year's credit crunch. There were early signs, furthermore, of a serious balance-of-payments problem with foreign countries. Domestic industries were expanding rapidly to fill the wartime
demand, but Schultze warned Johnson that the boom could turn to
bust when military spending would shrink at the end of the war.64
But while Johnson's advisers agreed on the need for a tax increase,
they could not agree on its size or timing. In frustration, Johnson
scrawled on one report of differences among his aides: "For God's sake
get agreement." 65
That agreement finally came in July, on a plan to increase the
earlier proposal for a 6 percent surtax to 10 percent, effective retroactively to July 1 on corporate taxes and to September 1 for individual
income taxes. Both surtaxes would expire on June 30, 1969, and would
produce two years of restraint. 66 The fears of a grossly unbalanced
budget and of galloping inflation finally led Johnson in July to ask
Congress for the surtax, nineteen months after Ackley first had made
the case for a tax increase. By then, evidence of an inflationary boom
was unmistakable, and it was clear, explained Charles J. Zwick,
Schultze's successor as budget director, that "you couldn't support
both guns and butter without an increase in taxes." 67
Johnson's advisers had misread the scale of the dip in the
economy, and the rapid upswing had taken them by surprise. They
had misjudged, by an even larger margin, just how much more difficult it would be to pass a tax increase than a tax cut. The "new
economics" logic of fine tuning thus developed a bias in favor of
stimulus over restraint. Johnson himself finally agreed to the tax increase when the costs of not doing so became unmistakable. In his
White House economics seminar, he understood the theory that his
advisers argued, and he eagerly embraced the happy side of the Keynesian equation; but he hesitated in taking painful steps until the
evidence was incontrovertible. By that time, as his advisers had
warned, the inflationary demon had been unleashed.

m
The tax surcharge encountered immediate problems with Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee. He could
see no signs of an economic upturn in July when the administration
was reviving the plan, and as Gardner Ackley's successor as CEA
Chairman, Arthur Okun, wrote later, "Congress would not act on a
forecast; it wanted facts." 68 Califano warned the president, "Mills is
going to be more difficult to sell this time than in the past." 69 Mills
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was making it clear that he did not like the tax surcharge and did not
think it would pass Congress.7° His position was simple: Johnson
would have to choose between guns and butter. Mills would move
toward restraint, but he preferred cutting the Great Society programs
to increasing taxes.7 1 To Budget Director Schultze, it was "clear that
Wilbur Mills, many of the other Democrats, and all the Republicans
on Ways and Means are going to try to hold us up" for bigger budget
cuts.72
At a meeting with congressional leaders a few weeks after Johnson
had submitted his proposal, Congressman Hale Boggs made the point
simply to Johnson: "With Mills you can get it out of committee, and
without Mills you can't." 73 Ackley meanwhile continued to warn, now
in even harsher terms, about the implications of a failure to act.
Without a tax bill, he wrote to Johnson on October 13, there would
be "interest rates that will curl your hair, a new depression in housing, a new surge in imports" that would worsen the balance of trade
and increase inflation in 1968 to almost 5 percent-with even worse
to come in 1969. With a tax increase, inflation would be only about
2.5 percent, he said.74
Despite the warnings, Mills was unmoved. The congressional
liaison staff learned that Mills was feeling neglected by Johnson. The
president, Mills hinted, had not called him to the White House for
consultation since the tax bill went up. 75 Despite the signals the president was getting, however, aide Larry O'Brien, Schultze, and Ackley
all opposed making a bow to Mills.76 Mills then broached his own
plan, through a staff member, to get the bill moving. He would support a tax increase if the administration would agree to a $4 billion
cut in expenditures, with Congress and the president sharing the
responsibility for selecting the cuts. 77 The staff investigated this plan
and thought they had a deal, but Mills subsequently backed away.78
Johnson tried to rally his forces in late October and asked Califano
to get the word out: "Let's not give up yet." 79 But from many sources
the president learned that Mills would not budge for the rest of the
year. Congressman Carl B. Albert glumly reported, "Mills told me he
would not report it out until the climate in the country is ready for
it-whatever that means." 80 The president's personal relations with
Mills had soured, and Mills made it plain that he would not budge
unless the president agreed to spending cuts. 81 The very fact that Mills
was trying to dictate spending cuts, however, enraged George H.
Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, in whose
domain rested decisions on spending. 82 Johnson believed, furthermore,
that Mills did not want to sully his powerful reputation by reporting

THE ECONOMIC EDUCATION OF JOHNSON

I 69

the tax bill until he was sure he could get it passed. Mills used that
excuse in turn to block the tax measure. He was "flim-flamming us,"
remembered congressional liaison J. Barefoot Sanders, Jr., later. Sanders
was convinced that Mills could have passed the bill without large cuts
if he had tried. 83
Part of the bad blood, Budget Director Schultze speculated, had
its roots in the administration's flip-flops on the investment tax credit.
When the administration was looking for extra revenue in November,
1966, Mills backed the president in suspending the investment tax
credit. A few months later, in March, 1967, Mills again backed the
administration in restoring the credit when the economy dipped. "He
felt he had been made to look like a fool," Schultze explained, and
he was leery about going along with the economic forecasters once
again-especially without the benefit of the solicitous LBJ
"treatment." 84 For his part, Mills made this explanation to the Johnson
Library's oral history project: "All I was ever trying to do in respect
to the 10 percent surcharge was to describe the circumstances that
would have to be brought to bear in order to get the 10 percent tax
increase passed. The President knew what I was doing. He couldn't
buy it." 85
By early 1968, the White House had become convinced that Mills
did not want a tax bill at any price. He told the congressional liaison
staff that he wanted the administration to assure him of at least 17 5
votes on the floor before he would report the bill. The congressional
liaison staff, however, could win no guarantee that if they did round
up that many votes, Mills would in fact report the bill and that if he
did report it, he would not then insist on extra conditions, such as
a ceiling on federal spending. That put the congressional liaison staff
on the spot. They counted only 110 "will support" votes and 33 "will
probably support" votes among Democrats in the House, and they
doubted they would ever be able to round up more than 155 votes until Mills had reported the bill. Members of Congress did not want to
commit themselves blindly to a tax increase, and as the 1968 election drew closer, the prospect of voting for any tax increase became
less and less attractive. 86 Treasury Secretary Fowler reported that
neither Mills nor Mahon "want to block the parade," but "neither
one is particularly anxious to assert the type of 'gung ho' boldness
in leadership it may take" to get the bill passed. 87
The impasse enormously frustrated Johnson. The cities were
uneasy, the limited war was running beyond all expected bounds, the
economy was heating up quickly, and he could not get firm action
on any front. He badly wanted something that would cool the economy
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but would not wreck his domestic programs. Just a few days after announcing that he would not seek reelection, he said to congressional
leaders: "If I were a dictator, I would say I've got to have $15 of the
$24 billion in taxes we repealed [in 1964] back again. When we cut
taxes, we didn't have a war and cities problem as we do now." 88 His
frustration boiled over even into Vietnam strategy. He wanted some
"radical new ideas," he told his staff, ideas that would lead to getting
the troops out and to putting the money into economic development
instead. With everybody withdrawing forces, perhaps there could be
a United Nations-supervised election-and a reduction in the administration's economic problems.89
Administration officials began a new phase of negotiations with
Mills. The administration suggested a 4:10:6 formula: $4 billion in
immediate expenditure reductions, $10 billion less in further spending authority, and $6 billion less in present spending authority. Mills
insisted on a 5:20 formula: $5 billion in immediate cuts and $20
billion in cuts in future obligations. Budget Bureau studies showed
that the administration could cut no more than $4 billion without
deeply hurting the Great Society. And even if Johnson were to accept
the Mills 5:20 plan, there would be no guarantee that Mills would
then accept the surtax.90
Califano saw the battle as "a critical turning point in your
[Johnson's] Presidency," where "the importance of winning the tax
fight transcends the fiscal problems." Without it, he warned on May
2, 1968, Johnson would lose all effectiveness in Congress and the executive branch, and he would have a far-harder time in leading the
country. Califano urged Johnson to "give consideration to coming out
fighting" and to "turn loose everything we have to take the Ways and
Means Committee away from Mills." 91 At a press conference the next
day, Johnson did indeed draw his guns. He said simply, "The Congress has not been that cooperative," and he singled Mills out by name.
Mills's plan, Johnson hinted, "would injure the national interest instead of serving it." He then argued, "I think we are courting danger
by this continued procrastination, this continued delay. Don't hold
up a tax bill until you can blackmail someone into getting your own
personal viewpoint over on reductions." 92
When Mills still would not budge, the administration decided to
outflank him. The constitution requires that ali tax measures
originate in the House, and House procedures required tax bills to
originate in Mills's Ways and Means Committee. Mills's refusal to
move thus had effectively blocked the bill for months. Senate leaders,
however, worked with the administration to attach the surtax to a
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relatively innocuous House-passed bill that extended soon-to-expire
excise taxes. At this point, Mills could duck the bill no longer. The
Senate passed the bill on April 2, and that led to a long and tumultuous
conference. Mills continued to press for higher spending cuts than
the administration was willing to accept. Meanwhile, an international
gold crisis increased pressure for quick action on the deficit.
The conference committee finally came to agreement near the
end of June, and on June 28, thirty months after Ackley had first made
the case for the surtax, Johnson, without ceremony, signed it into law.
The bill set a retroactive 10 percent surcharge on individual and corporate income taxes, with the individual increase effective April 1,
1968, and the corporate increase effective January 1, 1968. Both surcharges were to be effective until July 1, 1969. In addition, the compromise required a $6 billion immediate cut in spending and a further cut of $8 billion in unspent appropriations authority. The compromise thus favored Mills in current spending cuts, but the administration was able to escape with $11 billion less in cuts for unspent
appropriations authority than Mills had wanted. Furthermore, Congress, for the first time in history, set a ceiling on federal spending
of $180.1 billion for fiscal 1969, compared with the president's budget
request of $186.1 billion. Congress told the president how much to
cut-but not where.
IV

The last major decision that Johnson faced before leaving office
in January, 1969, was whether to recommend that the surtax be extended an extra year, until July 1, 1970. The Vietnam War was showing no signs of slowing down, and the president faced a large budget
deficit without the extension. But President-elect Richard Nixon refused to commit himself to the extension. Califano urged Johnson,
"I do not want to see you leave office with a budget that will be attacked" for "gimmickry and budget manipulation" or for "failure to
maintain the momentum you have spent 5 years building in social
programs." 93 Johnson agreed, and he recommended the one-year
extension.
After making the decision, Johnson was in a reflective mood. In
a meeting with members of the CEA staff and their families, he said
to them: "If I had it to do over again I would not have changed much.
I would have made the same decision to recommend a guns-and-butter
budget to the Congress, and I still would have ignored the counsel
of those who called for a breathing spell in the enactment of new
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legislation." 94 Those decisions turned out to be some of the most
fateful in modern economic history. They helped to unloose a rampant inflation that proved unexpectedly difficult to quell, an inflation that persisted, to the consternation of economic theorists, even
in the midst of recessions and high unemployment.
The roots of these decisions were far more complicated than the
argument that Johnson lied to protect both Vietnam and the Great
Society. White House economists underestimated the degree to which
Vietnam was fueling the economy in late 1965, and they overestimated
the slowdown that occurred in late 1966 and early 1967. The federal
deficit grew rapidly, from $3.8 billion in fiscal 1966 to $8. 7 billion
in 1967 and $25.2 billion in 1968. Growth in spending for Vietnam-a
$14.5 billion increase in 1967 and a $6.3 billion increase in
1968-added greatly to the deficit, but increases in Great Society programs and the slowdown in the economy significantly caused it to
increase as well. The Federal Reserve rode to the rescue in 1966, with
tight money that in the short run kept inflation from getting completely out of hand, but the system's stop-and-go policies had serious
effects on some sectors of the economy, made the economy more unpredictable, and only worsened the basic disease. The success of the
"new economics" during the early years of the Johnson presidency
had been bright. The tax cut demonstrated that government could indeed deliver a well-timed stimulus, and the "full employment" goal
of 4 percent was palpably close. But the future proved more difficult
to predict than the president's economists had hoped. Once the future
was clear, it became far more difficult to apply restraint than stimulus,
and once the surtax had been enacted, governmental economists had
overestimated the slowing effect that it would produce. 95
Johnson himself was quite naturally leery of embracing the harsh
medidine that went with bad news until the implications were obvious. But even after those implications were painfully apparent, one
of the last of the congressional barons, Wilbur Mills, remained intransigent. Only by outflanking the chairman was Johnson finally able
to win congressional passage of the tax increase. For a president who
had come to the job with an unquestioned reputation for skill in dealing with Congress and who had demonstrated his skill by winning
a tax cut within weeks of taking office, the irony was painful.
The irony is part of the essential tragedy of Lyndon Johnson and
his administration. He unquestionably had a deep philosophical commitment to federal action, both for peace in Vietnam and for the needs
of the poor. 96 Once committed, he felt inescapably bound to the goals.
Bill Moyers tells a revealing story. Moyers once asked Johnson, "If you
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could talk to anybody, just sit there with our shoes off and talk, who
would you like to talk to?" Johnson replied, "I'd like to talk to
Toynbee." "Why?" Moyers asked. "He could help me understand what
I'm up against in Vietnam. It's that God damn slate that you find when
you walk into this office. You know, it wasn't written by Kennedy,
and it wasn't written by Eisenhower, it was written by history. And
I just don't understand it." As Moyers reflected later: Johnson "fought
that war because he felt that history had decided we should. Well,
we know that history is what men make it." 9 7 For Johnson, destiny
and confusion among his advisers led him into an economic trap that
he felt he could not escape from.
The biggest irony of all was that the tax increase proved to be too
little and too late to rein in inflation. The Federal Reserve, in a hopeful
reaction to Congress's passage of the surcharge, eased back on the
money supply in mid 1968 as it waited for the increase to take hold.
The surcharge, however, created barely a ripple in the economY, and
by the end of 1968 the Federal Reserve reluctantly concluded that the
surcharge was a dud. After several cycles of ease and restraint, the
Federal Reserve once again stepped on the brakes to slow the economy
and thus further worsened the stop-and-go monetary policy that had
existed behind the scenes since 1966.
By this time, the seeds of fundamental economic instability had
been planted. War-induced inflation, accompanied by the expansion
of social programs and left unchecked by a tax increase, led consumers
to begin to expect inflation to continue. The longer it remained, the
harder it proved to uproot, and inflation became brutally persistent.
Complicating matters further was the growth of unemployment, first
to uncomfortable and, later, to crisis levels. This cruel combination,
which was christened stagflation, was the ultimate rebuff to the
Keynesian economists who surrounded Johnson. Inflation and
unemployment were supposed to be trade-offs, and Keynesian theory
simply could not explain how the two could grow simultaneously.
The unexplainable happened nonetheless, and the result was a decade
of instability that spilled over into international crises as well. Meanwhile, the federal government had its last balanced budget in fiscal
1969 before beginning seemingly endless years of deficits. The attempts by Johnson and his advisers to manage the economy foundered
on economic uncertainty and political reality as they unintentionally helped to steer the nation onto economic shoals.
Lyndon Johnson proved to be an able student in the economics
seminar that his advisers ran for him. He was a quick study, but he
found it hard to embrace the full implications of his lessons, especially
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when the lessons were unclear. He found it difficult to deal with the
uncertainty of economic predictions, to jump before the evidence was
irrefutable. Johnson was a man of considerable subtlety in public
policy. He attempted to fight a limited war when it would have been
easier to fight a large one; he battled for the Great Society, even in
the face of a widening war, when many members of Congress gladly
would have cut the social programs. He was a president caught in his
dreams, unable to control his destiny, and in the end he was destroyed
by this conflict.
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A Bibliographical Note
The Johnson Library's holdings on economic policy constitute one of the
finest parts of the collection, but they have been relatively little explored.
The subject has escaped the closures for security or privacy reasons that afflict other parts of the papers. Johnson's economic advisers, furthermore, ran
a seminar through the memos that they wrote for the president, so there is
an unusually rich record of debates, arguments, and decisions.
In addition, the oral histories from the economic policy makers are
valuable. The library's oral-history project has interviewed all of the main
actors, and many of the histories are very helpful in interpreting the memos,
in confirming perceptions, and in suggesting arguments that are not otherwise available. In addition, the library contains a "Meeting Notes File," which
contains notes on meetings in which the president participated. These notes
contain unusually frank comments not available elsewhere. Put together, all
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of these sources support the accuracy of Johnson's memoir, which is itself
an important document for studying these questions.
This essay touches on only a few of the vastly important economic problems with which the Johnson administration dealt. Other relatively umesearched issues on which the library contains rich holdings include the role of
Johnson's Council of Economic Advisers, congressional strategy on economic
policy, and the budgetary process-especially the Planning-ProgrammingBudgeting system that Johnson extended throughout the government.

4 I Foreign Aid and the Balanceof-Payments Problem:
Vietnam and Johnson's
Foreign Economic Policy
Burton I. Kaufman
WHEN VICE-PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON was suddenly elevated
to the White House after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
on November 22, 1963, he was faced with a series of problems-and
opportunities-in the area of foreign economic policy. The most important of these were maintaining at least the present level of foreign
aid against growing congressional opposition and resolving the nagging
balance-of-payments deficit. Until about 1966 the president enjoyed
strong congressional support in dealing with these problems. But the
United States' growing involvement in Vietnam changed all that.
The war affected the administration's foreign economic policies
in at least two ways. First, it exacerbated the balance-of-payments
problem, thereby helping to weaken the dollar in international money
markets and to undermine the international monetary system, based
as it was on the stability of the dollar. Second, by helping to tum a
once friendly into an increasingly hostile Congress, this country's
growing involvement in the conflict also undermined the administration's effectiveness on Capitol Hill and made it difficult for the White
House to get its high-priority items, including its spending proposals
for foreign aid, through the House and Senate without major cuts and
revisions. Indeed, foreign aid became the focus of congressional
misgivings and discontent over the war and over U.S. foreign policy
in general, and the huge cuts that the program sustained were directly
attributable to Congress' displeasure with the administration's escalation of the war after 1965.
I

Initiatives that had begun under Kennedy and, in some cases,
under President Dwight D. Eisenhower before him set the agenda of
the new administration after Johnson entered the White House in
1963. Basic to that agenda was maintaining or even increasing the
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size of the nation's foreign-aid program. This promised to be difficult,
for foreign aid had never been particularly popular, either among the
American public or on Capitol Hill. Dating back to the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Marshall Plan of 1948, the aid program had
moved gradually from European reconstruction to defensive alliances
and, finally, during Eisenhower's administration, to the economic
development of Third World countries.1 President Kennedy had called
for an even greater emphasis on economic aid to Third World nations, and soon after taking office, he had asked Congress to replace
the Mutual Security Act, by which foreign aid had been administered
for the previous ten years, with new legislation that would emphasize
an expanded program of development loans. Congress responded by
authorizing $7.2 billion for such loans over a five-year period. This
allowed Kennedy to streamline the entire foreign-aid program and to
establish, in November, 1961, the Agency for International Development (AID), which combined into one agency most of the nation's
technical- and economic-assistance programs overseas.
However, the House and Senate rejected Kennedy's request for
a five-year appropriation, insisting that the funds be appropriated annually as they had always been. Furthermore, Congress cut heavily
into the administration's requests for foreign aid, questioning the
management and effectiveness of foreign aid, arguing that too much
emphasis was being placed on military aid, and raising doubts about
the United States' ability to fund the program. In fact, by the time
Kennedy was killed in 1963, congressional opposition to foreign aid
had reached a new high, and Congress had cut the president's recommendations for fiscal 1964 by a record 34 percent, a problem that his
successor would have to face almost immediately after assuming
office.2
The new president shared many of the same concerns that Congress did about the foreign-aid program. Indeed, in a number of
respects, Johnson was more in sympathy with the program's critics
than with its defenders. As majority leader in the Senate for most of
Eisenhower's eight years in office, Johnson had almost always helped
to push the president's foreign-aid requests through Congress.3 Having taught Mexican-American students as a young man and then having represented in Congress a state that had a large Spanish-speaking
population, he had also long regarded himself as an expert in Latin
American affairs. As president he would display a particular interest
in the Alliance for Progress, which had been established in 1961 to
stimulate economic recovery and development in Latin America.4 In
addition, he had a real interest in eliminating hunger and in providing
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adequate nourishment world-wide, which he would make clear
throughout his administration. 5
On the other hand, many of Johnson's own views on the foreignaid program were narrowly circumscribed. As a congressman and a
senator, he had not displayed any particular interest in world affairs,
and to the extent that he had considered such issues as foreign aid,
he had been concerned not so much with their long-term economic
or social benefits to other nations as with their costs and with the
political return to the United States (and to himself) . Even after he
had been in the Oval Office for more than a year, he had said to a
group of congressmen, "One of the troubles with the aid program is
that you fellows place all the incompetent people you know in aid
jobs"; he added, "I know, because I used to do it myself." In other
words, as president, Johnson was not against foreign aid; far from it;
but he did have doubts about the cost effectiveness and the administrative efficiency of the program, concerns that were sometimes
more important to him than the program itself. Furthermore, he expected some form of measurable political return for America's
munificence, if nothing more than evidence of political gratitude on
the part of the recipient towards its benefactor.6
Other considerations also heavily influenced Johnson's attitude
on foreign aid and, for that matter, on most foreign economic issues.
In the first place, while he loyally supported Kennedy's aid program,
with its increased emphasis on development assistance, just as he had
supported most of Eisenhower's requests for aid, Johnson never felt
comfortable with Kennedy's approach to the Third World. Johnson
believed even more strongly than Kennedy had in regional programs
of mutual self-help, such as the Alliance for Progress, for Latin
America, and similar programs for Asia and Africa. He was also convinced that the world's other industrialized nations had to assume
more of the responsibility for the Third World, and he placed far more
emphasis than Kennedy had on the importance of private investment
in underdeveloped countries. In this respect, Johnson's approach to
economic development was a throwback to the early years of the
Eisenhower administration, when Eisenhower had tried to substitute
a program of expanded trade and private investment for foreign aid. 7
Perhaps as important, Johnson rarely failed to consider the domestic
political consequences of his foreign economic programs. Just as he
expected a political benefit to the United States from the assistance
that it provided to other countries, he was hesitant to undertake any
initiative that might either weaken him politically or undermine the
office that he represented. Conversely, he was willing to expend great
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effort and to take considerable risks in order to maintain presidential
integrity.
The limits of Johnson's commitment to foreign aid and his
abiding concern with political considerations was clearly evident in
his conflict with Congress over Kennedy's aid program for 1964. To
be sure, after taking office, Johnson stated his determination to restore
some of the large cuts that had already been made in the separate
authorization bills passed by the House and the Senate. He even made
an unexpected evening visit to Capitol Hill to meet with House
Speaker John W. McCormack's informal "Board of Education" session of congressional leaders to press for the full authorization, and
Johnson warned Otto Passman of Louisiana, who led the fight against
foreign aid in the Appropriations Committee, that if he (Johnson) did
not get the full $3.6 billion, he would carry the battle to the House
floor, where he would whip Passman.8
The president was far more concerned with Kennedy's tax bill
and his civil-rights measure, however, than he was with the foreignaid legislation. Thus, Johnson never carried through with his threat
to the Louisiana congressman. Even with respect to the aid program,
Johnson was worried more about an amendment to the appropriations
legislation that had nothing to do with foreign assistance than with
the aid program itself. Just before Kennedy was killed, Republican
Senator Karl E. Mundt of South Dakota attached to the measure a
rider, which would have prohibited the Export-Import Bank from
guaranteeing loans to finance trade with any Communist countries.
Johnson regarded Mundt's amendment and other similar ones as a
challenge to his office and as a test of his new authority as president.
Therefore, he decided to take whatever steps were necessary to defeat
the proposals. The vote on the amendment was set for November 26,
the day of President Kennedy's funeral. Johnson later commented: "We
could not afford to lose a vote like that, after only four days in office.
If those legislators had tasted blood then, they would have run over
us like a steamroller when they returned in January, when much more
than foreign aid would depend on their actions." 9
By using his considerable powers of persuasion and by displaying all the political acumen that had made him such an effective majority leader when he was in the Senate, the new president was able
to defeat Mundt's amendment and similar efforts. From the White
House, Johnson stayed on the phone, contacting his supporters to keep
them in line. At the same time he invoked Kennedy's memory to win
over undecided or uncommitted members of the House and the
Senate. Towards the end of the fight, when the House balked at a con-
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ference report that excluded restrictions that the House had recently
passed, he called the members of the House, many of whom had
already left Washington for the Christmas holidays, back to town for
another vote. On the next day, December 23, he invited the congressmen to the White House for a reception, where he stood on a
chair in the State Dining Room to press his case. In an unusual 7:00
A.M . session less than twenty-four hours later, the House agreed to
a second conference report, which allowed the president to authorize
export guarantees if he found them to be in the national interest.10
As a number of newspapers later noted, Johnson's decisive actions
during his first few weeks in office, including his successful fight
against credit restrictions on East-West trade, quickly established his
reputation as a strong and dynamic leader. But the new president left
his first bout with Congress over foreign aid convinced that dramatic
changes would have to be made in how the aid program was presented
to Congress if additional cuts were to be avoided. Believing that there
was a great deal of waste and mismanagement in the aid program and
having real reservations about its benefits for the United States, the
new president even considered splitting up the Agency for International Development in order to make the foreign-aid program more
palatable to Congress.
Eventually, Johnson decided against this, having been advised by
congressional leaders that too many changes had already been made
in the administration of the program.11 Instead, Johnson adopted
another tactic. Believing that previous cuts had seriously eroded the
prestige of the presidency, he decided to present Congress with a "preshrunk" request for 1965, which would make it extremely difficult
for the House and the Senate to reduce it still further. At the same
time, he would make clear to the House and the Senate that he was
placing more emphasis on self-help by recipient nations and that he
intended to rely more on private investment to assist in the economic
development of Third World nations, even making such investments
eligible for a special tax credit.12
Accordingly, in his message to Congress in March, Johnson asked
for only $3.52 billion in foreign aid, or approximately $1 billion less
than what Kennedy had asked for a year earlier. "The funds I am requesting," Johnson remarked, "will be concentrated where they will
produce the best results, and speed the transition from United States
assistance to self-support wherever possible." 13 During the ensuing
legislative process, administration leaders and congressional supporters pushed the point that the request for aid represented a "harder
figure" than any of the other proposals in recent years. They also con-
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tinued to emphasize the program's increased emphasis on self-support
and private investment.14
In all, Johnson encountered relatively little difficulty in pushing
his program through Congress and in getting most of what he had
sought. There continued to be the usual objections to foreign aid that
had been raised since at least Eisenhower's administration. Significantly, Johnson's request in May for $125 million in additional
economic and military assistance for South Vietnam troubled some
congressmen who were already worried about the worsening crisis in
Southeast Asia. Compared to a year earlier, however, the congressional
debate over foreign aid in 1964 was muted. For the first time in the
nineteen-year history of the foreign-aid program, the House Foreign
Affairs Committee approved the president's full requests for funding,
including the additional aid for Vietnam. Furthermore, the final appropriation of $3.25 billion was only $267 million, or 7.6 percent, less
than the original request, the lowest percentage cut in the entire
history of the aid program. Johnson's strategy of presenting Congress
with an already scaled-down program, his usual attention to every
detail of the legislative process, and the death in May of the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Clarence Cannon of
Missouri, who had supported past efforts to trim foreign aid-all accounted for getting the program through Congress relatively
unscathed.15
By the time that Johnson signed the foreign-aid legislation into
law in October, he was also having to pay more and more attention
to the balance-of-payments deficit. This, too, was a problem that he
had inherited from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In
fact, because of a precipitous drop in U.S. holdings of gold-from $24
billion in 1954 to about $18. 7 billion in 1959, as a result of the
payments deficit-Eisenhower had been forced to adopt many of the
same policies that Johnson would later employ. These included the
tying of aid to the fostering of trade, a cutting back in military expenditures overseas (a major item in the deficit), and the discouraging of Americans from investing abroad, except in Third World countries where U.S. capital was still considered to be essential to economic
development.16
Nevertheless, the balance of payments had continued to
deteriorate even after Kennedy had become president. As large
amounts of gold continued to leave the United States, the dollar came
under speculative attack. In order to reestablish confidence in the
dollar, to offset speculative surges, and to put an end to the heavy
losses in the nation's gold stock, the Kennedy administration had
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created a series of new financial tools and had obtained an agreement
among the finance ministers and the central bankers of the ten leading
industrial countries (the so-called Group of Ten) to make available
$6 billion in supplementary resources to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) for lending to any one of the ten. But while these measures
stopped the hemorrhaging of America's gold holdings and the gold
outflow for 1961 and 1962 slowed by half from what it had been in
1960,17 the balance of payments, on which the stability of the dollar
ultimately rested, continued to worsen.
In an effort to deal with this continuing problem, Kennedy had
announced in July, 1963, a comprehensive balance-of-payments program, the major feature of which was an interest-equalization tax,
designed to stem the flow of U.S. capital abroad by increasing the cost
to foreign borrowers of raising money in the United States. The program also provided for a further tying of foreign aid to U.S. exports,
a further reduction in overseas military costs, and a decision to seek
a $500 million standby credit from the IMF. But before the program
could be fully implemented, Kennedy had been killed, and it was left
to Johnson to deal with the whole thorny problem of the balance of
payments.18
From the time that he had taken office, the payments deficit had
affected almost every aspect of Johnson's foreign economic program.
Because of the unfavorable balance of payments, for example, the president had directed, in December, 1963, that maximum use be made
of dollar credits rather than local currencies for the purchase of
agricultural goods that were being sold under PL 480, or the Food for
Peace program.19 Similarly, the administration had increased the tying of AID grants and loans to American procurement as part of its
program to reduce federal expenditures abroad. For the same reason,
it had ordered significant cuts in overseas military spending and in
the number of government personnel who were serving abroad. Finally,
it had proposed a 50 percent increase in the quotas of the IMF as a
way of bolstering the dollar and the much weaker pound. 20
In fact, finding ways to achieve both additional financing for the
U.S. deficit and increasing international liquidity were the main
thrusts of Johnson's international monetary policy, just as they had
been for Kennedy.21 But the Europeans-especially the French, Dutch,
and Belgians-opposed a significant enlargement of the IMF (which
provided deficit nations with short-term balance-of-payments loans)
because the fund operated under the existing gold-dollar system,
which, they believed, allowed Washington to pay its debts by speeding
up its printing presses. President Charles de Gaulle of France, espe-
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cially, wanted to dethrone the dollar as a reserve currency and to force
greater discipline on the U.S. economy, which he considered to be
profligate.22 Instead of a SO percent increase in the IMF quotas,
therefore, the Europeans agreed in August to only an overall increase
of 25 percent, an action that White House aide Francis Bator and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy termed "more mouse than
elephant." 2 3
Nevertheless, the administration's overall scorecard for dealing
with the balance-of-payments deficit during its first year in office was
encouraging. The liquid deficit for 1964 was pegged at $2.4 billion,
down 28 percent from 1963 and down 39 percent from the annual
average for the years 1958 through 1960.24 Gold losses were even more
encouraging, being 60 percent less than the previous year and almost
90 percent less than the annual average for 1958 through 1960.25 To
be sure, the United States was still not out of the woods. Indeed, figures
for the last quarter of 1964 showed a worsening of the payments deficit,
so that at the end of January, a cabinet committee on the balance of
payments met at the White House to review possible additional
measures for holding down the dollar outflow from the United States.
For the most part, however, the mood of the meeting was sanguine.
Although there was by now consensus that additional measures were
called for, most participants at the meeting did not regard the situation as critical. "There is danger in too small and too weak a program,"
Chairman Gardner Ackley of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
thus told the preside:µt. "But there is also danger in too strong and
restrictive a program" (Ackley's italics) . Consequently, the committee recommended only a program of carefully monitored voluntary
restraints on direct investments and short-term loans abroad, a program that McGeorge Bundy referred to as one of "moral suasion." 26
On February 10, President Johnson presented the proposal to Congress. Although he asked the House and the Senate to renew and extend existing legislation, including the 1964 Interest Equalization Tax,
the president made clear that the heart of his program was a voluntary program of credit restriction. Assuring Congress that the state
of the dollar throughout the world was "strong-far stronger than three
or four years ago" -and that the dollar remained "as good as gold,
freely convertible at $35 an ounce," he said his recommendations were
"designed to serve our balance-of-payments objectives without imposing direct controls on American business abroad." "We seek to
preserve the freedom of the market place," he concluded (Johnson's
italics) . Publicly, the administration refused to estimate the impact
that the program would have on the payments deficit. But privately,
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administration officials anticipated cutting the deficit in half, from
about $3 billion in 1964 to approximately $1.5 billion for 1965.2 7
One proposal for dealing with the balance-of-payments problem
that the White House decided not to adopt was tightening credit and
raising interest rates as a way of discouraging imports and of attracting foreign capital. Although considerable discussion took place over
this issue, the administration concluded that the domestic economy
was still not sufficiently robust to withstand such a tight money
policy. 28 Powerful groups, including organized labor, also spoke out
against tightening credit, which George Meany, president of the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), told Johnson would be "a
dangerous measure in an economy of persistent unemployment and
rapid increases in both productivity and labor.1129
In Europe, reaction to the president's balance-of-payments program was mixed at best. On the one hand, there was satisfaction that
the United States was concentrating on limiting the outflow of capital,
and there was a sense that the bank part of the program would probably work. On the other hand, there were serious doubts about the
administration's ability to curtail corporate outflows by voluntary
means, and there was much regret- that in its program, the White
House did not include provisions for tightening domestic credit. 30 The
attitude in the United States was also mixed, as some businessmen
expressed puzzlement as to what exactly they were expected to do,
while others made clear that they could not curtail foreign spending
projects that were already under way. For the most part, however, the
general feeling within the business community was one of giving the
program a chance to see what it would accomplish. 31
Congress felt much the same way. In hearings before the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee that began in March, Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon and other administration officials spelled
out the administration's case for restricting the flow of capital abroad.
A number of economists and academicians also testified before the
committee, debating among themselves whether the balance-ofpayments deficit represented a "crisis" or a "near crisis," an argument
that mystified some senators. 32 On the whole, however, the administration had an easy time in Congress. By the end of September
the House and Senate had passed virtually unchanged the entire
package of legislation that Johnson had requested. 33
Indeed, 1965 marked the height of achievement insofar as
Johnson's foreign economic policy was concerned. Not only did Congress give the president almost everything that he wanted with respect
to his balance-of-payments program, but the payments deficit itself
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declined to $1.3 billion, the smallest deficit since 1957 and less than
half the $2.8 billion figure for 1964. This was enough to convince administration officials that the problem was under control. 34 Almost
as important, Johnson succeeded in getting his foreign-aid request of
$3.38 billion through the House and the Senate pretty much intact,
just as he had a year earlier. The final appropriation of $3.2 billion
represented a cut of just 6.9 percent, the smallest on record, smaller
even than the 7.6 percent reduction a year earlier.3 5 A major debate
did take place over the future and structure of foreign aid, which taxed
relations between the White House and Chairman Fulbright of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who wanted to separate
economic from military assistance and who favored a multiyear
authorization for foreign aid.36 The differences between Fulbright and
the administration, which did not want to stir the already-murky
waters of foreign aid, might have served as a warning of the difficulty
that the president would soon face in the Senate. 37 But together with
the payments legislation that Congress has already approved, the
passage of the aid legislation for 1965 added to the already existing
image of Johnson as being the most effective president since Franklin
Roosevelt. The year 1965 had indeed been a very good one for President Johnson.
II

It was the last such year, however. As a result of the Vietnam War,
matters changed dramatically during the next year and stayed that
way for the remainder of Johnson's administration. The improvement
in the balance of payments that had taken place in 1965 proved to
be transitory, not intrinsic. Although there were complex reasons for
this, having to do largely with excess demand and weak fiscal policies,
a major factor-as the administration realized but failed to do anything
about-was the cost of the Vietnam War, which further inflated an
already overheated economy, creating import demand, cutting into
export growth, and causing an outflow of gold and dollars that
threatened the very stability of the dollar, and indeed, the international monetary system. 38 But the balance-of-payments deficit was
not the only casualty of the Vietnam War; the White House's foreignaid program became a victim as well. For opponents of the war, particularly in the Senate, opposition to foreign aid became a way of striking back at the White House where it was particularly vulnerable
while presenting their own case to the American public. As a result, the debates over foreign aid, beginning in 1966, became increas-
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ingly acerbic, and the cuts in the program became more and more
severe.
It would be unfair to blame the Vietnam War entirely for the nation's balance-of-payments problem. As we have already seen, the
payments deficit was one that President Johnson had inherited from
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Furthermore, as early as 1965,
a number of administration officials had begun to express concern
about Johnson's program for dealing with the payments deficit, both
before and after Congress had acted on the program and before the
war could have much effect on the nation's economy. For the most
part, however, the recommendation of these economic experts was
merely to ask for stand-by controls on foreign credits should the president deem them necessary. 39
More important, the administration chose to ignore the connection between the Vietnam War and the nation's balance of payments
even though it was well aware that such a connection existed. It did
not act to counter the impact that the war had on the payments deficit,
through a combination of fiscal and monetary policy, because (1) it
did not think the payments deficit posed any major threat to the dollar
and (2) it was committed until too late to a "guns and butter policy."
As a result, the conflict in Southeast Asia continued to exacerbate
the nation's balance-of-payments problem, thereby weakening the
dollar and ultimately undermining the international monetary structure, which was based on the dollar.
Although the cost of the Vietnam War in terms of the nation's
balance of payments cannot be measured precisely, it certainly was
substantial. Several respected economists have put the annual costs
at $3.6 billion from 1964 to 1967. Of this amount, they attribute $1.6
billion to increases in direct military spending abroad and $2 billion
to the additional costs of inflation. If these figures are even approximately correct, then a major portion of the payments deficit during
these years was due to the war in Vietnam. As Robert Shaffer, a senior
economist with the Bank of America thus commented in a report to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970, "The war in
Southeast Asia cannot take the blame for the whole of our inflationary
and balance of payments problems, but it is obvious that it must share
a large part of them.1140
Furthermore, administration officials were fully aware of the impact that the war was having on the balance of payments. As early
as the end of November, when the military build-up in Vietnam was
still in its initial stages, a specially appointed cabinet committee commented on the connection between the war and the deficit. Forecasting
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an overall deficit of $1.4 billion for 1966, it attributed a good part of
the increase to a growth of $290 million in Defense Department
spending overseas, accountable "entirely to our intensified effort in
Southeast Asia." "A further $200 million increase in expenditures may
occur next year and worsen the projected deficit by that amount," the
committee also stated. However, the committee recommended that
the president merely tighten the existing voluntary program. 41
The committee's forecast of a $1.4 billion deficit in payments for
1966 proved to be remarkably accurate. The actual figure of $1.42
billion represented an increase of only $123 million over the deficit
for 1965, which was still only about half the $2.8-billion figure for
1964. Nevertheless, what concerned public officials both in the United
States and abroad, both within the administration and on Capitol Hill,
was the fact that there was any deterioration at all. Although the
cabinet committee had accurately estimated the size of the payments
deficit, other administration officials had predicted at the beginning
of the year that the balance of payments would move into equilibrium,
which was defined by the administration as a deficit or surplus no
greater than $250 million. Not only were they proven wrong, but by
the end of 1966 the deficit was growing, not contracting. Moreover,
the gains that the voluntary program had achieved were being more
than offset by the costs of the war in Vietnam.
That the balance-of-payments program was not working as well
as the administration had hoped was revealed by a report the Department of Commerce issued early in. 1966, a report that showed that
the country's major corporations planned to spend a record $8.8 billion
in plants and equipment overseas during the year. Also, preliminary
estimates indicated that the nation's trade balance would decline
significantly over the year, thereby exacerbating the deficit. Indeed,
figures on the balance of payments that were released in May showed
a seasonally adjusted first-quarter deficit in payments of $582
million.42
The White House was clearly worried by these latest figures. But
precisely because it attributed the deficit to the military build-up in
Vietnam rather than to any basic weakness in its own economic
policies, the administration concluded that no radical change was
called for in its balance-of-payments program. At a press conference
on May 18, Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler thus blamed the war in
Southeast Asia for the deficit in two ways. Not only did the war involve direct military outlays abroad, he said, but by heating up the
economy, it also raised prices and adversely affected the nation's
balance of trade. As a result, instead of an anticipated improvement
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from the previous year's $4.8 billion trade surplus, first-quarter figures
showed the surplus dropping to an annual rate of $4.4 billion for 1966.
"We suggest that careful analysis will support the proposition that,
absent the Vietnam build-up, the United States might have moved
substantially closer to equilibrium in its balance of payments," the
treasury secretary concluded (Fowler's italics) .43
What Fowler was saying, in other words, was that the American
economy and the American dollar were basically sound. The balanceof-payments deficit could and would be controlled. In the absence of
the conflict in Southeast Asia, the United States might already have
approached equilibrium. As for the dollar, whatever weakness was attributed to it was more the result of its heavy responsibilities as a
reserve currency than of any other factor, including the need to pay
for the overseas costs of the war. By sloughing off the economic impact of the Vietnam War in this way and by concluding that the international monetary system was structurally stable, the administration was ignoring the additional stresses and strains that the war was
placing on the nation's balance of payments. As a result, the dollar
was further weakened in international money markets, and the world's
entire monetary structure was placed in jeopardy.
In fact, the administration always remained far more concerned
about increasing international liquidity than about the impact that
the war was exerting on the nation's balance of payments. If by creating
a new reserve currency the dollar could be relieved of some of its international responsibilities, the White House was confident that it
could handle the nation's payments deficit. In June, 1965, therefore,
President Johnson instructed Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler to
establish a special study group on international monetary reform to
look into the matter of a substitute for the dollar. An advisory committee, known as the Dillon Committee after its chairman, former
Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, was also formed.
On the recommendation of the study group and the Dillon Committee, Secretary Fowler issued a call on July 10 for an international
conference to consider the creation of a new reserve asset in the
IMF, which would be based upon a system of "special drawing rights."
A number of different versions of this system were already in existence at the time Fowler asked for an international meeting. Although the precise details still had to be worked out, essentially the
concept being developed in Washington was to have an asset that,
like gold, could be used to buy foreign currencies and to settle balanceof-payments deficits without having to rely on the credit facilities
of the IMF. 44
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In August, Fowler and Undersecretary of State George Ball visited
all the major West European capitals to push for the convening of a
conference on international liquidity, which, they argued, would
eliminate the need for new monetary gold or increased holdings of
dollars. No mention was ever made of the economic consequences
of the Vietnam War. 45 Indeed, the administration presented its case
for a new reserve asset on the basis of an insufficiency of gold to keep
pace with the rapid growth of world trade, rather than on the United
States' payments deficit and a corresponding weakness in the dollar.
In explaining the rationale for a system of "special drawing rights,"
President Johnson later remarked: "By supplementing gold and dollars, the 'special drawing rights' system would relieve pressure on
both." 46
Just as the Europeans had earlier expressed doubts about the administration's balance-of-payments program, so now they expressed
reservations about its plan for a new reserve asset. With the notable
exception of France, which was still concerned mainly with reducing or ending the special status of the dollar, the Europeans were not
so much against a new asset per se; but they preferred an asset that
was somehQW linked to gold. Most certainly the_y did not want the
United States-or England-to escape honoring their international
obligations by paying their deficits with "funny money" instead of
with hard currencies. Reporting on a series of sessions that the Group
of Ten held in Paris at the end of January, Treasury Secretary Fowler
thus informed the president that the meetings "revealed a wide area
of agreement on international monetary reform, but a very sticky
disagreement on the relation between gold and the new reserve unit"
(Fowler's italics). Fowler concluded that "the Continentals are not
going to be easily budged from their determination to hitch the new
unit to gold and to keep it in a secondary position to gold." 47
Fowler was right. The Group of Ten held a series of meetings
throughout 1966 and well into 1967. It agreed that a new reserve currency was needed, but it failed to agree either on the form of that new
currency or on whether it should simply increase existing IMF drawing rights. The deadlock was not broken until the end of April, when
the United States agreed that the European members of the Common
Market would have veto power over the manufacture of the new asset
by increasing their quotas under the weighted voting procedures of
the IMF. Even then, there was a further delay until September before
agreement was reached in principle on the establishment of the new
asset, to be known as Special Drawing Rights (SDRsl, and many details
of the system were still not resolved. 48 The result was that when an
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attack against the British pound began in November, which would
spread to the dollar and threaten the entire international monetary
structure, the administration was forced, in President Johnson's words,
"to deal with it by using the tools at hand." 49
The assault on the British pound had not been unexpected in
Washington. Great Britain's balance of payments was chronically far
worse than that of the United States, and its inability to inspire confidence in its long-term economic future had led to recurring speculation against sterling since 1961. In 1964 the United States had taken
the lead in arranging a $3 billion package of credits from the Group
of Ten members plus Austria. This massive support turned the
speculative outflow into an inflow and thus saved the pound. In 1965,
Undersecretary of State George Ball personally negotiated an additional $925-million package of credits from the United States and the
European central banks. By mid 1966 the British were able to announce that they had repaid all of their short-term debts to foreign
banks, although they still owed the United States about $500 million.
Already the trade gap had begun to widen ominously again, however;
and once more the pound came under heavy pressure, in part because
the Vietnam War was helping to drive interest rates up in the United
States, thereby attracting capital away from London. The British
responded with a tough economic policy at home and with heavy borrowing abroad, which included almost a doubling of their credit (or
swap) line with the United States, from $700 million to $1.35 billion.
The program worked well through the first quarter of 1967. Towards
the end of 1966, Great Britain even enjoyed a surplus in its balance
of payments. 50
Then the British were hard hit again by a disappointing amount
of exports, by rising interest rates abroad, and, finally, by the ArabIsraeli war of June, 1967. The conflict led to the closing of the Suez
Canal, substantial withdrawals of sterling, and increased costs for imports, largely for petroleum. In a last-ditch effort to hold the sterling
rate by drawing funds back to Great Britain, London increased the
discount rate sharply. The United States tried to help by making selective market purchases of sterling. But this time the speculative
pressures were too great. Britain began to lose reserves at a rate of $250
million a day. Finally, on November 18, 1967, London announced to
Washington that it was devaluing the pound from $2.80 to $2.40.
Those who had gambled on a devaluation of sterling and had cashed
their pounds in for gold had won their bet. 51
The situation that the United States was now facing became
perfectly clear. "Now the dollar is in the front line," Treasury Secretary
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Fowler remarked rather imprudently but truthfully after news of the
devaluation was officially announced in London. Washington was fully
aware that the price of gold would come under great upward pressure
in the case of a British devaluation, as speculators turned to their next
likely candidate for devaluation, the already-weakened dollar. "The
gold market has been under strong demand pressure during most of
1966 and 1967, and little relief appears in sight," Secretary Fowler thus
informed President Johnson a few days before sterling was devalued
(Fowler's italics) . If sterling fell, Fowler said, there would be great
monetary unrest. Perhaps the only solution to the crisis would be a
rise in the price of gold.52
The White House was determined, however, to keep the dollar
as "good as gold" -that is, to keep the dollar convertible at the exchange rate of $35 an ounce. To do otherwise, to effectively devalue
the dollar by increasing the price of gold, would have had far-reaching
consequences, not the least of which would be to drive up the overseas
expenses of United States defense commitments, including the cost
of the war in Vietnam. It would also make imports for American consumers more expensive, something that the administration was anxious to avoid.
Estimating that losses would be as high as $2 or $3 billion a day
(compared to Britain's highest daily loss of $1.3 billion), the administration thus turned to the gold pool, which had been established
in London during Kennedy's administration in order to prevent undue speculation in gold and to channel gold to central banks in an
orderly fashion.53 The strategy was risky, for it was far from certain
that the pool would go along with the United States in holding down
the price of gold. 54
As it was, in the week after the devaluation, the pool was called
on to support the gold market to the extent of $580 million in gold,
with the United States supplying 60 percent of the gold.55 Furthermore, the European members of the pool were becoming more and
more concerned about the losses that they were sustaining. As demand for gold continued to grow, some erosion of European support
became evident. By the end of December, losses in the gold pool
reached more than $1.5 billion. Exacerbating the crisis were two additional developments. First, preliminary figures indicated that the
U.S. balance of payments would deteriorate very badly during the
fourth quarter of 1967. When these figures were made public, concern about the dollar was almost certain to be translated into additional speculative demand for gold. Second, U.S. losses of gold were
rapidly bringing American gold reserves close to the amount necessary
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in order to meet the legal requirements that gold be held to cover 25
percent of the domestic issue of notes, or about $10 billion. The
Federal Reserve Board could waive this requirement, but this was
hardly understood in European markets; in any case, the gold-cover
requirement had a bad psychological effect on the gold market, because
it suggested that the United States would soon be unable to meet its
commitment to keep the dollar convertible.56
To meet the immediate crisis, the president outlined, on New
Year's Day, a new and much-tougher balance-of-payments program.
Forecasting a payments deficit of $3.5 to $4 billion, the president stated
that the United States could not "tolerate a deficit that could threaten
the stability of the international monetary system-of which the U.S.
dollar is the bulwark." As the centerpiece of his program, he announced a series of mandatory controls over private investments abroad. He
also authorized the Federal Reserve Board to tighten its program
restraining foreign lending by banks, and he announced a series of steps
that were designed to lower government spending overseas, curtail unnecessary U.S. travel abroad, and increase the U.S. trade surplus. Such
a program, he said, would "keep the dollar strong. It will fulfill our
responsibilities to the American people and to the free world." Two
weeks later, in his State of the Union message, the president asked
Congress to remove the legal requirement for a 25 percent gold cover
on issues of notes, remarking that this would free up more gold in
defense of the dollar.57
Reaction abroad to the president's balance-of-payments message
was highly favorable, and for a few months, this had a tranquilizing
effect on the speculative fever. But doubts about the president's ability
to get his program through Congress contributed to a build-up of
pressures against the dollar once more. In Washington, various proposals were considered to deal with this latest chapter in the gold
crisis, including a recommendation by the Dillon Committee to close
the gold pool, adopting in place of the pool a two-price system that
would keep the official price for gold-or the price at which official
transactions would take place-at $35 an ounce while letting the
private market set its own limits. 58
This was the policy that the administration adopted. The resumption of heavy speculation in gold in early March made it abundantly
clear that the United States would have to take new steps to protect
the $35 price of gold. In the first week of March the pool had to put
$300 million of gold into the market. In four days beginning on March
11, the pool lost approximately $1 billion. By the end of the week,
speculative fever had gotten out of control. To make matters worse,
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the members of the pool, except for Germany, announced their intention to replace their losses by drawing gold from the United States.
In response, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed all diplomatic
posts on March 15 that the London gold market was to be closed that
day and that the United States had invited the central bankers of
Europe to an emergency meeting in Washington to discuss the
situation.5 9
At the meeting, which convened on the sixteenth, Chairman
William McChesney Martin of the Federal Reserve Board announced
flatly that the United States had ruled out any increase in the official
price of gold. He also made it clear that either agreement had to be
reached on some plan based on the $35 price or a new system would
have to be established in which the dollar would no longer be convertible. With really little choice between going along with the United
States or risking total chaos, the central bankers agreed to a two-tier
system, pledging neither to sell nor, for the time being, to buy gold
in the private market, thereby giving up potential profits but leaving
speculators with the problem of unloading their gold at prices that
might fall below $35 an ounce. Soon after the announcement of the
two-tier system, the price of gold in the private market retreated back
towards $35 an ounce.
For the moment, then, the gold crisis was over, and the dollar
remained convertible at $35 an ounce. Ironically, a near revolution
in France in 1968, led by rioting students and workers who were protesting a rise in unemployment and a slowdown in the growth of the
economy, had the incidental consequence of strengthening the dollar
while undermining the French franc. Meanwhile, the machinery had
been put in place that would finally, in 1970, result in the issuing
of a new reserve asset, the SDRs.
In reviewing the critical months from November, 1967, when the
British first announced that they were going to devalue the pound,
until March, 1968, when the two-tier gold system was established,
President Johnson was thus able to claim that a "historic turning
point" had been reached in terms of the international monetary
system: "The world's leading bankers were telling the speculators that
henceforth the banks would be looking to the new international currency, not to gold, to enlarge monetary reserves. They were committed to building the international economy on the basis of intensive
partnership." 60
This was hardly the case, however. These critical months had
disclosed just how fractured and fragmented the international
monetary system really was. Paradoxically, they had also underscored
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just how interrelated the world economy was, just how dependent it
had become on the shaky dollar, and just how much the stability of
the dollar rested ultimately on a resolution of the United States'
balance-of-payments difficulties. Here lay the crux of the problem for
the White House; here also lay the ultimate dilemma for its entire
foreign economic program. Because, as administration officials had
always realized, in the absence of a settlement of the Vietnam War
or of steps to deal with a basic war-related cause of the payments probblem-war-generated inflation-the chances of a settlement of the
payments deficit were greatly diminished. Yet the president continued
to be committed to carrying on the conflict in Southeast Asia, and
he opposed the type of tax increase that might have cooled off the
domestic economy.
In fairness to Johnson, in his State of the Union address of January
10, 1967, he did propose a 6 percent surcharge on income taxes, which
was later raised to 10 percent. This was really a case of too little, too
late, however; for by the time Congress had approved the measure in
1968, the payments deficit had become chronic, and the dollar was
under speculative siege. Besides, until the gold crisis at the end of
1967, the heart of the administration's balance-of-payments program
continued to be voluntary controls on foreign investments and credit.
Only after the crisis had mounted did the White House move to a
more comprehensive program that included mandatory controls.
Furthermore, by 1968 the war had so undermined the president's
support in Congress that most of his legislative proposals for dealing
with the balance-of-payments problem were defeated on Capitol Hill.
The president did get Congress finally to pass his tax surcharge, which
had been rejected a year earlier; and the House and the Senate also
agreed to lift the 25 percent gold cover against Federal Reserve notes,
which the president wanted. But they rejected his proposals to tax
Americans who were traveling abroad, and they defeated the Trade
Expansion bill of 1968, which was designed to increase exports by a
further liberalization of world trade. They also failed to act on a third
administration proposal, which was aimed at attracting foreign visitors
to the United States by waiving visa requirements in certain cases.61

m
The Vietnam War loomed large, however, not only over the
balance-of-payments program but also over Johnson's foreign-aid program. Many members on Capitol Hill, particularly in the Senate, expressed their discontent over the war and over the administration's
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handling of foreign policy by voting against the program, by severely
cutting the president's spending recommendations, and by rejecting
his proposals for major changes in the program, including multiyear
authorizations and the separation of economic- from militaryassistance bills.
The White House, in order to get its foreign-aid bill through Congress in 1965, had agreed to conduct a review of the entire aid program. As a result of the review, which was conducted during the fall
of 1965, the president forwarded to Congress in January a $3.39-billion
foreign-aid bill, which was the smallest in the history of the program,
but one that was also substantially different from his two earlier proposals in terms of assumptions and objectives. As in the case of his
earlier requests for aid, Johnson continued to place great emphasis
on the self-help aspects of economic assistance; indeed, he now made
self-help and regional cooperation the core of his program. 62
At the same time, however, the president proposed separating the
military-aid and the economic-aid programs by introducing two
separate bills, and he requested five-year authorizations for each program. He also spoke more eloquently than ever before about the need
to attack the root causes of world misery and poverty, to address the
problems of disease and overpopulation, and, above all, to deal with
the problems of world hunger, which he referred to as "a catastrophe
for all of us." In order to eliminate hunger and to make the developing countries self-sufficient in food, he proposed a broad program of
food aid and agricultural assistance, which he labeled his Food for
Work program. 63 In effect, by asking to separate economic from
military aid and by seeking a multiyear authorization for the aid program, Johnson was responding to Fulbright and to the other senators
who had long pushed for such legislation. By his eloquent appeal to
rid the Third World of disease, overpopulation, and hunger, Johnson
may also have hoped for additional support in the upper chamber from
senators who had long been concerned with the social plight of the
underdeveloped countries. This did not happen, however; for by the
time that Congress took up the foreign-aid program, the war in Vietnam had become the Senate's overriding concern.
At just what time the Senate began to tum against Johnson in
regard to Vietnam is difficult to say. Certainly even in 1966, the president's conduct of the war was still enjoying considerable support in
the upper chamber, perhaps majority support. But stung by the rapid
escalation of the war and by the apparent unwillingness of the administration to negotiate a settlement of the conflict on terms that
North Vietnam could accept, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
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tee vented its anger by attacking Johnson's foreign-aid request for 1966
in nationally televised hearings that were dominated by the topic of
Vietnam. Roles became totally reversed in the debate over foreign aid.
Now the administration led the fight for multiyear authorization of
the aid program, while committee chairman Fulbright, who one year
earlier had pushed for this measure, chose to attack the administration's aid program because it did not place enough emphasis on
multilateral aid and because it would aid such dictatorial regimes as
the former Diem government in South Vietnam, which, Fulbright
held, had led to "full scale war." 64
Despite a personal appeal from Secretary of State Dean Rusk
for a five-year authorization bill, 65 the committee reported out a bill
that limited the foreign-aid program to a one-year authorization.
Although the committee did go along with the administration in
reporting out separate bills for economic and military aid, it also cut
the president's economic-aid request by slightly under $100 million
and his military-aid request by $25 million, not in themselves major
reductions but ones that did reflect its change of attitude from a
year earlier, when it had cut the president's original request by $28
million. In sending the measure to the floor of the Senate, the committee made clear just how much it had been influenced by its discontent over the Vietnam War, a war, it said, that ''casts a very long
shadow" and that had led many members of the committee to "feel
that the United States is overcommitted, or in danger of becoming
overcommitted, in the world at large.1166 Even after the measure had
reached the full Senate, the war continued to dominate the debate
as Fulbright, who had agreed to manage the legislation, nevertheless
voted for a series of restrictive amendments and cuts in his committee's own bill.67
As a result, the total authorization for economic ;1nd military
assistance was cut by nearly $500 million from what the president
had requested. These reductions were salvaged in the House, where
support for the war was much greater. 68 Even in the lower chamber,
however, the Vietnam War was a major coxicern. Although many
members of the House were reluctant to voice their opinions in an
election year and therefore supported the authorization measure that
came out of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the committee itself
recognized the growing opposition to the aid program because of the
war when it stated in its report on the aid legislation, "Much of the
criticism of foreign aid reflects dissatisfaction with the world situation or with aspects of U.S. foreign policy which the foreign assistance
program has been used to implement." 69
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Furthermore, in the ensuing appropriations process, the aid program was sharply cut back to $2.9 billion, almost $450 million less
than what the administration had originally requested and $567
million, or 16.3 percent, less than what Congress had authorizedthe largest percentage cut since 1964 and the first time since 1958
that the aid program had been funded under $3 billion. Trying to explain the rationale for these reductions, Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut pointed to a "neo-isolationism which threatens the entire
structure of our foreign policy." He then added that "whatever their
motivation . . . it is difficult to escape the impression that [these neoisolationists] are using the foreign aid program . . . as an instrument
of pressure in an effort to compel the Administration to revise its Viet
Nam policy." 70
Dodd's observation applied even more to the 1967 fight over
foreign aid. Anticipating a struggle, Johnson had established a special
task force on foreign aid in October, under AID's administrator
William S. Gaud, to recommend improvements in the program and
to consider "the steps necessary to create a stronger public and congressional constituency for the program." The task force made a series
of recommendations, which emphasized particularly the importance
of popular participation and self-help in all phases of the development
process,7 1 themes that Johnson had underscored in his annual message
to Congress, in which he asked for a $3.2-billion foreign-aid package.
Stressing also the importance of regional development programs, the
president told the House and the Senate that his program represented
the "minimum contribution to mutual security and international
development which we can safely make." 72
Congress had not bought that argument a year earlier, however,
and it did not buy it in 1967. Indeed, congressional support for foreign
aid dropped to an all-time low when the House and the Senate adopted
a series of restrictive amendments that were aimed at curbing the
president's authority to conduct foreign policy. Both directly and indirectly, the war in Vietnam once more had determined the outcome
of the debate. In the House the issue was not so much the war itself
as it was the need for fiscal restraint. But even this was tied into the
costs of the war. A conservative coalition of Republicans and southern
Democrats, who had greatly influenced the House's action on other
administration-sponsored legislation, argued that vast cuts were
needed in foreign aid so as to reduce the nation's mounting deficit.
They were joined by a number of northern liberals, who were convinced that given the escalating costs of the conflict in Southeast Asia,
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cutting foreign aid was the only way to save at least some of the
domestic programs of the faltering Great Society.73
In the Senate the link between opposition to the foreign-aid program and opposition to the war was even more direct, as Fulbright
and a group of other Democratic senators continued to use the debate
over foreign aid as a vehicle for attacking the White House's conduct
of the war. Over the summer and fall of 1966, relations between the
White House and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had deteriorated from bad to worse, as Johnson and Fulbright
had clashed over such issues as sales of arms to the Mideast, which
the senator blamed for initiating an escalation in the Middle East arms
race and which the president defended as necessary in light of a
massive Soviet arms build-up in the region, including the sale of
MIG-2ls to lraq.7 4 They also came to loggerheads over Johnson's decision to increase the number of countries that were receiving development loans and technical assistance under the foreign-aid programs.
Fulbright accused the president of violating the intentions of Congress, which had placed restrictions on the number of countries that
could receive such aid. Johnson responded that Congress had given
him the authority to exceed the statutory limits when he deemed that
it was in the national interest to do so.7 5
Although both of these questions came up in the 1967 debate over
foreign aid, it was the war in Southeast Asia which, more than any
other issue, shaped the discourse and determined the dialogue that
took place. Using the same metaphor as it had a year earlier, the
Foreign Relations Committee described the "shadow of Vietnam" as
hanging even "far longer and darker" over foreign aid than it had a
year earlier.7 6 Similarly, in responding to Secretary of State Rusk, who
had just finished urging the Foreign Relations Committee to support
the foreign-aid program as a way of bringing about a more peaceful
world, Chairman Fulbright commented: "Perhaps I do not view it in
the right perspective. But when you talk about building a peace, while
at the same moment we are waging an ever-increasing war, it leaves
one with a sense of schizophrenia." 77
Consequently, the Senate and the House cut the president's request for 1968 by nearly $1 billion, or from $3.12 billion to $2.19
billion. This was $408 million less than the $2. 7 billion appropriation for 1956, hitherto the smallest appropriation in the history of
the foreign-aid program. Moreover, they restricted the president's
authority over foreign aid in a number of ways, including the ban on
selling arms on credit to Third World countries after 1968 and the
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revocation of the president's discretion to waive the ceiling on the
number of nations that would be eligible to receive development loans,
which Congress had set at twenty. In sum, Congress delivered a
crushing blow to the president's foreign-aid program, which reflected
clearly its displeasure with the administration's policy in Southeast
Asia.7 8
Matters became even worse for the White House in 1968, as the
House and the Senate again ripped into the administration's requests
for foreign aid, approving a bill that, for the second year in a row,
established a record low in funding. In fact, the battle over foreign
aid in 1968 was almost a repeat of the conflict between the White
House and Congress a year earlier. Once more the president made
the smallest aid request, $2.9 billion, in the history of the program,
repeating the now-familiar themes about the program's stress on selfhelp and on multilateral and regional programs of economic development but giving special attention to the need for agricultural growth
and population planning in Third World nations in order to win their
"war against hunger." 79 As in 1967, however, the war in Vietnam
dominated every aspect of the legislative process. In the hearings before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which again were televised
nationally, Secretary Rusk was forced to devote virtually all of his
testimony to a defense of the administration's policy in Southeast Asia,
as Chairman Fulbright set the tone of the hearings on opening day
by commenting that it was "not possible to talk about foreign aid,
or indeed any problem of this country's foreign relations without
discussing the war in Vietnam." 80 In fact, Rusk had agreed to appear
in open session before the committee only because the administration believed the alternative would be no aid bill at all, which would
enable the press to report that the White House had "sacrificed foreign
aid" for Vietnam.81
Rusk's appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee,
however, did the administration scarcely any good, as the committee
in July reported out a bill adding an additional $48 million to the $968
million in cuts that the House had already made on the president's
request. In sending the measure to the floor of the Senate, which approved the committee's recommendations virtually unchanged, the
committee remarked that it had "acted on the foreign aid bill this
year against a background of growing concern over the international
posture of the United States and over the problems which the
American people face at home." The committee added that "over both
the foreign and domestic crises hang the fiscal and balance-of-
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payments crises .. . which fundamentally result from the overcommitment both at home and abroad." 82
Indeed, the reductions in appropriations t: at were finally approved
by the House and by the Senate in October were, in terms of percentages, the largest ever. The $1. 76-billion measure that was sent to
the president was $1.16 billion, or 39. 7 percent less, than the $2.92
Johnson had originally requested. Furthermore, the heaviest cuts were
made in precisely those development programs, such as the Alliance
for Progress, that the president had emphasized in his February message to Congress. Also, Congress had placed further restrictions on
the president's authority to dispense foreign aid, including the ban
on such assistance to nations that were already trading with North
Vietnam. It would be too much to say that opposition to the war in
Vietnam was the only reason for Congress' hostility to Johnson's
foreign-aid program. ClearlY, all the concerns that Congress had been
expressing for years about the program, as well as new worries about
the balance-of-payments deficit, were evident in this latest debate over
foreign aid. But certainly the Vietnam conflict was the central issue
in 1968, even more than it had been in 1967.
IV

In a real sense, then, President Johnson's foreign-aid and balanceof-payments programs were casualties of the Vietnam War. One can
legitimately ask, "So what? What was at stake here?" After all, the
critics of foreign aid had long contended that such assistance to Third
World countries (as opposed to Marshall Plan aid to Europe) had been
money down the drain, failing either to bring about economic development in the Third World or to make friends for the United States or
even to prevent hunger and starvation in places such as Africa or certain parts of Asia. Even President Johnson had had serious reservations about the effectiveness of foreign aid, and there is plenty of
evidence to support the position of those who advocated cutting the
aid program or eliminating it entirely. As for the impact of the Vietnam War on the nation's balance of payments and, by extension, on
the international monetary system, one can also legitimately wonder
whether, in the long run, much could have been done to redress the
balance of payments or even whether the existing gold-dollar monetary
system was defensible or worth defending. After all, it seems perfectly
clear in the middle of the 1980s, with record-level payments deficits
being recorded almost every quarter, that the United States' balance-
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of-payments problems are so generic that no single action taken by
any president in the 1960s could have stayed the red ink that has
flowed for more than a quarter of a century in America's international
accounts, much less could have prevented the system of floating exchanges, which replaced fixed rates in 1971 and with which the world
has been successfully conducting international business ever since.
Whether or not the foreign-aid program has successfully achieved
even a small part of the many goals ascribed to it over the last forty
years, however, the fact remains that it was the central feature of U.S.
foreign economic policy from the 1940s through at least the 1960s.
Furthermore, as the United States became increasingly concerned
with developments in the Third World, beginning sometime in the
1950s, the foreign-aid program became integral to the nation's overall
foreign policy and remained so throughout the 1960s. One only has
to point to one of the better-known parts of that program, the Alliance
for Progress, to illustrate this point. Moreover, whether or not the program has been successful in achieving its goals, it has had a number
of important institutional spin-offs, such as the Inter-American
Development Bank (IADB), for Latin America, and the International
Development Association (IDA), a soft-lending agency of the World
Bank, which the United States helped to establish at the end of the
1950s in order to promote Third World economic development and
which in the 1980s is assuming an important role in refinancing the
huge international debts of Third World countries. Such achievements
as these are not to be scoffed at lightly.83
As for the balance-of-payments problem, even if the payments
deficit appears in the 1980s to be rooted in fundamental structural
changes in the world economy over the last twenty-five years, -most
notably competition from Japan and other developed or developing
nations, the fact remains that in the 1960s the Vietnam War exacerbated an already-serious payments problem, that this weakened the
dollar, and that ultimately the weakened dollar undermined the existing international monetary structure. Furthermore, the administration understood perfectly well the interrelationship between the
payments deficit and the Vietnam War, but it chose to ignore this fact,
because it was satisfied that the dollar was basically sound, it was
unprepared to risk the political flack that any economic tightening
as a result of the war might create, and it was most certainly unwilling to reconsider its military commitment in Vietnam. So, like its
foreign-aid program, its balance-of-payments program fell victim to
the war in Southeast Asia.
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Although this chapter has emphasized only these two programs,
they were by no means the only foreign economic issues that concerned the president during his five years in office. There were a
number of other problems, inherited from the previous administration, with which Johnson also had to deal as president. These included
the P.L. 480, or "Food for Peace," program; the Kennedy Round of tariff
negotiations; the establishment of the Asian Development Bank;
quotas on oil imports; increased funding for the Export-Import Bank;
and the expansion of East-West trade. But while all of these matters
received considerable attention during Johnson's administration, none
was regarded by the White House as being more important than the
questions of aid and the balance-of-payments deficit, and many of
them shared the common denominator with aid and the payments
deficit of being affected in a way that was contrary to the administration's policies because of the war.
To take just one example, in Johnson's well-known speech at
Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, in which the president
offered to enter into peace talks with North Vietnam, he also held
out the prospect of a massive billion-dollar economic-development
program for Southeast Asia. As part of the program, in December the
United States would join with thirty-two other nations in signing a
charter for the establishment of the Asian Development Bank. And
in his foreign-aid message of February 9, 1967, Johnson indicated that
he would ask Congress for $200 million as the United States' contribution to a special trust fund to be administered by the bank. Even
before he had submitted his proposal to Congress, however, he had
been advised by Treasury Secretary Fowler-that it was likely to receive
a hostile reception because of the war and because of the United States'
huge financial commitments in Southeast Asia. 84 In September, the
president did submit a request to Congress in which he asked for $200
million for the bank, but the atmosphere in Congress was so hostile
that the president delayed forwarding the proposal for a week, and once
the request was sent, it never made its way out of committee. 85 In
1968, Johnson again asked for congressional approval of a $200-million
U.S. contribution to the bank's special trust fund; but the results were
the same as they had been a year earlier. The bill died in committee
after the Foreign Relations Committee rejected an amendment to the
legislation providing that no more than $25 million should be appropriated for the bank in any single year until the Vietnam conflict
was ended.86 In terms of Johnson's foreign economic policy, then, the
war in Vietnam had the same cancerous effect as it had on other
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aspects of the administration's foreign and domestic policies, destroying what had been the most promising-and popular-administration
since the New Deal and turning it into a dying patient over whose
early demise few tears were shed.
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Part 2 I Protecting the Environment

5 I Lyndon Johnson and
Environmental Policy
Martin V. Melosi
IN QUANTITATIVE MEASURES ALONE the Johnson administration's "New Conservation" deserves more attention than it has yet
received. No less than nine task forces directly addressed environmental problems (see list 1, Appendix) . Between 1963 and 1968 the president signed into law almost three hundred conservation and beautification measures, which were supported by more than $12 billion
in authorized funds. This represented more environmental measures
than had been passed during the preceding 187 years. The legislation
spanned issues from land policy to water pollution and from wilderness areas to urban open space (see list 2, Appendix) . Thirty-five areas
were authorized for addition to the National Park Service.1
Given the scale of legislative action and heightened national interest in the environment during the 1960s, it is surprising that the
record of the Johnson administration remains diffuse-if not obscure.
Admittedly, the field of Environmental History is quite new and its
limits are still being defined. Yet, few historians have looked beyond
the popular environmental signposts of the 1960s-such as Rachel
L. Carson's Silent Spring (1962), the Santa Barbara oil spill (1969), the
National Environmental Policy Act (1969)-to identify and evaluate
the "New Conservation." Several questions, barely explored, require
careful attention: i Iow does the conservation and beautification record
of the Johnson administration fit into the evolution of the modern
environmental movement? Was the New Conservation really new?
What was the role of President Johnson in establishing environmental policy between 1963 and 1968? An assessment of documents in
the LBJ Library-and some speculations based on the existing
literature-can begin to answer these questions.
From Conservationism
to the Modern Environmental Movement
The variety and extent of the conservation and beautification programs of the Johnson presidency demonstrate a commitment to the
environment that is on a par with any administration before or since.
While not providing the leadership on every issue, the Johnson ad-
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ministration's wide-ranging activity supports the claim that the 1960s
constituted a transitional period from an old-style conservationism,
concerned primarily with the utilization of natural resources, to a
modern environmentalism, emphasizing quality-of-life issues and environmental protection.
The "old" conservation, initiated in the Progressive Era, was an
effort to conserve, preserve, manage, or protect the nation's resources.
As business reform was meant to bring order to the American economy
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so conservation
was meant to rationalize the use of natural resources. What came to
be known as "the conservation movement" in the United States had
its intellectual antecedents in eighteenth-century Europe and its
American origins in the early nineteenth century.
By the late nineteenth century, several milestones had marked
the coming of the movement, including the publication of George
Perkins Marsh's Man and Nature (1864), the development of the "national park" idea, the establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey
(1879), and the founding of John Muir's Sierra Club (1892) . By the
turn of the century the conservation movement had achieved national
status, especially with the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.
Public policy on resource questions after 1900 was guided by those
who wished to prevent waste through efficient use-or resource
conservationists-as opposed to those who were more interested in
saving what remained of the wilderness-or preservationists. Some
historians, such as J. Leonard Bates, thought that the conservationists
of the Progressive Era were combatting the greed and wastefulness
of the business world. Others, especially Samuel P. Hays, perceived
that professionals and scientists from the East, acting from within
the federal bureaucracy, were employing centralized policy-making
powers to curtail the waste of resources and to establish programs of
"wise use" in the West. This meant that western interests were often
at loggerheads with federal conservationists, since the former wanted
local control and the ability to exploit the resources for their own
economic ends. 2
The New Deal built on the legacy of the Progressive Era. Franklin
Roosevelt brought into office a strong personal interest in conservation,
and he surrounded himself with men of similar thought, such as Harold
L. Ickes, Henry A. Wallace, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Hugh Hammond Bennett.3 But of more importance, the massive problems of the
Great Depression-especially related to the dust bowl in the West and
to economic strife in the South-helped to steer the New Deal government toward federal solutions to pressing environmental problems. The
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soil-conservation program emphasized the efficient use and management of soil resources to preserve agricultural lands. A concern for grazing lands in the West led to the Taylor Grazing Act (1934). Reforestation
programs, aided by the establishment of the Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC), complemented soil conservation. In addition, the New
Deal government conducted several resource-development projects, led
the drive to develop the nation's wildlands and rivers, and participated
in a program of scientific game management.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is probably the best known
of the resource-development activities. It was the most sophisticated
application of the multiple-use concept that had yet been devised.
TVA was a multipurpose river project that involved flood control, the
production of fertilizer, soil conservation, reforestation, the construction of inland waterways, the promotion of regional economic growth,
and the generation of hydroelectric power. As part of the New Deal
recovery program, TVA was also meant to serve as a source of
unemployment relief in the South.
While the various conservation programs of the New Deal were
not organized through a coherent environmental policy, there was
little doubt that they perpetuated federal leadership in the management of the nation's resources. However, for several years after the
New Deal, conservation policy on the national level failed to grow
much beyond the narrow interest in resource management. The
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962 is often cited as
the beginning of the modem environmental movement. Although Carson's attack on pesticides was significant, a single event did not give
rise to such a diverse movement. The modern environmental movement in the United States arose during the 1960s, but its roots were
embedded in the past, especially in resource conservation, preservationism, naturalism, antipollution, and public~health campaigns both
in the United States and in Europe. · ·
The recent origins of the movement are to be found in post-World
War II natural-environment issues, such as outdoor recreation,
wildlands, and open space; in concerns over environmental pollution;
and in the maturing of ecological sciences. It is also linked to the "sixties" generation. Cynics have argued that political and economic elites
either sponsored or supported environmental activities as a way of
distracting protesters from antiwar, antipoverty, or civil-rights activities. However, the political and social turmoil of the 1960s
presented an opportunity for raising questions about environmental
protection, and it provided willing supporters, especially among
idealistic teens and young adults.

116

I

MARTIN V. MELOSI

The environmental movement was rooted in more than youthful
idealism. While drawing its major support from the middle and uppermiddle classes, politically it functioned as a coalition that cut across
class lines and varying interests.4 Older preservation groups, such as
the Sierra Club (1892) and the National Audubon Society (1905), were
experiencing a revival of interest by the late 1960s and early 1970s.
More recent organizations that had corporate backing, such as Resources for the Future (early 1950s) and Laurance Rockefeller's Conservation Foundation (mid 1960s), promoted the efficient utilization
of resources. Legal remedies received attention from the Environmental Defense Fund (1967) and the Natural Resources Defense Council
(1970) .
Into the 1970s, aggressive and often militant protest and citizen
action were carried out by groups such as Friends of the Earth
(splintered off from the Sierra Club), Zero Population Growth, the National Wildlife Federation, and Ecology Action. Also individuals, such
as biologists Rachel Carson and Barry Commoner, popularized and
promoted the study of ecology. Beyond the borders of North America,
"Green parties" and "ecoactivists" inaugurated their own versions of
environmental protest.
Modem environmentalists generally shared an appreciation of the
fragility of ecological balances, a notion of the intrinsic value of nature,
a personal concern for health and fitness, and a commitment to selfreliance. They by no means espoused uniform political views or reform
tactics. Some accepted governmental intervention as a way either to
allocate resources or to preserve wildlands and natural habitats. Others
were suspicious of any large institution as the protector of the environment. Some believed that the existing political and social structure
was capable of balancing environmental protection and economic productivity. Still others blamed capitalism for promoting uncontrolled
economic growth, materialism, the squandering of resources, and even
the coopting of the environmental movement for capitalism's own
ends. 5
While the modern environmental movement gained national attention quite dramatically during the late 1960s and the early 1970s,
we have only impressionistic notions of its roots, nature, scope, and
achievements. Samuel P. Hays is attempting to provide a synthesis
for the modern environmental movement in much the same way that
he attempted to define and explain the conservation movement of the
Progressive Era. Hays's long-awaited book on modern environmental
politics is nearing completion, but glimpses of his synthesis have
already appeared in several article-length studies. Hays supports the
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notion that the early to mid 1960s were significant in the development of the modern environmental movement. He sees three
distinct stages in the evolution of environmental action: the initial thrust, between 1957 and 1965, which emphasized natural environmental values in outdoor recreation, wildlands, and open space;
the growing interest in "ecology," between 1965 and 1972, which
focused on antipollution and environmental protection; and the period
after 1972, which brought to public attention such issues as toxic
chemicals, energy, and the possibilities of social, economic, and
political decentralization.
While one might quibble with the precise chronological
breakdown of the modem environmental era, Hays points to the
significant shift from conservation to environmentalism during the
1960s, a shift that reinforces a growing belief among scholars that the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was as much a
culmination as a new starting point for governmental interest in environmentalism. In this context the Johnson administration must be
viewed as a transitional force in the evolution from old-style conservationism to modem environmentalism.6
The Johnson Administration in the Environmental Era

In a 1968 memorandum that summed up the conservation
achievements of the Johnson administration, Secretary of the Interior
Stewart L. Udall stated:
A general conclusion-quite inescapable-is that Presidential leadership has changed the outlook of the nation with regard
to conservation and has added vital "new dimensions." No longer
is peripheral action-the "saving" of a forest, a park, a refuge for
wildlife-isolated from the mainstream. The total environment
is now the concern, and the new conservation makes man,
himself, its subject. The quality of life is now the perspective and
purpose of the new conservation. 7
From his vantage point at the end of the Johnson presidency, Udall
casts the administration in a visionary role-an advance agent of
modem environmentalism. However, the very name New Conservation suggests a looking backward as well as a looking ahead. While
environmental activity was vigorous, some programs were merely extensions of Progressive Era or New Deal resource management; others
focused more clearly on antipollution and other quality-of-life issues.
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In some cases the administration was a leader; in some, a follower;
in others, a usurper. Despite Udall's claim, the New Conservation was
not a coherent, consistent program.
This is not to say that the New Conservation was mere illusion
or simply public relations. As a transitional concept it blended the
governmental traditions of the past while reacting to contemporary
environmental issues that were emanating from several sources-both
inside and outside the government. An examination of the holdings
of the Johnson Library suggests that the promotion of the New Conservation by Secretary Udall and others guided the president and
several of his advisers toward a more sophisticated, holistic perspective on the environment. However, because the presidential papers
essentially provide a "view from the top," they also reveal the perspective of national leaders who were taking credit for pioneering programs
and policies that were as much the result of mounting grass-roots sentiment and congressional actions as of executive leadership. However,
before we can set limits on the Johnson administration's achievements
in establishing environmental policies and programs, we must try to
determine what forces shaped the New Conservation within the
government. A brief look at key individuals and groups who were close
to the president is in order.
The Legacy of fFK

As with other issues, it is difficult to determine exactly what impact a completed term by John F. Kennedy would have had on environmental policies and legislation. It seems clear, however, that the
Kennedy presidency provided the most-immediate momentum for the
New Conservation of the Johnson years. Kennedy was the first president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to take any direct initiative on environmental policy. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy
authorized the Natural Resources Advisory Committee. One of his
first special messages to Congress, in February, 1961, dealt with the
development and conservation of natural resources. In May, 1962, he
called the White House Conference on Conservation, which went
beyond the old "wise-use" issues to examine questions dealing with
the deteriorating quality of the environment.
While Kennedy's congressional record on the environment was
anemic, he brought a new mind set to the presidency which led
naturally into an elaboration of environmental policy on many fronts.
Most significantly, he rejected the notion that environmental issues
were state and local responsibilities. His predecessor, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, had believed that the federal role in conservation and anti-
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pollution could be extended, but only if additional federal funding
was not involved. James L. Sundquist has noted: "The major contribution of John F. Kennedy to national thinking about the outdoor environment was, perhaps, an open mind about the budget.118 The exercise of federal authority, backed by a commitment to more federal
funding, was the underpinning for Kennedy's environmental policy.
It was the Johnson administration, however, that took action on those
impulses.9

Lady Bird
The terms natural beauty and beautification permeated the conservation rhetoric of the Johnson administration. In a speech to the
1964 graduating class of the University of Michigan, President Johnson
asserted: "We have always prided ourselves on being not only America
the strong and America the free, but America the beautiful." 10 Indeed,
one of the working groups that developed the Great Society programs
was on "natural beauty." And most significantly, in May, 1965, the
White House Conference on Natural Beauty met in Washington, D.C.,
and produced its report, "Beauty for America." 11
Lady Bird Johnson was the person who was most responsible for
the president's heightened aesthetic sense. In response to the 1965
State of the Union addr-ess, she stated: "I liked the accent on education, on medical research, and on preserving this nation's beautythe preservation of the beauty of America along the highways, in the
cities, in National Parks-'the green legacy for tomorrow.' I hope we
can do something about that in our four years here." 12 Between 1965
and 1968 she actively sought to make "natural beauty" a key national
issue.
Casual observers of the Johnson administration's environmental
record have difficulty in seeing beyond what they believe to have been
the superficial commitment to environmentalism that was expressed
in the drive for natural beauty. To the severest critics, the beautification projects of the First Lady were little more than aesthetic
frivolities. This kind of criticism underestimates the influence that
Lady Bird had on her husband and the catalytic role that she played
in raising environmental issues to national attention. The concern
for beautification may not have taken environmental issues much
beyond traditional conservation, but it did reinforce the commitment
that grass-root organizations and the Kennedy administration brought
to the issues.
A memo from Matthew Nimetz to Joseph Califano noted that an
article in the December, 1967, issue of Sports Illustrated was "critical

120

I

MARTIN V. MELOSI

of the Federal effort [on the environment] to date: it says we concentrate too much on 'natural beauty' and too little on more fundamental problems." 13 Whether that is a fair assertion is another question,
but it is a testament to the influence of the First Lady that the drive
for beautification carried such significance. Lady Bird's campaign
against billboards, her plea for urban beautification, and her support
for preserving natural beauty kept environmental issues before the
American people and on the agenda of the president. Secretary Udall
wrote to the president that "the leadership of the First Lady and her
nation-wide crusade for beautification has been a vital part of [the]
attempt to re-educate the country." 14 While the president was prone
to refer to the beautification program as "Lady Bird's business," her
activities brought to Washington a key ingredient necessary in order
to launch an effective environmental program.15

Stewart L. Udall
Within the administration, no one wielded more influence over
conservation policy than did Secretary of the Interior Udall, the first
Arizonan to be selected for the cabinet. Udall had interrupted his college studies to work for two years as a Mormon missionary; then he
had served in World War II; and ultimately he had practiced law in
Tucson with his brother, Morris. Beginning in 1954, Stewart Udall
had served his first of his three terms as a United States congressman.
On the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, he was recognized
as a member of the "conservation bloc." In 1959 a House fight over
a labor bill brought him into contact with Senator John F. Kennedy.
Udall's delivery of Arizona's votes at the 1960 Democratic National
Convention, according to Douglas H. Strong, "won Kennedy's
gratitude and Lyndon B. Johnson's respect for his (Udall's] political
skill." It also won Udall the secretaryship of the Department of the
Interior, a position that he held from 1961 through 1969.16
Prone to impulsive statements and lacking strong administrative
ability, Udall made a slow start as secretary of the interior. In time,
this dedicated conservationist and dedicated liberal made his presence
felt in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For most of his tenure,
he maintained a good working relationship with both presidents, keeping environmental issues constantly before them. He found LBJ to be
"very receptive" to new programs and policies, but Udall also believed
that the successes that were achieved during the Johnson years would
probably have come also if Kennedy had served his full term.17
Udall played an important role as cheerleader in both administrations, persuading Kennedy to send a conservation message to Con-
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gress, the first such in decades; encouraging Lady Bird to stress
beautification and conservation programs; and reminding LBJ of the
importance of the New Conservation. Beyond that role, Udall was a
central advocate of expanded programs in numerous areas, including
outdoor recreation, the national park system, and antipollution.18
Udall embodied the faith that the federal government could lead
the country in the conservation battle. This was not to be symbolic
leadership but was to be a commitment to fund new programs and
to invest in environmental protection. In Udall's words and actions
could be seen the transformation of old-style conservationism into
modern environmentalism. He was among the first government officials to defend the conclusions of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring. His
perspective on the role of the Interior Department also reflected a
change in direction. Rather than administering the department as a
loosely knit group of bureaus and agencies that promoted resource
development and protected western interests, he saw the department's
mission as serving national environmental needs. He was not without
inconsistencies, however. When issues of water development and
scenic conservation clashed, Udall tended to take the traditional pose
of the westerner, so he supported water development.19
In The Quiet Crisis (1963), Udall stated his philosophy in clear
terms:
America today stands poised on a pinnacle of wealth and
power, yet we live in a land of vanishing beauty, of increasing
ugliness, of shrinking open space, and of an overall environment
that is diminished daily by pollution and noise and blight.
This, in brief, is the quiet conservation crisis of the 1960's. 20
Udall's rhetoric showed many of the signs of the modem environmental movement-namely, a relatively broad ecological perspective, a
concern for quality-of-life issues, and a commitment to environmental protection. However, his preoccupation with traditional conservation issues-such as land policy, national parks, reclamation, and
resource management-marked him as a transitional figure in the
history of American environmentalism more than as a pioneer of a
new ethic. 21

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The Kennedy legacy, Lady Bird, and Stewart Udall-all helped to
create the New Conservation as well as to shape Lyndon Johnson's
own environmental views. But other factors-less direct but equally
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obvious-also influenced the president. In a 1973 Audubon Magazine
editorial, for example, one of Johnson's admirers wrote: "The man
from the Texas hill country had a deep love for the land, and his efforts to preserve and restore it not only laid the foundation for the
environmental crusade of the 1970s, but enriched the quality of life
for all Americans." 2 2 By implication, at least, Johnson emerges from
these lines as the modern equivalent of Franklin Roosevelt-as he
liked to be reminded by his aides and advisers. Udall stated in an oral
interview that Johnson "thought about the land a lot the way Roosevelt
did. Roosevelt was his idol and you could come up with a good idea
and say, 'This is good for the land and good for the people,' he bought
it." 23 The comparison with FDR the conservationist-which crops up
repeatedly in the literature-gave Johnson yet-another important link
to his revered political past as a Roosevelt liberal. If for no other reason,
Johnson could give broad support to the New Conservation as
perpetuating the goals of the New Deal.
Yet Johnson had a broader vision for America than the New
Deal-namely, the Great Society. By happy coincidence, rising grassroots interest in quality-of-life issues tapped the spirit of the Great
Society that President Johnson envisioned. In his speech at the University of Michigan he claimed that the Great Society was "a place where
the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands
of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community.... It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality
of their goals than the quantity of their goods." 24 In a letter of thanks
to a member of the Task Force on Natural Resources (1964), Johnson
noted the need for "imaginative programs of resource development,"
and he added: "In the years immediately ahead we have, I believe, an
unparalleled opportunity to take some major steps forward toward
creating the Great Society. You and your colleagues on the Natural
Resources Task Force have made a major contribution toward that
goal."2s
The impulse for a federal solution to social problems, which was
deeply embedded in the Great Society, was firmly connected to the
environmental programs of the Johnson years. The noted environmentalist Lynton K. Caldwell argued, in Environment: A Challenge for
Modem Society (1970) :
Lyndon B. Johnson ... anticipated the environmental quality issue in his Great Society address, on May 22, 1964, which
spoke directly to the values of the post-World War II generation
that would shortly determine the direction of American politics.
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His espousal of natural beauty and environmental quality surprised and gratified conservationists, who had not looked for this
type of commitment from a professional politician from western
Texas. The depth of the Johnson commitment was open toquestion. But regardless of the President's sincerity, the fact that he
had publicly identified himself with the environmental issue
strengthened its position in American political life.26
Caldwell's cynicism about Johnson's sincerity in promoting the New
Conservation is not completely unwarranted. The president's Great
Society idealism was clearly tempered by his political pragmatism.
Geographer Richard A. Cooley has argued that in supporting programs
in conservation and natural beauty, Johnson "knew a political issue
when he saw one." 27 And Caldwell, assessing the Democrats' stance
on environmental issues during the 1964 presidential campaign,
asserted that candidate Johnson stayed clear of potentially dangerous
environmental-quality issues-pollution, urban sprawl, public
transportation-by associating with "the more easily managed expression 'natural beauty.' " 28 On the other side, John P. Crevelli accepts
LBJ's environmentalism as sincere: "There is no other conclusion to
make than that Johnson believed in his words." 29 Also, as a strong advocate of "more is better," Johnson took great pride in the "sheer bulk"
of legislation during his administration. 30
Johnson certainly took advantage of the growing environmental
spirit of the times. And there is little doubt that as a professional politician, he sensed the value of the New Conservation to his larger Great
Society goals. However, the influence of FDR and the New Deal, the
Kennedy legacy, Lady Bird, and Stewart Udall cannot be ignored if we
are to have a complete picture of Johnson's commitment to environmentalism. A reasonable conclusion is that Lyndon Johnsonthrough a variety of influences-supported the New Conservation
as an integral part of his Great Society. In this way, he helped to
place environmental issues in a larger political context. To be sure,
there were limits to his environmentalism; these are manifest in
political constraints and partisan considerations, in distractions from
myriad social programs, and in his preoccupation with the Vietnam
War.
In order to better understand the breadth and depth of the New
Conservation, we must look beyond presidential leadership to the
bureaucratic structure that devised the executive environmental policy
and to the legislative activity that produced new environmental
laws.
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Key Departments and Agencies
The New Conservation was not simply the province of a small
group of individuals-not even the president. To what extent the
Johnson administration was committed to a new direction in environmental policies and programs depended, in part at least, on the
interaction of key departments and agencies. Even after the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency during the Nixon administration, environmental programs were diffused throughout the
federal bureaucracy, with no central clearing house for the establishment of policy. This suggests that U.S. environmental policy has been
and still remains fragmented, reflecting the collective interests and
actions of governmental agencies and of Congress.
At least since the New Deal, there have been several attempts
to consolidate federal environmental programs into a single department in order to offset the fragmentation of environmental policy.
A favorable political climate during the 1960s led congressional leaders
and officials in the Johnson administration to seek such a consolidation. In 1964 the President's Task Force on Government Organization, which was chaired by Donald K. Price, recommended that five
new executive departments be created, including a Department of
Natural Resources (DNR). One option suggested the merging of the
Departments of Interior and of Agriculture, with nomesource programs going to other departments. The other option was that the
Department of Agriculture be retained but that the Forest Service and
the Soil Conservation Service be transferred to the Department of the
Interior. With either option, the task force recommended that some
water-resource functions of the Federal Power Commission and of the
Army Corps of Engineers be moved to the new Department of Natural
Resources. Little came of these plans.
In 1965, Senator Frank E. Moss of Utah again proposed that
natural-resource agencies be reorganized into a DNR. The Corps of
Engineers, perpetually an opponent of reorganization, fought the Moss
bill. The corps favored the status quo as a way of protecting its
monopoly over dozens of public-works projects. In addition, the
Bureau of the Budget argued against giving to the new department
the coordination and planning functions that Congress had assigned
to the Water Resources Council through the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965.
In 1967 the President's Task Force on Government Organization,
chaired by Ben Heineman, called for an even larger Department of
Natural Resources and Development, which would include the Corps
of (Civil) Engineers and the Departments of the Interior, Housing and
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Urban Development, Transportation, and Agriculture. By this time,
the fate of such attempts at reorganization was preordained.31
The very reason for the attempted mergers is why they never
occurred-namely, the vested interests of the departments and agencies. The development of programs has most often taken priority over
making comprehensive environmental policy, since programs can be
controlled by the agencies, whereas policy cannot be. Secretary Udall
favored a Department of Natural Resources for the obvious reason that
the Department of the Interior stood to gain the most from such an
arrangement. But he, too, recognized the difficulties posed by interagency rivalry. In a memorandum to Joseph Califano, Udall stated
his belief that the Johnson administration could "succeed where the
others failed" if the president would formulate a "sound plan," if congressional realities were kept in mind, and if the Cabinet would
observe "team discipline." 32 But Udall had to depend upon the president to initiate the action that would create the DNR. And Johnson
was too much the politician to be caught up in such a web.
Even relatively small-scale change in the environmental apparatus
created serious internal tensions. In 1966, Udall attempted to secure
the transfer of water-pollution programs from HEW to Interior.
Originally, Udall sought the transfer of air-pollution programs as well,
but he trimmed down his request. Key adviser Joseph Califano initially
cautioned the president not to rush into a decision to authorize the
transfer: "The political feasibility of such action at a time when HEW
is considering an Assistant Secretary for Environment is highly questionable." However, he eventually supported Udall's stance, arguing
that most of the outside experts on the task force agreed with the
move since the president had initiated his program "to attack water
pollution on a river basin basis." 33
HEW Secretary John W. Gardner was predictably strenuous in his
opposition, arguing that since Interior had close working relations
with the oil and mining industries-which were major industrial
polluters-that the department had "a built-in conflict of interest."
Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, one of the leading congressional
environmentalists, pointed to the impropriety of dismantling and
transferring the new Water Pollution Control Administrationestablished under HEW's control in 1965-before it had been fully
established and was operational. He also pointed out that Interior was
western oriented, while the most serious pollution problems were in
the East. And he warned about the potential political fallout from such
an untimely move, namely, fuel for the Republicans' claim of "Administration confusion," and criticism from state and local officials. 34
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Udall, however, prevailed in this miniwar. Clearly, Interior feared
the repercussions from having both Interior and HEW set standards
for water quality, rather than having HEW maintain control of the
Water Pollution Control Administration. Dual responsibility would
mean having Interior set the standards on river-basin plans and having HEW set the standards on all other rivers. Also, enforcement might
become inconsistent. Most significantly, dual responsibility would
pit HEW and Interior against each other in relations with Congress
and the president. Udall's advisers asked: "If we were starting from
scratch today would we create a Corps of Engineers and a Bureau of
Reclamation?" 35
The dispute over the Water Pollution Control Administration
points to the need for a better understanding of the internal workings
of executive agencies-such as Interior, Agriculture, HEW, the Federal
Power Commission jFPCJ, and TVA-that are responsible for environmental programs.36 Interdepartmental or interagency rivalries
also help to demonstrate why national environmental policy remained
fragmented and particularist in the wake of a more holistic perspective on the environment that was coming from outside the government during the 1960s.
It is unfair, however, to assume that the relative influence of
governmental agencies that are concerned with the environment remained static. Stewart Udall's expertise and his close working relationship with the president gave Interior much leverage over its cabinet
rivals. The Public Health Service, which traditionally had played an
important role in antipollution, was being raided by other agencies.
A case in point is the transfer of its water-pollution programs to HEW
and then to Interior. The most significant shift in influence over environmental policy during the Johnson years was the rise of the Office
of Science and Technology jOST), which played an increasingly important role in advising the president on issues of environmental quality. In many ways, OST functioned like the Council on Environmental Quality jCEQ), which was established along with the Environmental Protection Agency IEPA) in 1970. The CEQ proved to be a relatively weak advisory body, but it was the only government agency
designed to oversee energy and environmental issues.
OST provided an overview of energy and environmental issues,
but it was more aggressive in asserting itself than was the CEQ. In
1957, President Dwight Eisenhower had created the post of special
assistant to the president for science and technology as a response
to the launching of Sputnik. In 1962, President Kennedy had established the Office of Science and Technology, with the special assis-
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tant retaining primacy in matters concerning national-security policy,
intelligence, arms control, and other international initiatives. In addition, the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering
was created, to reduce the work load in the area of military problems.3 7
Under the leadership of Director Donald F. Hornig, OST began
to broaden its responsibilities to include problems of health and the
environment. Precedent for such a move went back as far as 1959,
when the President's Science Advisory Committee intervened to study
a public scare over tainted cranberries on the eve of the holiday
season.38 Little by little, Hornig brought OST into most major environmental issues that the Johnson administration was facing. OST
participated in several environmental task forces; director Hornig
chaired both the 1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies and
the 1968 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment.
Hornig noted in an oral interview that OST's range of activities
was dictated by "the sense of significance, either by what matters to
the President at any given time or perhaps more important-is to try
to anticipate for him what is going to matter." 39 Without the heavy
programmatic commitment of other agencies that had interests in the
environment-and the limits that go with it-OST could range over
many issues without significant constraint. Of particular importance
was the role of OST in promoting the coordination of and the providing of data on the scientific and technical programs relating to
pollution abatement. 40
Despite its flexibility in addressing environmental issues, OST
was wary about attempts to weaken its power. Senator Gaylord Nelson
of Wisconsin introduced a bill in July, 1965, to designate Interior as
the primary agency for ecological research. But OST opposed the bill
and, through a delay in its own study of research programs, helped
to table it. When he reintroduced his bill, Senator Nelson proposed
to locate a council on environmental quality in the office of the president. Again, OST successfully headed off such a plan. 41
While OST kept potential rivals at bay in the Johnson administration, the establishment of the EPA and the CEQ during the Nixon
years had diminished its influence over environmental matters.
Without enforcement functions and without its own programs to
manage, OST never was likely to emerge as an omnibus agency like
a department of natural resources. OST's de facto role in coordinating
environmental policy was formalized with the CEQ, thus offering an
important precedent but with the same limits. EPA assumed primary
responsibility for enforcing antipollution laws, but it rarely
demonstrated a capacity for providing a policy overview. Vested in-
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terests that were based upon a broad distribution of programs
throughout the federal bureaucracy worked against a coordinated environmental policy-or at least against interagency cooperation. Yet
during the Johnson years, OST-and Interior-broadened the efforts
of the executive branch in addressing environmental quality as a national issue.
Major Environmental Issues, 1963-68

The Johnson administration's support for and development of environmental legislation was vigorous, but it was not clearly focused
nor well coordinated. The vigor grew out of a response to (1) the leadership of Stewart Udall, Lady Bird, and others within the administration; (2) grass-roots enthusiasm for many quality-of-life issues; and
(3) the actions of congressional leaders, such as Senators Muskie,
Nelson, and Henry M. Jackson (Washington), Congressman Wayne
Aspinall (Indiana), and others. The lack of focus and coordination
stemmed from the complexity and scope of the issues, the relative
newness of "environmentalism" as opposed to "conservationism," and
the nature of the federal bureaucracy.
The overarching goal of the administration-if there was onewas to wed concern over the environment to the larger goals of the
Great Society. This meant either identifying with continuing congressional efforts at environmental reform or writing new legislation. New
proposals came primarily from special task forces-nine in all-which
focused on recreation, natural resources, natural beauty, environmental pollution, and energy. 42 In large measure, the early task forces
focused on traditional issues of conservation-the wilderness, water
resources, wildlife-but increasingly the studies emphasized pollution problems and the urban environment. By and large, the administration's proposals on conservation enhanced the existing programs rather than redirecting them. However, the antipollution
measures were more far-reaching, while the conceptual emphasis on
the urban environment was very innovative.

Wilderness, Parks, and Public Lands
The rhetoric of "natural beauty" tended to camouflage the administration's emphasis on traditional conservation programs during
the early Johnson years. Especially through Udall's leadership, the administration concentrated on extending the national park system and
the public-lands program rather than on reevaluating the basic tenets
of conservation. In response to the 1964 Task Force on the Preserva-
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tion of Natural Beauty, Interior noted that the report failed to discuss
the Wilderness Act and various proposals in regard to national parks. 43
But the 1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies devoted considerable attention to the administration's plan to expand the national
park system, to develop a national trails system, and to extend the
national forest system. A Bureau of the Budget memorandum explained why there was such a shift of emphasis: "The Task Force has
not really functioned as a Task Force. Secretary Udall requested suggestions from each of the agencies involved.. .. The report, therefore,
reflects Secretary Udall's views, with very little consideration of
priorities as reflected in the responsibilities of other agencies of the
Government." 44
Udall was at his persuasive best in promoting traditional conservation programs, despite the grumblings of some officials who wanted
the environmental agenda to expand more rapidly. Given the momentous impact of the Wilderness Act in 1964, however, the administration could hardly begin to set environmental policy without taking
into account the important upsurge of interest in land and water
conservation.
The passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 was a conservation
landmark. The act set aside four wilderness areas totaling 9.1 million
acres in the national forests. It also included a provision whereby large
roadless tracts in national parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges
could be added to the designated wilderness areas. According to
historian Roderick Nash, the concept of a wilderness system "marked
an innovation in the history of the American preservation movement.
It expressed ... a determination to take the offensive. Previous friends
of the wilderness had been largely concerned with defending it against
various forms of development." 45
The legislative battle over the wilderness had raged for nine years.
The drive for wilderness legislation had begun in 1955, when Howard
Zahniser, executive director of the Wilderness Society, had proposed
it in a speech before a conference in Washington of the American Planning and Civic Association. The actions of the Wilderness Society,
the Sierra Club and other groups, brought the idea of wilderness preservation to congressional attention. And while the 1964 act fell short
of the preservationists' goals, a permanent wilderness system was
created at last. 46 Although the Johnson administration did not initiate
the Wilderness Act, it did incorporate the legislation into its general
conservation program. Public-land-management agencies, including
the Forest Service, preferred managerial discretion rather than
legislative decree to set land policy. Secretary Udall and other ad-
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ministration leaders, however, did not resist the new momentum; they
promoted additional mandates for wildlands and scenic and recreational programs.
The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission
(ORRRC)-a study commission established by Congress-made
several recommendations which led to new actions. For example, the
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1964 was passed in direct
response to the ORRRC's recommendations. This act provided funds
for the acquisition of lands within the national forests, which was
the first major opportunity to add land to the system during the
post-World War II era. In 1968 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and
the National Trail System Act followed. The North Cascades (in
Washington), the Canyonlands (in Utah), and the Redwoods (in
California) were added to the national park system, and Guadalupe
Mountains (in Texas) was authorized. In addition, new categories of
federal land administration were created-national seashores,
lakeshores, and recreational areas.47
The accomplishments of the early to mid 1960s were not achieved
in a vacuum; environmental groups and the federal courts also played
a vital role. 48 But the vigor with which the administration pursued
the elaboration of the wilderness and national parks systems, especially through Udall's relentless leadership, graphically demonstrates
the extension of federal power in land- and water-use programs. These
programs also fit the spirit of the Great Society and firmly grounded
the "New Conservation" in traditional conservation causes.
Of course, considerations of practical politics determined the extent to which the president supported his Interior secretary's conservation goals. John P. Crevelli has raised some important questions
about the politics of wilderness preservation during the Johnson years
in his article in Prologue, "The Final Act of the Greatest Conservation President." In this case study about an eleventh-hour attempt
in 1968 to greatly increase the nation's parklands, Crevelli discusses
why Johnson settled for an additional three hundred thousand acres
rather than an anticipated seven million acres. Political reality persuaded the president to accept a small victory rather than a great
defeat. In the final days of his presidency, with the Vietnam War and
countless domestic programs consuming his time and with his power
slipping away, Johnson was fearful of asking for too much and, in the
end, getting nothing. "His ego," Crevelli concluded, "would not permit a final defeat at the hands of the Congress over which he had been
master for so many years on most domestic affairs." 49
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A personal consequence of Johnson's decision was an abrupt end
to the strong professional and personal relationship between LBJ and
Udall. In settling for three hundred thousand acres, the Sonora Desert
reserve had been omitted. This large parcel was located in Udall's own
congressional district in Arizona. The Interior secretary believed that
Johnson had omitted the parcel to show him "who was boss," not an
uncommon LBJ trait. It is more likely, however, that this decision was
based on the president's belief in the "art of the possible.1150

Water Resources
Water resources were an important component in the New Conservation. Again, the scale of activity was more impressive than the
innovation in approach. A possible exception was the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act of 1968, a companion measure to the Wilderness Act, which
created a system of wild rivers. Within the administration, it was
perceived to be as historic as the wilderness bill. In 1965, President
Johnson had suggested, in his message to Congress on natural beauty,
that it was time to identify and preserve "free flowing stretches of
our great scenic rivers before growth and development make the beauty
of the unspoiled waterway only a memory." 51 A bill was prepared,
which passed the Senate but died in a House committee. Again in
1967, Johnson had repeated his plea for scenic rivers, and the Ninetieth Congress obliged by passing a compromise bill. In alJ, in the
Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth Congresses, seventeen bills had been introduced dealing with scenic and recreational rivers. 52
The National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act established a river
system that was composed of segments of eight rivers, made provision for additions to the system, and encouraged state participation
in the preservation of scenic rivers. While the establishment of public
recreational areas was not new and while the practice of federal condemnation authority to acquire areas for public purposes was not new
either, the law raised controversies over the "public good" versus
private property rights and over development versus nondevelopment.
These issues were made intense because some of the rivers ran outside of federal lands through populated areas in the East, rather than
through public lands in the West. Coming at the end of the Johnson
presidency, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act showed many of the signs
of a more aggressive environmentalism that would surface during the
1970s. 53
President Johnson's interest in the new law, as well as in other
water projects, was strong and sincere. Udall has recalled:
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He always had a lot of insight on water problems and this
grew out of the New Deal period and the dams that were being
built in his own congressional district. He had an intimacy with
water projects. He knew how they functioned and this, of course,
was something that President Kennedy did not have and it was
something that worked to my advantage.54
While the Johnson administration may not have seriously
challenged the status quo with its various water projects, it did promote a wide array of programs. The president gave support to the International Hydrological Decade, a world-wide effort to advance
knowledge about water issues. Desalination programs were discussed
extensively. Governmental officials gave the proper attention to waterdevelopment projects, which were important political links between
Washington and the state governments. 55 They also generally supported the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
of Reclamation in building dams and reservoirs, constructing canals,
and promoting flood control. However, growing criticism of the agencies for their narrow cost-benefit approach to the development of water
projects led, in part at least, to the Federal Water Project Recreation
Act of 1965. The act gave local governments a greater role in planning and financing federal water projects and, most importantly, gave
legislative recognition to the idea that recreation and wildlife were
"benefits" that were equal to economic and other utilitarian wants
and needs. 56
As with other components of the New Conservation, setting
water-resources policy was understood to be primarily a federal responsibility. In 1965, President Johnson authorized officials in the Bureau
of the Budget to recommend that Congress establish a national water
commission to review long-term requirements for water and how the
requirements should be achieved. A memorandum to Joe Califano
from the Bureau of the Budget noted that "the long range water problems in the Southwest are no more acute-and probably less acutethan those in the Great Lakes and the New York-New England
areas." 57
Some water issues were recognized but were not successfully
acted upon during the Johnson years. For example, in the mid 1960s,
coastal wetlands began to attract attention because of their recreational potential, but also because of their environmental significance
in preserving wildlife and in acting as natural flood reservoirs and
pollution-treatment systems. The 1966 Task Force on Resources and
Recreation recommended that the Interior Department study estu-
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arine areas and called for the departm ent to "protect and preserve in
their natural condition" estuarine areas that were considered to be
valuable for sport and commercial fishing, wildlife conservation, outdoor recreation, scenic beauty, and scientific study. It also called for
permits to be issued by Interior before anyone could dredge or fill in
a navigable estuarine area, and it recommended that there be stricter
control of the army's projects in regard to shore-erosion control, dredging, filling, or beach protection.
However, a bill that was introduced in the Ninetieth Congress
to institute the permit system was badly diluted. As finally passed,
the act only authorized $250,000 for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 for
the purpose of conducting a study and an inventory of estuaries. But
funds were never appropriated. In addition, Congress reduced the
authorization of other funds for a study of estuarine pollution to be
made by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. As a
result of federal inaction and growing public interest, some statessuch as Massachusetts, Maryland, and Florida-took the lead during
the late 1960s and the early 1970s in passing laws to protect coastal
wetlands, while others-such as New York, Michigan, and
Wisconsin-developed programs to protect inland wetlands. 58
Wildlife
Historian Thomas Dunlap has argued that the movement for the
protection of endangered species has gone through two phases. The
first began during the early 1960s with a broad interest in protecting
wildlife. The second phase emerged with the passage of the Endangered Species Act in 1973 and with the more difficult task of administering a practical program. "Legal protection for endangered
species," Dunlap has stated, "began casually." The Land and Water
Conservation Act of 1964 established a fund to support federal and
state outdoor recreational and wildlife work, which was broadly defined. The Endangered Species Act of 1966-the first act of its kindwas not designed to expand the scope of federal power. It did not define
endangered species effectively, and it did not clarify the problem of
cooperation with the states in developiµg a plan of action. The
secretary of the Interior was authorized to buy land, but he could
not regulate the taking of endangered species. 59
During the 1960s the federal government made some gestures to
protect species from extinction, but a practical program still lay in
the future. Secretary Udall was the major administration force behind
wildlife protection. In fact, Udall's last act as secretary of the Interior
was to sign a final order creating two wildlife refuges. However, he
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was unable to get the kind of attention from the president on this
matter that he had on water projects. The three-hundred-thousandacre "parting gift to future generations," which Johnson agreed to during the final hours of his administration, would aid wildlife conservation, but it was not part of a broad plan of wildlife conservation.60
Clearly, a changing public attitude toward nature during the postwar
years and the efforts of environmental groups at the grass roots influenced the writing of future wildlife legislation to a greater extent
than did the efforts of the Johnson administration. 61

Pollution Control
In the area of pollution control, the New Conservation
demonstrated a close association with the modem environmental
movement. Several issues and events stimulated the interest in antipollution measures. Rachel Carson's assault on pesticides is a good
example of the shift from traditional conservation to a focus on human
well-being. The concern over the destruction of wildlife habitats
helped to stimulate an interest in the functioning of ecological systems. Environmental groups drew attention to the exploitation of
natural resources. The strip mining of coal attracted considerable
debate. The commercial viability of nuclear power raised questions
about radiation, the siting of plants, and reactor safety. The ubiquity
of air pollution-especially in the form of smog and coal smokemoved policy makers toward clean-air standards. And oil spills, jetengine noise, and various industrial pollutants brought into high relief
the contradictions of the drive for economic growth and the wish for
an improved quality of life. 62
President Johnson set a dramatic tone about pollution in several
of his public statements in the mid 1960s. For example:
Ours is a nation of affluence. But the technology that has
permitted our affluence spews out vast quantities of wastes and
spent products that pollute our air, poison our waters, and even
impair our ability to feed ourselves. At the same time, we have
crowded together into dense metropolitan areas where concentration of wastes intensifies the problem.
Pollution now is one of the most pervasive problems of our
society.63
In principle, at least, antipollution was an integral part of the Great
Society.
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The administration's general approach to antipollution was consistent with the other components of its environmental policy-to
confront what were perceived as national issues through the broader
exercise of federal authority. The 1964 Task Force on Environmental
Pollution outlined an extensive program concerning "The Federal
Responsibility for Pollution." A list of fourteen guidelines for policy
was presented, including federal initiative on interstate compacts or
other regional plans to combat pollution; international cooperation
to abate pollution in river basins, air sheds, and water zones; the
development and management of economic incentives to reduce pollution; the implementation of new technical expertise to solve problems; improved monitoring systems; and better public-information
programs. 64
Whether the administration could translate its broad interest in
antipollution into tangible policy was another question. While an appreciation for the functioning of ecological systems helped to identify a growing list of pollutants, legislators and administration officials
responded to discrete problems instead of dealing with pollution in
a holistic manner. This was the most obvious-but not necessarily
the most effective-way to confront pollution problems, especially
since no single agency in the federal government had the overall
responsibility for pollution control at the time.
Air pollution emerged as a national problem because of the
criticism of coal burning by utilities and other industrial users and
also because of the rising concern over smog. Through the encouragement of health officials and academics, HEW had sponsored the first
National Conference on Air Pollution in 1958. The tone of the conference was cooperation between industry and government to reduce
air pollution, but it attracted few people from the coal industry and
few conservationists. By the time of the third Conference on Air Pollution in 1966, both coal and environmental interests were well
represented. During the mid 1960s a relatively innocuous law-the
Clean Air Act of 1955-underwent several revisions that were potentially injurious to the coal and electric-utility industries. The 1967
act changed the emphasis from air pollution as a local problem to air
pollution as a national problem, but one that required cooperation
between industry and government. In the broadest sense, this revision
brought industry into the policy-formation phase of air-pollution legislation, resulting in a Clean Air Act that many felt was "coal's law." 65
A relatively new source of air pollution-automobile emissionsposed different problems. Los Angeles, the "smog capital of America"
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during the 1950s, became a living laboratory for studying massive
doses of auto emissions. It became apparent during the 1960s that
smog was a national problem, requiring the attention of the federal
government. While California led the way in emissions control, federal
law slowly moved toward a recognition of the problem. The 1963 Clean
Air Act for the first time gave the federal government limited enforcement power over interstate pollution. The 1965 amendment to that
act recognized the need to control motor-vehicle pollution on a national scale, and it empowered HEW to establish and enforce airpollution standards for new motor vehicles. The 1967 Air Quality Act
was the first piece of federal legislation that was designed to control
lead emissions. But the automobile and oil industries continually
resisted tougher standards; and while the public paid homage to clean
air, it resented carrying the burden of responsibility through higher
costs and reduced automobile performance. 66
There had been considerable support for some type of federal standards both in Congress and in the executive branch. But what kind
of standards? Senator Muskie-"Mr. Pollution Control"-generally
opposed fixed standards on emissions, fearing that they would be
"minimal rather than uniform." The administration ignored Muskie's
opposition, supporting national emission standards for major industrial sources of pollution. In addition, the administration's plan
gave authority to regional commissions-to be staffed and financed
by the federal government-to set standards for their particular regions.
Muskie continued to voice opposition, and he presented his own version of the proposed bill. The compromise version, which became the
1967 law, included many of the administration's original recommendations, including a regional orientation for setting standards.
However, Muskie is credited with having shaped the standard-setting
procedures by placing direct responsibility both on the states and on
the federal government. While the act was the first to attempt to control lead emissions from automobiles, it mandated ambient air-quality
standards for coal-burning industries. In the case of the latter, at least,
the coal industry and its allies believed that they had achieved the
lesser of two ·evils by avoiding national emissions standards. 67
For his part, President Johnson had a difficult time in not playing politics with air-pollution legislation. Throughout the maneuverings over the bill, he was reluctant to come down hard against the
automobile and coal industries, holding out hope that cooperation
between the government and business could help to solve the problem. When HEW initially presented a proposal to the White House
in 1965 calling for enforceable federal standards on automobile ex-
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haust, the president queried whether the industry had been consulted.
The proposal was dropped and ignored for several months. Muskie's
persistence, criticism in the press, and the general momentum of the
antipollution movement forced LBJ to accept a more stringent approach to standards for automobile emissions-or at least to avoid
public debate over the matter. 68 A scribbled response to a suggestion
that the president support the formation of a nonprofit corporation
headed by business leaders to fight air pollution was telling: "Keep
this away from W.H. [the White House]." 69
Water-pollution control-including sewage treatment and oil
pollution-had equal standing during the Johnson years with airpollution control. Leadership came especially from Senator Muskie,
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution.
During the early 1960s, congressional leaders were ready to accelerate
the pace of pollution-control legislation and to increase the federal
role in water-pollution control. Before 1948, legal authority to control water pollution resided almost exclusively on the local level or
in the states. But between the late 1940s and 1965, water-pollution
control was mired in controversy over federal enforcement powers and
financial assistance for the construction of waste-treatment plants.
In 1963, with a Democratically controlled Senate and a pervasive
spirit of federal leadership in social programs, Muskie introduced
significant amendments to the 1961 water-pollution-control act, including water-quality standards and the transfer of administrative
authority from the Public Health Service to the new Federal Water
Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) within HEW. When it was
finally passed in 1965, the Water Quality Act made significant headway in controlling some forms of water pollution.
The 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act was an important addition, growing out of a tortuous compromise between the executive
branch and Congress. The administration was concerned about
Senator Muskie's proposal for a huge increase in grant authorization
for treatment facilities, and it was wary of granting strong pollutioncontrol authority to the states. Therefore, the administration plan
called for water-pollution control on a regional basis. Muskie disliked this approach because it placed less emphasis on the states' waterquality standards which he had fought for in the 1965 legislation.
Because Congress resisted the idea of regional plans, favoring instead
public-works programs that would be controlled by their constituencies, Muskie's version won out. While a veto was considered, the president wanted some form of water-pollution control, so he signed the
bill. 70
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By the last two years of the Johnson administration, interest in
water-pollution control expanded to include interest in oil pollution.
The sinking of the huge tanker Torrey Canyon in March, 1967, helped
to dramatize the need for updating federal legislation in regard to oil
pollution. In 1967 the Senate passed a bill that dealt with oil pollution and acid mine drainage, and in 1968 it approved a second measure,
which included sections on vessel and thermal pollution. However,
lack of action in the House and other delays pushed consideration
of the bills until after the Santa Barbara oil-spill disaster in 1969. This
left the unfair impression that the Johnson administration had
neglected a form of pollution that was linked to the president's home
state. Beyond legislative action, the administration had begun to consider multiagency contingency plans for responding to oil-spill
emergencies. Yet, in view of the later Santa Barbara spill, hindsight
suggests that the administration had not done enough to avoid an oilpollution disaster.71
Undersecretary of the Interior David S. Black attempted to explain to an administration critic about mineral development on the
Outer Continental Shelf:
In essence, we were confronted with the difficult task of
achieving a balance among several factors: the right of all the people of the United States to receive the benefit of public resource
development, the needs of consumers in the petroleum-short West
Coast region, and the legitimate interest of the local community
in preserving its natural environment.7 2
While the Johnson administration and Congress cannot be credited
with having made sweeping progress in pollution control during much
of the 1960s, they did address an array of pollution problems that had
been given short shrift for many years. Air and water pollution received the lion's share of attention, but there was a growing interest in oil
pollution, noise pollution, sight pollution (through the beautification
program), and, to a much lesser degree, strip mining and nuclear radiation. A forum for discussing these crucial environmental interests had
been established on the federal level. And while government leaders
did not initiate the debate over pollution, they responded to it more
vigorously than had their predecessors in office.7 3
The Urban Environment
Through an array of social programs, including beautification, the
Johnson administration had demonstrated its interest in urban prob-
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lems and the quality of city life. A concern about the urban environment not only grew out of the general environmental impulses of the
decade; it also stemmed from the revival of interest in growth management. Planners and policy makers debated issues such as urban
growth, development, national planning, environmental protection,
and population management. While federal officials did not formalize
a comprehensive policy of growth management for cities, they did institute individual programs. 74
The general interest in outdoor recreation had its urban aspect
during the early 1960s. During the Kennedy administration, the Housing Act of 1961 had included a $SO-million fund for urban open space.
In 1965, Congress had added $310 million for the development of parks
and for urban beautification. Between 1962 and 1972, the program,
which was administered by the Urban Renewal Administration,
granted $442 million to more than one thousand units of government,
which led to the purchase of 348,000 acres. Urban-oriented parks also
expanded the purposes of the national park system. The establishment of the Cape Cod National Seashore in 1961 had begun a trend
which carried forward into the Johnson years with such areas as the
Fire Island National Seashore 11964). 75
The Johnson administration gave particular attention to the
delivery of sanitary services. As discussed earlier, the funding of sewage
treatment was an important feature of water legislation. The administration also made strides in dealing with solid wastes. In a special
message on the conservation and restoration of natural beauty, President Johnson called for "better solutions to the disposal of solid waste"
and recommended federal legislation to assist state governments in
developing comprehensive disposal programs and to provide funds for
research and development. Soon after this call to action, Congress
passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. This act recognized the
ever-mounting volume and changing character of refuse, as well as
the inability of current methods to deal with the problem. Not
satisfied with the act alone, Johnson, with the advice of his Scientific Advisory Committee, directed that a special study be made of
the national problem of solid waste. This resulted in the 1968 National Survey of Community Solid Waste Practices. It was the first
truly national study of its kind in the twentieth century.76
The Johnson administration moved beyond the natural habitat
with its historic-preservation program. The first major commitment
of the federal government in the area came with the National Historic
Preservation Act of 1966. This law broadened previous legislation,
such as the Historic Sites Act of 1935, which had authorized the Na-
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tional Park Service to survey and acquire sites. The 1966 legislation
authorized the secretary of the Interior to establish the National
Register of Historic Places, which includes structures, sites, districts,
and cultural resources of significance to the American heritage. Listing
on the register was a prerequisite to the acquiring of federal matching
grants for the acquisition or preservation and for federal tax benefits. 77
The Johnson administration's venture into the urban environment
was the most imaginative and innovative aspect of the New Conservation, because it brought several new federal programs to the cities.
While individual component~ of the urban programs stressed wellknown concerns-namely, air and water pollution, recreational space,
land use, waste disposal, and historic preservation-taken as a whole,
they reflected a fresh recognition of the "urban environment." By
elevating local issues to national prominence, cities no longer had
to take a back seat to the wilderness as vital environmental challenges.
The natural environment and the built environment were being fused
in the national consciousness, possibly for the first time.
The Johnson Administration and the Environment

There is little doubt that the events of the early and mid 1960sinside and outside of government-set the stage for the passage of
NEPA and the blossoming of the modem environmental movement.
Did the Johnson administration play a major role in these events? Lynton Caldwell has suggested that the "White House support for
environmental-quality efforts was ambiguous." While the president
convened a conference on natural beauty, he also signed legislation
that resulted in the running of overhead powerlines through Woodside, California, even though the community was willing to put them
underground. The secretary of the army continued to issue fill permits in San Francisco Bay, despite rising protests. And the White
House remained neutral in environmental battles over the Florida
Everglades and the Indiana Dunes. Even in cases where action that
favored environmental causes was taken, "White House follow-up
showed neither direction nor vigor." Part of the reason, Caldwell has
argued, was Johnson's increasing preoccupation with the deepening
conflict in Vietnam and with the growing civil disorder at home.
Caldwell has concluded: "The Johnson administration, notably
through the efforts of Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, had
taken a large step forward toward a national policy for the environment. But it had stopped short of the threshold. The locus of environmental policy making shifted to the Congress." 78
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Caldwell's assessment is persuasive in several ways, but it is incomplete. The administration often demonstrated a lack of consistency in support of environmental issues. The president certainly grew
more preoccupied with the domestic and international crises that were
stymieing the Great Society. Congress did play a vital role in
establishing new environmental laws. Yet, if we consider what came
before the 1960s rather than what came afterwards, a slightly different
perspective on the administration emerges.
It would be unfair to suggest that the New Conservation was
the governmental expression of modem environmentalism, for it
was not. Nevertheless, it was clearly an important transitional step
between old-style resource conservation and the more recent emphasis on environmental quality and environmental protection. The
effort to make conservation and natural beauty important political
issues, rather than peripheral interests, separated the Johnson administration from most of its predecessors. In breadth of coverage,
certainly, the New Conservation was new: urban environmentalism
and antipollution acquired parity with wilderness preservation and
land and water conservation. Several environmental issues that had
formerly been regarded as local concerns achieved national status,
including air pollution, sewage treatment, historic preservation, and
waste disposal.
The Johnson administration cannot be credited with initiating
the major environmental causes of the time, but it cannot be considered superfluous and certainly not obstructionist. Within the administration the commitment to environmental programs was built
upon three major factors. First, key advisers within the administration-especially Stewart Udall and Lady Bird Johnson-acted as
conduits between the emerging environmental movement and the
White House. Some issues were filtered or modified by these intermediaries, but the administration was not cut off from the outside world, nor did it make decisions in a vacuum. Second, the tradition of federal involvement in the social welfare of Americans, which
is consciously linked to the New Deal and which achieved broader
expression in the Great Society, gave environmental programs a legitimate claim to administration support. And third, executive leadership was provided by a politically opportunistic president who happened to appreciate the broad outlines of environmentalism, if not
the details of it.
There were limits, to be sure, in the New Conservation. The focus
on federal responsibility or federal remedies to environmental problems-"creative federalism," as Udall called it-often paid little heed
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to more specific local, state, or regional issues. In some cases, political
compromises restrained the environmental goals that were being expressed by those outside of government; in other cases, the federal
government coopted ideas and programs in an attempt to set national
policy. But we must be careful not to view the Johnson administration's-or any administration's-commitment to national remedies
as an accomplished fact. The diffusion of environmental programs
within the bureaucracy, the lack of a clear institutional focal point
for structuring environmental policy, the myriad conflicting goals and
vested interests that are represented in the executive, judicial and
legislative branches of government-all worked against a cohesive national policy in regard to the environment.
The Johnson administration's New Conservation was broad,
sometimes bold, and often controversial. To some, it went too far; to
many environmentalists, it did not go far enough. If its place in history
is not yet well established, it is because we as yet do not know what
to make of a president who led us simultaneously into Vietnam and
into the Great Society. We barely have a feel for the institutional
mechanisms within the federal bureaucracy and Congress that shape
environmental laws and carry them out. And we still know all too
little about the modem environmental movement and its potential
repercussions. If the study of the New Conservation has yet to provide many answers, it raises many gnawing questions about the state
of environmental affairs in the United States.
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Appendix
Task Forces on the Environment
1964 Task Force on Environmental Pollution
Task Force on Natural Resources
Task Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty
1965 Task Force on Pollution Abatement
1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies
Task Force on the Quality of the Environment
Task Force on Resources and Recreation
1967 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment
1968 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment
SOURCE: White House Central Files, Task Force Reports, Johnson Library

Major Legislation on the Environment, 1963-68
1963 Clean Air Act
1964 Canyonlands National Park
Fire Island National Seashore
Water Resources Research Act
Wilderness Act
1965 Federal Water Project Recreation Act
Highway Beautification Act
Land and Water Conservation Fund Act
Solid Waste Disposal Act
Water Quality Act
Water Resources Planning Act
1966 Clean Water Restoration Act
Endangered Species Act
Federal Coal Mine Safety Act
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Protection Act
Historic Preservation Act
Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore
1967 Air Quality Act
National Emissions Standards Act
1968 National Trails Act
Redwood National Park
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act

6 I Lady Bird Johnson
and Beautification
Lewis L. Gould
MRS. LYNDON B. JOHNSON'S CAMPAIGN on behalf of the
beautification of the United States has not as yet become part of the
historical record of her husband's presidential administration.
Although students of the environmental moyement now recognize
the contributions of Lyndon Johnson and his presidency to the
emergence of a new ecological spirit in the 1970s,1 Mrs. Johnson's
similar efforts to improve the appearance and quality of Washington,
D.C., and other places in the country, her advocacy of highway
beautification, and her concern for the environment in general are
still regarded as either a side show from the real work of the Johnson
years or as a politically motivated task with which the First Lady could
occupy herself.
These conclusions first appeared in the early comments about
the beautification campaign after the Johnsons had left the White
House. Best-selling memoirs of White House employees assigned
credit to Mrs. Johnson's aides, Mrs. Elizabeth ("Liz") S. Carpenter and
Mrs. Bess Abell, for having devised a program that enabled the First
Lady to emulate, but not to imitate, the restoration work that Mrs.
Jacqueline Kennedy had performed for the White House. Nancy
Dickerson, writing in the mid 1970s, conceded the serious purpose
of Mrs. Johnson's work but argued that "beautification was probably
the only subject that LBJ would have let her handle without jealousy."
The caustic Barbara Howar, in Laughing All The Way (1973), speculated on what Mrs. Johnson's impact on her husband and his presidency would have been "had she used her influence in matters more
crucial than beautifying a troubled nation." 2
More positive evaluations were less widely read. June Sochen, in
a 1973 book on women activists and thinkers in this century, advanced
the view that "Lady Bird's concern for the natural environment
foreshadowed the much publicized ecology movement of the late sixties." More recent appraisals have extended Sochen's conclusions. In
a comparison of First Lady activism with the model of Eleanor
Roosevelt, Abigail McCarthy has observed that beautification, "despite
the somewhat gimmicky tone of its title," bore real results by directing attention to the environment and by improving the quality of
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life in towns and cities, especially Washington, O.C. Vaughn Bomet,
too, assigns credit to the Johnsons for having laid the groundwork for
environmentalism in the 1970s; he calls the First Lady "well suited
to being the organizer, propagandist, spokeswoman, and recruiter of
talent for her cause of beautification." 3
As the ample materials in the Johnson Library reveal, especially
the recently opened beautification files, her role in the administration was even more extensive than the impression offered in previous
accounts of her work. In pursuing beautification, the First Lady functioned as a legislative aide, adviser on appointments, shaper of policy,
and public advocate for the administration. Tangible results of her
efforts included the Highway Beautification Act of 1965; a lasting
enhancement of the physical appearance of Washington, O.C., and
other urban and rural places; and the involvement of environmentally
minded individuals and groups in the shaping of government programs. Less immediately visible, but in the long run of equal importance, was the stimulus that she gave to an increased ecological consciousness in the nation at large. Like her husband, Mrs. Johnson had
a significant role in providing a foundation for the environmental
movement that burgeoned during the 1970s.
A sensitivity to her physical surroundings and their natural beauty
marked the early life of Claudia Alta Taylor in Karnack, Texas, where
she was born on December 22, 1912. Her mother, Minnie Patillo
Taylor, introduced her youngest child and only daughter to music,
books, and the arts at an early age. After her mother died when Claudia
was nearly six, her busy father, Thomas Jefferson Taylor, the owner
of a general store and "Dealer in Everything," often left her in the
charge of a maiden aunt, Effie Patillo. Claudia played in the fields and
on the lake near her home. "When I was a little girl," she said in 197 6,
11 I grew up listening to the wind in the pine trees of the east Texas
woods." Years after her childhood, she wrote about Caddo Lake: 11 I
loved to paddle in those dark bayous, where time itself seemed ringed
round by silence and ancient cypress trees, rich in festoons of Spanish
moss. Now and then an alligator would surface to float like a gnarled
log. It was a place for dreams." Already called "Lady Bird" by a family
cook, she disliked the name but made her peace with . it in early
adolescence. 4
After attending school in Marshall, Texas, Claudia went on to St.
Mary's School for Girls in Dallas, where she pursued her love of the
theater. In 1930 she entered the University of Texas, and friends
remembered her affection for the out of doors during the ensuing four
years. "She loved bluebonnets," her friend Gene Boehringer said; "she
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loved everything about Austin and Texas, and she loved the hills and
the dirt and everything in Austin." 5 Though she concentrated in college on history and journalism, she also took a course in geology,
"which stretched my perspective of the life of man on this physical
planet." She wrote for the Daily Texan; she was publicity manager
for the University of Texas Sports Association, the women's athletic
organization on campus; and she read Dorothy Parker, D. H. Lawrence,
and Emily Dickinson. She believed that at the University, "all the
doors of the world suddenly were swung open to me." 6
In November, 1934, after a brief courtship, she married Lyndon
B. Johnson, then a congressional aide in Washington. Over the ensuing three decades, the rhythms of his political life shaped her career.
Her initial reticence as a speaker gave way to facility by the early 1960s.
She ran his congressional office during his wartime military service
in 1942, and she successfully managed the radio station that they purchased in Austin and, later, their expanding television holdings. 1\vo
daughters were born in the 1940s and were raised around the demands
of her husband's emerging prominence in the Senate after 1949. Lyndon Johnson was a demanding and affectionate, though often a difficult, spouse. He criticized her appearance, sometimes embarrassed
her, and was faithful when he chose to be. He also stretched her
abilities, and she had grown in self-confidence and skill as a public
figure before he came to the presidency.7
A strong bond in the marriage, she believed, was their mutual
interest in the land. They shared, she told an interviewer in 1964, "a
deep sense of oneness with the land, a reliance on the land and the
love of it." When Lyndon was directing the National Youth Administration in Texas from 1935 to 1937, she participated in the discussions that led to the idea of roadside parks along the state's highways.
"I loved the trips across the country to Washington and I never got
too many of them," she recalled. On these journeys and on the later
campaign trips in Texas, she observed the changing shape of the land
and the impact that billboards, junkyards, and buildings were having
on scenic views. Her interest in nature also manifested itself in "quite
a remarkable garden" that she raised in wartime Washington. "There
is something remarkably more beautiful about flowers that you
yourself have planted and divided and cared for than any other flowers,"
she observed in 1965. "It reminds one that creation of beauty is a
happy experience." 8
When she entered the White House as First Lady in the wake of
John F. Kennedy's assassination, Lady Bird Johnson wanted neither
to imitate what Jacqueline Kennedy had done nor to depart from it
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in a manner that might arouse criticism. Most of her first full year
as First Lady was spent in feeling her way into a proper role. Until
President Johnson decided to run in 1964 and was safely elected, her
initiatives could only be exploratory. She made speeches in which she
exhorted women to be "dedicated doers" on behalf of a better society,
and she gave public support, through personal visits, to the administration's war on poverty and hunger. But even in this transitional phase,
she thought about issues of conservation and the environment. In
June, 1964, she discussed with Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall
and Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges the effect that highway
construction was having on national parks and wilderness areas. In
the diary that she kept regularly, she noted that Udall was "a loud
voice for preserving the wilderness, the National Parks, the shrines,
the jewels of America." Two days later, Jane Jacobs, a critic of urban
planning, spoke to the First Lady's "women doer" luncheon about
the problems of the cities. Mrs. Johnson identified one issue in particular: "How to make a city beautiful." 9
The primary political concern of the Johnsons in 1964 was success against Barry Goldwater in the autumn. In October, Mrs. Johnson
made a flamboyant whistle-stop tour of the South on the "Lady Bird
Special," which helped to keep more than half of Dixie in the
Democratic column.10 A similar motive underlay an earlier trip to the
West with Udall in August, 1964, to visit Indian reservations and to
assist Democratic senatorial candidates in Montana and Wyoming.
The tour also laid the basis for the First Lady's close working friendship with Udall and provided some initial stirrings of the actual
beautification program. As they flew in a propeller plane across the
Rocky Mountain area, they sat side by side and found, in Udall's words,
an "instant rapport" about the land and its resources. Mrs. Johnson
had "an instinctive feeling for the beauty of the country," and Udall
sensed that her commitment to conservation subjects grew during
the trip.11 Speeches that James Reston, Jr., of the Interior Department
wrote for her spoke about the beauty of the region and the need to
preserve it.12
The woman in the seat next to Stewart Udall in August, 1964,
was five feet, four inches tall, with dark hair, prominent features, and
a ready smile. To help her husband after his heart attack, she kept
her weight at 110 pounds. Photographs and television cameras usually failed to capture her attractiveness and her outgoing public personality. Highly organized, very intelligent, and a perpetual reader,
Mrs. Johnson had, one close friend said, "one of the most compartmentalized minds I've ever known." Those who worked closely with
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the First Lady learned that she was always prepared, and she expected
others to have done their homework. Walter Washington recalled that
Mrs. Johnson's eyes missed nothing on their walks around the capital
city. Cautious with money and hard-headed about business matters,
she also had an idealistic impulse to serve humanity and to better
society. Above all, she knew how to influence her husband, and she
knew the limits of that authority.13
The First Lady understood that access to news and publicity was
central to success in Washington. She brought in Liz Carpenter as the
first officially designated press secretary to a First Lady. Carpenter was
ebullient and vocal, "the White House's female P. T. Barnum," as
Helen Thomas has called her. Carpenter had an excellent sense of
how the working press functioned. To help her with television appearances, Mrs. Johnson relied on Simone Poulain. The social
secretary, Bess Abell, daughter of Senator Earle Clements, was a model
of discretion and efficiency. Morale was excellent among those around
Mrs. Johnson, and her staff exhibited few of the tensions that are often
characteristic of work in the White House.14
As soon as Barry Goldwater had been defeated in November, 1964,
Mrs. Johnson "began to think of what I could do to help" the president and his policies. The Head Start program for preschool children
attracted her involvement in 1965/66, but the "whole field of conservation and beautification" had "the greatest appeal." 15 In mid
November she asked a number of friends and advisers for ideas about
how she could best pursue her general goals.
Suggestions came in rapidly. Mrs. Katie Louchheim, who had long
been active in the Democratic party and who was a State Department
official, surveyed what the administration was already doing about
natural beauty; in a memorandum of November 20 she proposed that
awards should be given for "preserving, improving, or beautifying the
American scene." On that same day, Mrs. Johnson met with Udall
at the LBJ Ranch. "It was her idea," Udall remembered, "to start out
in the National Capital to demonstrate what could be done" and then
to use Washington as a model for the rest of the country.16 Elizabeth
Rowe, the wife of a former aide to Franklin Roosevelt and a long-time
friend of the Johnsons, was chairman of the National Capital Planning Commission. In early December she offered the complementary
idea "that you extend your interest in the White House's beauty and
history to the whole city." Rowe added that a White House Committee on Washington's Appearance might be a suitable vehicle to "sup~
port present and future programs on the city's beauty." 17
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During the early 1960s the physical situation of the nation's
capital and the social problems that it reflected stimulated efforts to
revitalize and reclaim the federal city. "Washington is a shabby city
compared with most European capitals," Udall told the First Lady,18
and critics outside of government spoke even more harshly. Wolf von
Eckardt, who wrote on architecture and urban design for the
Washington Post, said in 1963 that among Washington's disgraces were
its "many lawns, dilapidated sidewalks, ugly and confusing clutter
of traffic signs, decrepit benches, forbidding trash baskets, hideous
parking lots, poorly lit, deserted, and crime-ridden city parks, and a
desperate dearth of amenities" for residents and tourists.19
On a larger scale, such issues as pollution, controversies over
highway location and construction, public transportation, and a
deteriorating inner city made Washington an example of the urban
dilemmas that were convulsing the 1960s. To that mix was added the
city's subordinate relation to Congress, which left the city's eight hundred thousand residents without self-government. Even more salient
was the presence of a black majority that was impoverished and
segregated and a white minority that was in control both economically
and politically. Touching one aspect of the capital city's problems
meant becoming involved in a whole range of issues. As Antonia
Chayes, who was a lawyer on the Planning Staff of the National Institute of Mental Health and an aide on Mrs. Johnson's 1964 campaign, observed in a memorandum "On the Cities" in December,
1964, the aim of improving urban life in Washington had large implications for the central domestic theme of Johnson's presidency:
"These goals reach for the 'Great Society.' 1120
At the outset the public plans for Mrs. Johnson's beautification
initiative addressed only the issue of the city's appearance. By early
1965 the First Lady had decided to form a committee of approximately
twenty private citizens and public officials to promote a greater
awareness of Washington's beauty. She told her friends that her role
would be advisory; she would act as a general sponsor who would
make some awards to worthy beautification projects. The name of the
panel evolved into the First Lady's Committee for a More Beautiful
National Capital, and letters were sent out to the proposed members,
inviting them to a meeting at the White House on February 11, 1965.
"It is in our own communities," the letter from the First Lady said,
"that we can best participate in creating an environment which has
beauty, joyousness, and loveliness, as well as dignity." In addition to
selecting Udall and Elizabeth Rowe, Mrs. Johnson tapped Laurance
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S. Rockefeller; Walter Tobriner, a commissioner of the District; Mrs.
Katharine Graham, publisher of the Washington Post; and Mrs. Mary
W. Lasker of New York City, a benefactor of health and beautification causes. Other members came from the federal government, from
the private sector, and from a group of prominent Washingtonians who
were active in the District's affairs. 21
The First Lady's beautification campaign also consciously drew
inspiration from the Johnson administration's ambitious effort to
beautify the nation in general. In his "Great Society" speech of May,
1964, the president had spoken about the need "to prevent an ugly
America" because "once our natural splendor is destroyed, it can never
be recaptured." 22 As his wife listened to Lyndon Johnson in 1964, "as
I began to see the things he was applying himself to, there emerged
the interests that made my heart sing, the ones that I knew most about
and cared most about. Those were the environment and beautification." The extent of the First Lady's reciprocal influence on her husband remains unclear. Stewart Udall believed that "she influenced the
President to demand-and support-more farsighted conservation
legislation." Neither of the Johnsons committed much to paper on
this and other subjects, and conclusions about the flow of ideas are
only speculative. The exchange of views between the spouses was
probably mutual, rather than a definite movement from the president
to the First Lady. 23
The Task Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty was named
in July, 1964, and it worked through the rest of the year on such topics
as "the cost of ugliness" and "natural beauty and the public interest."
Mrs. Johnson read the task force's report when it was issued in
November, 1964, and discussed it with Udall when he visited the
ranch. The president mentioned natural beauty in his 1965 State of
the Union speech, the first chief executive to have alluded to the subject in that way. Mrs. Johnson noted in her diary: I hope we can do
something about that in our four years here." 24
President Johnson opened the natural-beauty campaign on
February 8, 1965, when he sent Congress a special message on "Conservation and the Restoration of Natural Beauty." The president called
for "a new conservation," which would provide "restoration and innovation," and urged that "our planning, our programs, our buildings,
and our growth" all have "a conscious and active concern for the value
of beauty." Specific programs included highway beautification, cleanair legislation, an array of other conservation measures, and the White
House Conference on Natural Beauty in May, 1965. 25
11
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At the same time, the First Lady prepared to launch her own
beautification drive. She met with Laurance Rockefeller, who had
already been selected as chairman of the Natural Beauty Conference,
to discuss the subject. It was, she noted, "like picking up a tangled
skein of wool-all the threads are interwoven-recreation and pollution and mental health, and the crime rate, and rapid transit, and
highway beautification, and the war on poverty, and parks-national,
state, and local." She was "desperately interested in something positive
coming out of this program, something besides a lot of words and proliferation of committees." 26
The public learned of the First Lady's plans when a lengthy interview appeared on "Ways to Beautify America" in the February 22,
1965, issue of U.S. News and World Report. "I am proud that this Administration has accepted the commitment to make our cities and
country more beautiful for all the people." She observed that "the time
is ripe-the time is now-to take advantage of this yeasty, bubbling
desire to beautify our cities and our countryside." 27
The First Lady's Committee for a More Beautiful Capital assembled in the Blue Room of the White House on February 11, 1965. After hearing her read from Lord Bryce's description of Washington in
1913 to underscore the possibilities of the city's beauty, the committee members explored her charge ''to implement what is already underway, supplement what should be underway, and to be the catalyst
for action.'' They agreed to plant flowers in the traffic triangles and
squares of Washington, to give awards for neighborhood beautification, and to endorse existing projects, such as the revitalization of
Pennsylvania Avenue and the preservation of Lafayette Park. 28
Mrs. Johnson's interview and news reports about the initial
meeting of the committee evoked an enthusiastic popular reaction.
To handle the accumulation of mail on beautification, the First Lady's
staff was expanded. Sharon Francis, an aide to Secretary Udall, came
to the White House, first as a part-time helper and then, by the summer of 1965, as a regular assistant to the First Lady for beautification. Cynthia Wilson had begun to work for Mrs. Johnson in early
1965, and by the middle of the year, Wilson had assumed beautification duties as well. The women gradually acquired their own office
space in the East Wing. Francis handled the more public side of Mrs.
Johnson's campaign, writing speeches and dealing with agencies and
private citizens; Wilson oversaw the extensive correspondence that
the First Lady received about beautification issues, wrote press
releases, did advance work on trips, and helped with official events.
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Both Francis and Wilson had ample personal energy and a good grasp
of how Mrs. Johnson's mind operated. They served the First Lady
well. 29
The beautification work that Mrs. Johnson did between 1965 and
1969 spread out in many directions in response to burgeoning public
concern and the mounting national awareness of environmental problems. Washington, D.C., may have been the center of her activity, but
inevitably she was drawn into supporting and encouraging efforts that
were occurring in the rest of the country. Both in regard to the District
of Columbia and for national programs, Mrs. Johnson and her associates sought a more precise and inclusive word than beautification to describe their activities and purposes. "It sounds cosmetic and
trivial and it's prissy," she told an interviewer in 1980. Critics mocked
the term or pretended to agree on the aims while opposing their practical implementation, but nothing better ever came along, so the name
endured. 30
In the nation's capital, Mrs. Johnson began with a rush of activity in 1965. Her committee took inspection trips on the Potomac; they
planted trees and visited schools. Katie Louchheim strongly pursued
the program of competitive beautification awards for worthy projects
in the District. In November, 1965, Mrs. Johnson escorted a nationalnetwork television audience on a tour of the city and asked her
viewers: "What will we leave to those who come after us?" A year
and a half later, in March, 1967, she accompanied the wives of the
governors as they planted dogwood trees near National Airport. As
the Washington Star noted in October, 1966, "With a green-thumbed
glove and a gilt shovel, the First Lady has traveled all over town planting pansies, azaleas, chrysanthemums, dogwood and cherry blossom
trees." 31
Mrs. Johnson also worked extensively with the noted architect
Nathaniel Owings on the revival of Pennsylvania Avenue, displaying
what Owings called her "gentle urgency." They discussed the merits
of underground parking, and she prodded him about the appearance
of cherry trees at the Washington Monument and the time that it
would take to have fountains constructed on the Mall. She also lobbied with legislators about Owings's bill to establish a permanent
commission on Pennsylvania Avenue. Owings remembered one occasion when he, Secretary Udall, and the First Lady had unrolled some
plans for the avenue on the carpet and had knelt down to inspect them.
At that point, President Johnson walked in and said: "What in hell,
Udall, are you doing there on the floor with my wife?" 32
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As the beautification campaign progressed in Washington, two
alternative tendencies emerged within the committee and among
those around the First Lady. Katie Louchheim labeled one group "the
daffodil and dogwood set," while the other became identified with
Walter E. Washington, later to become the city's first mayor, and Polly
Shackleton. The main exponent of those who wished to stress the
planting of flowers, trees, and shrubs in the District was the New York
City philanthropist and long-time advocate of expanded governmental medical research programs Mary W. Lasker, widow of the advertising executive Albert D. Lasker. She had used her ample fortune to
spread trees and flowers throughout Manhattan with the same dedication that she had used to lobby senators and presidents to spend more
to defeat heart disease and cancer. Her beautification slogan was
"Plant masses of flowers where the masses pass," and she looked to
the general improvement of what Sharon Francis called "the
monumental and tourist parts of the city." 33
Wise in the exercise of influence in Washington, Lasker operated
through the National Park Service, which oversaw most of the
District's government land. She-enlisted the support of Sutton Jettthe regional director-and Nash Castro, Jett's assistant regional director. A member of the Park Service since 1939, Castro became a central figure in Mrs. Johnson's campaign in Washington. He met regularly with the First Lady at the White House, and he displayed a striking ability to see that plantings were made, materials were secured,
and work was carried out on time. She came to regard him as "indispensable," and he reciprocated, by expressing ample respect for "the
great work she has begun." 34
Mary Lasker's desire to spread seeds, bulbs, and plants at the
highway entrances to Washington and in the parks harmonized so easily with the mission of the Park Service that she was able to draw
readily on the service's budget for planting, location, and maintenance.
Her emphasis on "beautification through planting activities" struck
a warm response in the First Lady, who herself admired flowers and
trees; the New York benefactor also made herself useful to the
Johnsons with her mailing lists, publicity machinery, and friendships
on Capitol Hill. 35
Knowing that private funds would be required to supplement what
the government could allocate, Mrs. Johnson approved of Lasker's plan
for the Society for a More Beautiful National Capital in 1965 as a nonprofit, tax-exempt body to receive donations from the public and to
sponsor beautification endeavors. Initial hopes to raise more than $5
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million did not work out, but the society did take in about $2 million
from such donors as Laurance Rockefeller, Brooke Astor, Marjorie Merriweather Post, and other individuals and foundations. The society
did not raise money professionally during these years, but Lasker, with
the help of Carolyn Agger Fortas, was able to attract, through membership on the group's Advisory Council, in her words, "those who are
rich and possibly sympathetic." 36
The tangible outcome of Lasker's efforts was impressive. By April,
1966, Sutton Jett had reported to Mrs. Johnson that thirty-five park
sites had been beautified. Four hundred thousand bulbs bloomed that
spring along Rock Creek Park and the Potomac Parkway and in squares
and triangles across the city. Cherry trees, some donated by the
Japanese government, were planted on Hains Point; azaleas, cherries,
and magnolias were added along Pennsylvania Avenue. In early 1967,
Lasker reported to Douglass Cater of the White House staff that eighty
park sites had been landscaped, along with nine schools and eight
playgrounds. Half a million bulbs, one hundred thousand of which
she had contributed, had been planted, as had, Lasker continued,
"83,000 spring flowering plants, 50,000 shrubs, 25,000 trees, and
137,000 annuals." The First Lady recorded one White House discussion in early 1966 as evidence of her friend's irrepressible commitment to things floral. Mary Lasker "said with an absolutely straight
face, 'How are we going to get the nurserymen to have enough stock
to plant the whole United States?' " 37
Lasker displayed less enthusiasm for having the committee deal
with the social problems of the District; her interest remained fixed
on flowers and plantings. When the question arose in 1967 of having
landscape architect Lawrence Halprin speak about beautification in
the neighborhoods, Lasker responded "Oh, no, that's not what we
want to be doing." She believed that it would be easier to persuade
wealthy donors to provide funds for parks and gardens than for projects in the city's black district. When she advocated the creation of
community parks out of school facilities or sought recreational
facilities for publicly financed housing projects as a way in which the
government might discourage idleness and help to alleviate juvenile
delinquency, Lasker sounded paternalistic and to a degree condescending. With its emphasis on wealthy contributors and the impact of
beautification on the tourist population, Lasker's approach to
Washington's appearance seemed to Sharon Francis, Walter
Washington, and Lawrence Halprin to have elitist overtones that made
what she did merely cosmetic in light of the capital city's complex
urban difficulties.38

LADY BIRD JOHNSON AND BEAUTIFICATION

I

161

Walter Washington, at this time the executive director of the National Capital Housing Authority, advocated a beautification strategy
that was directed at the needs of the black community as well. The
fifty-year-old Washington, who chaired the Neighborhood and Special
Projects Committee of the First Lady's Committee, emphasized the
involvement of inner-city neighborhoods and schools in the campaign.
Even as she backed Mary Lasker, Mrs. Johnson also supported
Washington's approach. She offered her visible endorsement at a planting ceremony in the Greenleaf Gardens public-housing project in
March, 1965, and at other similar occasions during the next four years.
Two decades later, Walter Washington was still impressed with her
courage, charm, and personal rapport with residents when she toured
even the most impoverished sections of the city's ghetto. 39
The First Lady's commitment went beyond these public events.
In the summer of 1965, Washington's committee identified three
public schools for demonstration cleanup projects and initiated a
"clean-up," "fix-up," "paint-up," and "plant-up" program in the FortyNinth Census Tract in the city's Second Precinct. "The main focus,"
Washington wrote to Mrs. Johnson, "was an attempt to motivate the
children, youth, adults, and family units in a long-range program of
self-involvement for enhancing the physical appearance of the
community." 40
Project Pride, in the summer of 1966, represented a similar kind
of central-city beautification effort. Polly Shackleton, a Democratic
activist in Washington who was a member of the committee, selected
the Shaw Urban Renewal Area, "one of the most deprived areas in the
city," for a cleanup campaign. Residents caught rats and hauled off
debris, garbage, and abandoned cars. The project employed more than
one hundred local school dropouts and high-school students. Funding
of $7,000 came from the Society for a More Beautiful National Capital,
and the energetic Shackleton enlisted cooperation from diverse sectors of the District's govemment. 41
In the following year, Shackleton organized Project Trail Blazers,
which enrolled 110 youths in transforming a shuttered movie theater
into the Anacostia Neighborhood Museum, in creating "play space"
in housing projects, and in cutting nature trails in area parks.
Shackleton noted that the participants came "out of a background
of extreme deprivation which often makes its mark physically and
emotionally." Again, the society underwrote the project, and Laurance
Rockefeller added $50,000 to carry it through the summer and into
the fall. The First Lady visited the Anacostia Museum in August and,
according to Shackleton, "seemed pleased with what she saw." 42
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Another project that Mrs. Johnson pursued in the inner city was
the beautification of the recreational facilities at the Buchanan School
at Thirteenth and D streets, in southeast Washington. Walter Washington had taken her to see the school, which was "surrounded by
a sad area of broken concrete and weeds." Later, Washington also
showed the school to Mrs. Vincent Astor of New York City, whose
good works there included the upgrading of school playgrounds and
parks. In 1966 Brooke Astor's foundation donated $300,000 for an outdoor community center near Buchanan School, and a year and a half
later Mrs. Johnson spoke at the dedication ceremonies. Sharon Francis reported that in the ensuing days, "Buchanan Plaza was overwhelmed with users." 43
In April, 1967, the National Geographic did an article about Mrs.
Johnson's ·campaign. Walter Washington summed up the benefits of
her commitment to the projects that he and Shackleton had sponsored: "When this program started, there were some, I suppose, who
regarded it as Marie Antoinette's piece of cake, I mean, out in east
Washington, how many rats can you kill with a tulip? But it hasn't
been that way at all. We started with mass plantings, then we moved
on to Project Pride, and we are here." 44
By mid 1966 the beautification campaign in the nation's capital
was moving in an even more expansive way than the initiatives of
Walter Washington and Polly Shackleton had envisioned. Stephen Currier, president of Urban America, first came to Mrs. Johnson's attention when his organization sponsored a conference on cities in
September, 1966. The Johnsons hosted a reception at the White House,
at which the First Lady said that "the challenge to America's cities
is how to govern their growth boom with beauty and with compassion for every life and its fulfillment." Currier, who was married to
a member of the Mellon family, pursued good works through his
Taconic Foundation. He also gave money to civil-rights work in the
South and, as Sharon Francis said, "had an orientation in the direction of helping the needy and black part of the city." Currier initiated
conversations with Mrs. Johnson's associates about paying for another
staff member who could "work with Washington's business community on a daily basis as a representative of Mrs. Johnson's committee" or could raise money for the committee itself. By the time of
the cities conference, Currier and Francis had gone well beyond this
initial proposal and had agreed to employ a landscape architect to
make plans for Washington. Their choice was Lawrence Halprin of
San Francisco. 45
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Mrs. Johnson herself learned about Halprin during a conservation and beautification trip in the West in September, 1966. Sharon
Francis accompanied her and, in San Francisco, took the First Lady
and Liz Carpenter to Ghirardelli Square, an old chocolate factory that
Halprin had transformed into a shopping center and plaza. Mrs.
Johnson was impressed, Francis told her about Halprin, and they decided to secure his services. The landscape architect came to
Washington in October and toured the city with Walter Washington.
As they drove and talked, ideas emerged for improving the black
districts. As he rode with Mrs. Johnson, Halprin proposed to create
vest-pocket parks and to transform school grounds into recreational
spaces. Asked to comment, Mrs. Johnson said: "Well, I'm no expert
in these fields. You experts who know how to do the things must make
the judgments. All I would say is that any area this committee undertakes should be usable by lots and lots of people. It should be fun,
and its maintenance should be easy because any project we sponsor
will be a stepchild of the city." 46
After consultation and planning in November and December,
1966, Halprin set out his proposals at a meeting of the First Lady's
Committee on January 12, 1967. He described ambitious designs for
a large park near the Anacostia River, conversion of a transit-car barn
on East Capitol Street into a recreational center, and the development
of inner blocks near the Capitol into vest-pocket parks and recreational places. To accomplish Halprin's vision, some adjustment of construction plans for a projected freeway would be necessary. Mrs.
Johnson called it "an imaginative, exciting program with great potential. It will take a lot of hard work to implement it." A subcommittee, composed of Udall, Clifton Shackleton, Secretary Robert C.
Weaver of Housing and Urban Development, Commissioner Tobriner,
and others, was established to explore ways to bring Halprin's ideas
into being. 47
Within days of its unveiling, Halprin's initiative received a
devastating setback. Stephen Currier and his wife were lost on a plane
flight in the Caribbean. With their deaths went the assured funding
for Halprin's work as a consultant, as well as the money that Currier
had hoped to raise. It was, Sharon Francis recalled, "a very, very major blow that, of course, no one could have foreseen." 48
Nonetheless, Mrs. Johnson, Francis, and Halprin went forward.
They opened discussions with the local community, sought alternative funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, and started negotiations with the Department of Housing and Urban Development
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(HUD) about federal beautification grants for the Capital East-Inner
Blocks project. But changes in congressional funding for HUD grants
slowed the process, as did the general turning away from Great Society programs that marked 1967 I 68. Consequently, the Halprin proposals remained largely unrealized possibilities during the Johnson
years, though they underscored the ambitious range of Mrs. Johnson's
definition of beautification. 49
The First Lady's work with Walter Washington and Polly
Shackleton, as well as her endorsement of Halprin's plans, did not,
of course, prevent the city from undergoing serious violence and
rioting in April, 1968, after the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. The
conditions that fueled the riots were more deep-seated than even the
programs of the Johnson years recognized. Nonetheless, Walter
Washington believed then, as he did twenty years later, that Mrs.
Johnson, between 1965 and 1968, did important work in improving
the self-image and pride of the black community in Washington and
that her efforts had reduced tensions and alleviated problems. "Her
heritage as First Lady," he said at the White House in April, 1968, "is
not in beautification per se; it is in communication. It is in the hope
and desire to identify a human being with his environment." so
The legacy of Lady Bird Johnson in Washington, D.C., endured
after her departure in 1969. The Society for a More Beautiful National
Capital continued into the mid 1970s; but without the support of a
First Lady, it experienced fund-raising and organizational problems
that eventually caused it to disappear. Her floral contribution,
however, pervaded the city. The Park Service and the District government did better maintenance in the monumental and tourist areas
than in the black sections of the city, but all Washington residents
felt the impact of Mrs. Johnson's work as the seasons turned. Each
spring, say Washingtonians and visitors alike, when the cherry
blossoms, the azaleas, and the other flowers bloom, the collective
thought is "Thank God for Lady Bird Johnson." 51
The First Lady's beautification campaign in Washington engaged
her energies and filled her schedule. Yet she also carried on an equally
ambitious program nationally. She used the drawing power of the institution to stimulate citizen action to improve the appearance of the
nation's landscape. She encouraged participants in environmental affairs, the young, and the business community to meet and discuss
common issues. She spoke widely on beautification topics. Most important, Mrs. Johnson involved herself deeply in the administration's
effort to enact and implement legislation to regulate billboards and
junkyards and to preserve the natural scenery of the nation's highways.

LADY BIRD JOHNSON AND BEAUTIFICATION

I

165

After the president's message on natural beauty and after the U.S.
News interview, popular interest in Mrs. Johnson and beautification
burgeoned. To meet the public's concern, she traveled widely for her
cause and enlisted surrogates to assist her. Unable to meet all the invitations to speak that she received, in early 1966 she recruited cabinet
and Senate wives, under Mrs. Henry Fowler, wife of the secretary of
the Treasury, to serve on the Speakers Bureau. Beginning in the spring
of 1965, Mrs. Johnson herself took numerous well-publicized wellorganized tours for beautification. On May 11/12, 1965, she led a
"Landscapes and Landmarks" excursion through Virginia to Monticello and on to the Blue Ridge Mountains. Later that year she went
to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and to Buffalo,
New York, on separate trips. 52
Perhaps the most memorable of the conservation tours was the
trip to the Big Bend region of Texas in April, 1966. Seventy-five
reporters accompanied Mrs. Johnson, Secretary Udall, Liz Carpenter,
and other officials through the rugged mountains and on rafts down
the Rio Grande. "But mostly there were just the awesome spires of
the canyon walls pierced by centuries of wind, eroded by centuries
of water, with all sorts of tales to tell to a geologist," the First Lady
recorded in her diary. When the party of one hundred and thirty
camped at last after running the river, Liz Carpenter observed:
"Frankly, I like the parks where all the concessions are run by the
Rockefellers." This event impressed the media, but it also made the
important point that what Udall called "a wilderness experience" had
the direct support of the president's family. 53
Mrs. Johnson also delivered dozens of speeches on beautification
topics to groups across the country. In Jackson Hole in September,
1965, she told the National Council of State Garden Clubs and the
American Forestry Association that beauty "cannot be reserved 'For
nice neighborhoods only.' " She informed the American Roadbuilders
Association in Denver in February, 1966, that "great roads not only
get you from 'here' to 'there,' but they afford a revelation of America's
great beauty along the way.'' Toward the end of the presidency, in May,
1968, she declared, in dedicating a park in Stamford, Connecticut:
"We can make and re-make this land of ours into a land where people
can not only prosper but where they can see and feel the beauty of
our time and place.'' 54
As the Johnson administration became mired in the Vietnam War,
Mrs. Johnson encountered protests and hecklers on her travels. In October, 1967, at Williams College, where she received an honorary
degree and gave a speech on the environment, picketers appeared, and
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some students walked out when she·was introduced. On the next day,
at Yale, there were eight hundred demonstrators outside and a "very
quiet very attentive audience" of the same size inside for another
speech on the environment, "one thing that all of us share." The experience, Sharon Francis concluded, left her "very, very disheartened and
upset." Worried that she might not be able to visit campuses in the
future, the First Lady wrote: "I want to know what's going on-even
if to know is to suffer." 55
Mrs. Johnson's political style was inherently inclusive. Accordingly, she saw the business community as an important and necessary
ally of beautification. She wanted to move, as she wrote to a financial columnist in December, 1965, "from the garden club to the hardware stage of the problem." Responding to her campaign, corporations
such as the Reliance Insurance Company, Giant Food, and major oil
companies embarked on diverse beautification projects. Through
Adam Rumoshosky of the American Petroleum Institute, the First
Lady sought industry approval of the renovation and landscaping of
automobile service stations in Washington and elsewhere. Some of
these initiatives did not last beyond Mrs. Johnson's time in the White
House, some projects were largely symbolic, and there was a certain
- inescapable distance between beautification goals and corporate profits that was never bridged. Yet the First Lady identified no villains
herself, and she did not drive away any potential supporters from the
business sector. 56
In the field of her personal interest, Mrs. Johnson played a direct
role in appointments to boards and commissions that dealt with
beautification-related subjects. She watched the functioning of the
Citizens Advisory Committee on Recreation and Natural Beauty with
particular care. In March, 1968, John W. Macy, Jr., who handled federal
appointments, sent her the names of potential nominees to the panel.
"If you desire to retain any of the present membership," Macy told
her, "I will be happy to recommend them to the President." She consulted with her husband, and two months later they "mutually
agreed" on a list of appropriate selections. Mrs. Johnson's endorsements helped to obtain the appointment of several individuals
who had backed her efforts for highway beautification and other conservation causes. 57
Two beautification conferences in 1965 and 1966 also offered the
First Lady a platform from which to promote beautification. Opening the White House Conference on Natural Beauty, she told the
delegates that "ugliness is bitterness" and asked them, "Can a great
democratic society generate the concerted drive to plan, and having
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planned, to execute great projects of beauty?" Eight hundred delegates
spent two days listening to 116 panelists on such subjects as "The
Townscape," "The New Suburbia," and "Citizen Action." Thirteen
months later, in June, 1966, she welcomed to the White House the
five hundred delegates to the first National Youth Conference on
Natural Beauty and Conservation, a gathering arranged by her niece,
Diana MacArthur. Again, Mrs. Johnson spoke, urging the young people "to consider making America's beauty a full-time vocation."
Copies of the proceedings of the 1965 conference were sent out by
the president to mayors, county officials, and Congress in a further
attempt to create a constituency for natural beauty. Such conferences
reflected the essence of Mrs. Johnson's approach to her responsibilities
as First Lady. "She always liked to be in a position," Udall said, "of
commending those and participating in ceremonies where you were,
in effect, highlighting and dramatizing the good things that were happening in the country." Beautification meant consensus to Mrs.
Johnson, and she pursued consensus long after her husband's administration had lost it to an unpopular war and to domestic unrest.58
The policy issue in the beautification area with which Mrs.
Johnson became most closely associated and that best illustrates her
role as First Lady was the campaign to regulate junkyards, improve
the look of highways, and, most important, to control highway
billboards and outdoor advertising. Neither of the Johnsons had been
identified with the billboard regulation that emerged in the mid 195()s
and culminated in the Billboard Bonus Act of 1958. In fact, as a
senator, Lyndon Johnson was regarded as being friendly to the outdooradvertising industry. By the early 1960s the 1958 law had few friends
on either side of the issue. Only about half of the states had adopted
laws to oversee billboards and thereby to obtain the extra federal
highway funds that went to states that controlled such advertising.
The law, which was scheduled to expire in mid 1965, did not please
the billboard industry, the Bureau of Public Roads in the Department
of Commerce, or the advocates of a more stringent approach to
highway beauty. For some time the bureau and the lobbyists for
billboards had been talking about the shape of a new law. 59
In November, 1964, a few days after his election, President
Johnson called Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges and said: "Lady
Bird wants to know what you're going to do about all those junkyards
along the highways." The First Lady appears to have been a decisive
element in her husband's conversion to a proregulation position on
billboards. Under the pressure of the president's repeated expressions
of personal interest in early 1965, the staff of the Bureau of Public
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Roads entered into extended negotiations with key segments of the
junkyard and billboard communities. These talks stretched out over
four or five months. The First Lady and her staff were not kept informed of the discussions that Bill Moyers, in the White House; the
new secretary of commerce, John T. Connor; and the undersecretary
for transportation, Lowell K. Bridwell, were having with industry
representatives. The administration's strategy was to gain the support
of the Outdoor Advertising Association of America IOAAAJ, a pivotal
section of the billboard forces, by allowing billboards in commercial
and industrial areas in return for the OAA.Ns agreement to accept the
exclusion of such advertising from scenic areas along interstate
highways and the federally supported primary road system. These
negotiations had been successfully concluded when the White House
Conference on Natural Beauty assembled in late May, 1965.60
Because they were not aware of the extent of the administration's
bargaining with the billboard industry's lobbyists, particularly with
Phillip Tacker, president of the OAAA, the members of the roadsidecontrol panel at the conference recommended a law that would have
banned billboards even in commercial areas. To the surprise of the
panelists and the advocates of billboard regulation, the president, in
addressing the delegates, called for the banning of billboards and
junkyards from highways "except in those areas of commercial and
industrial use." Feeling betrayed, the members of garden clubs, roadside councils, and other beautification groups withdrew their support
from the legislation that the administration sent to Congress on May
27, 1965. Highway beautification went to Capitol Hill without extensive grass-roots backing from the conservation forces. It also faced
the resolute opposition of those who owned billboards in rural areas,
of economic interests that were dependent on tourist travel and the
signs that sought the trade of motorists, and of Congressmen who
were indebted to the local billboard operators for campaign help or
were sensitive to the impact of regulation on their constituents. "Lady
Bird's bill," as it soon became known, needed all of the president's
power and the sizable Democrati~ majorities that it could command. 61
Mrs. Johnson became extensively involved with the billboardcontrol struggle during the late summer as the bill bogged down in
committee in both houses. She had kept up with the legislative situation in midsummer through memoranda from Lawrence O'Brien, the
administration's link with Congress, and she participated in a decision to drop some parts of the program that lacked support on Capitol
Hill in mid August. Later in the month she met with Walter P. Reuther,
of the United Auto Workers, who promised to assemble organized
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labor and civil-rights groups to push for highway beauty. "We'll keep
our fingers crossed about the beautification legislation," she told
Reuther, "I've lived through enough last days of congressional sessions
to know that anything can happen. We'll hope for the best." Around
Washington at the end of August, 1965, the verdict was that Mrs.
Johnson was doing more than relying on hope. The word went out
from the White House that "the highway beauty bill was one of the
ones the President wanted this year, that he had to have this one, it
was reported, 'for Lady Bird.' " 62
The most significant aspect of Mrs. Johnson's activity on behalf
of the highway-beautification bill began on September 11, 1965. By
this time the administration had broken with the Outdoor Advertising Association and was seeking, in the House version of the bill, to
secure stronger language that would give the secretary of commerce
a greater voice in the regulation of billboards. To move minds and
votes, a working group met with the president that Saturday afternoon. Mrs. Johnson received specific lobbying assignments at this
gathering. She was to call four important congressmen, including the
chairman of the pivotal Subcommittee on Roads, John C. Kluczynski
(Dem., Ill.). She spoke to him that afternoon, and she talked with the
others over the next few days. In regard to the Kluczynski call, one
White House aide wrote: "Obviously Mrs. Johnson's call has had its
effect and the Congressman is all for anything we want.'' 63
As final action on the highway bill neared in early October, the
involvement of the First Lady and her staff intensified. Liz Carpenter,
having "put on my best Joy perfume and tightest girdle," went to see
Texas congressmen on behalf of Mrs. Johnson. "No one in the Texas
delegation likes the bill," George Mahon told Carpenter, "but no one
wants to vote against Lady Bird.'' Carpenter also talked extensively
with conservation lobbyists and friendly newspaper editors. Mrs.
Johnson herself wrote letters, made more phone calls, and oversaw
the lobbying effort on behalf of the bill. 64
Passage of the bill in the House on October 7, 1965, further highlighted Mrs. Johnson's role. Debate took place on a Thursday afternoon,
as congressmen were preparing to attend social events that night, including a "Salute to Congress" at the White House. The president insisted
that House action must occur that day. One disgruntled Republican, Robert J. Dole of Kansas, moved unsuccessfully to insert Mrs. Johnson's
name, instead of the secretary of commerce's, in the language of the
bill. Late in the evening the solid Democratic majority put the bill
through. After the Senate took action on the House bill, President Johnson signed the Highway Beautification Act on October 22, 1965.65
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Mrs. Johnson's participation attracted criticism during the
legislative process. "This legislation is a WHIM of Mrs. Johnson," a
Texas billboard owner wrote to the president, and in Montana a
billboard sought the "Impeachment of Lady Bird Johnson." Bill
Mauldin turned the latter thought to the First Lady's advantage in
a cartoon that depicted a motorist in a landscape filled with billboards,
one of which read "Impeach Lady Bird." Garden clubs and roadside
councils thought that the bill was weaker than it should have been,
and they displayed continuing reservations about it. Yet, as a Pennsylvania activist conceded: "Lady Bird scored a notable victory." She
agreed: "Isn't it wonderful that Congress has made highway beautification the law of the land," she said to a supporter. Still, she also decided to be a little less visible, if no less active, in pushing her
programs. 66
That decision governed how the First Lady performed in the next
phase of the highway-beautification battle over the enforcement of
the 1965 act. The billboard industry sought to use its congressional
allies to weaken the regulatory standards that the administration was
proposing in 1966 to implement the law. At the same time, efforts
were proceeding in Congress to reduce or eliminate funding for
billboard control. The First Lady and her staff kept a lower profile during 1965, but their participation behind the scenes showed little
change in her actual role. In January, 1967, she helped to persuade
a California state senator, Fred Farr, to serve as highway-beauty coordinator in the new Department of 'Iransportation. When funding bills
came up in Congress in 1967 and 1968, Liz Carpenter, Sharon Francis, and some presidential staffers wrote probeautification speeches
and statements for legislators to insert in the Congressional Record.
Mrs. Johnson also sought to limit the extent to which agencies of the
federal government could rent billboards in order to advertise their
programs. 67
Mrs. Johnson and her allies had to fight rear-guard actions during her last two years in the White House to retain the substance of
the Highway Act. Strengthening amendments that would have
bolstered key provisions languished in committee. More important,
appropriations for billboard control were slashed, and the administration had to retreat on key aspects of its enforcement standards. Congress limited, for example, the power of the secretary of transportation to set rules about the size, lighting, and spacing of billboards.
Some conservation groups would have preferred to see the 1965 act
die, convinced as they were that it had irremediable flaws. For her
part, Mrs. Johnson did her best to preserve the law and to keep it
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funded, and she participated in the formal details of the legislative
process to a degree that was unparalleled for the wife of the president.
She believed that an important initial step had been taken, and she
applauded the law's less controversial provisions to clean up junkyards
and to acquire and maintain scenic areas along the highways. On
balance, the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 represented the limit
of what could have been achieved at the time, and it would not have
been passed and enforced without Mrs. Johnson's support and active
lobbying. 68
Once President Johnson had announced his decision not to be
a candidate in 1968, the thoughts of the First Lady and her colleagues
turned to the related questions of the significance of her beautification work and the extent to which it might continue under the incoming president and first lady. In the summer of 1968 there was talk
within the White House of an executive order raising the First Lady's
Committee from informal to formal status. Arguments against the
proposal included a recognition that "the First Lady has never been
given official duties by law or executive order, and this would be a
break with tradition." When the subject of approaching Russell Train,
a prospective appointee to the Interior Department in the Nixon administration, about continuing the First Lady's Committee came up
after the election, Mrs. Johnson said, "I never want there to be anything
on paper that would indicate that we were instigating any selfperpetuation." She did agree to be the honorary chairman of the Society for a More Beautiful National Capital after January 20, 1969, and
she accepted Udall's appointment of her to an advisory committee
on national parks, historic sites, buildings, and monuments. 69
Praise and honors accompanied her all through the concluding
months of her husband's term. Eric Sevareid of CBS News told a luncheon of conservationists at the White House in November, 1968, that
the First Lady had stimulated "a new popular consciousness about
the precious American land." The editors of Christian Century concurred: "In a difficult time Mrs. Johnson has comported herself with
dignity and charm and has exercised a great spirit of leadership." Her
beautification associates, working through Secretary Udall, renamed
Columbia Island, in Washington, Lady Bird Johnson Park, and they
gave her benches and a planted area for the Johnson Library in Austin.
Sharon Francis spoke for the staff: "Well, you've made us all better
people, Mrs. Johnson." 70
Even before leaving Washington, Mrs. Johnson planned to carry
on her beautification work at the grass roots. She joined the garden
clubs of Stonewall and Johnson City and made annual beautification
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awards to members of the Texas Highway Department. She rallied the
city of Austin to construct parks and jogging paths along Town Lake.
The lake trails represented, she said, "a big piece of my heart." In 1982,
when she was seventy, she donated sixty acres of land and $125,000
to found the National Wildflower Center outside of Austin. The center
began to conduct research on the economic and aesthetic uses of wild
flowers, such as planting along highways to reduce mowing and other
maintenance costs. The project would be, Mrs. Johnson told her
friends, "my last hurrah," but her active schedule continued
unabated. 71
The historical impact of Mrs. Johnson's beautification campaign
transcended her specific achievements in Washington and around the
nation, important as they were. Her influence and encouragement
rippled across the country over the succeeding years. Former colleagues have stressed that she brought people together-Laurance
Rockefeller, Mary Lasker, Walter Washington, Lawrence Halprin,
Stewart Udall, and Nathaniel Owings-in constructive and productive interaction. In an even larger sense she awakened Americans, as
did others during the 1960s, to the environmental crises that lay just
ahead. Citizens who wrote to her about the California Redwoods, the
Grand Canyon, or a proposed New Orleans freeway received back from
the First Lady a sense of concern about their protests that legitimized
ecological issues for the future. 72
"I came very late and timorously to the uses of power," Mrs.
Johnson wrote in her diary in December, 1968. Hardly anyone who
knew her during the 1960s would agree with that characteristic bit
of self-deprecation and reserve. One associate calls her "the most consummate politician" he has known in Washington, because of her
ability to persuade diverse and discordant individuals to serve her goals
and purposes. The Johnson Library contains a large body of materials
about her beautification activity; these offer much support to that
positive judgment; they also provide fresh opportunities for studying
how Americans saw the environment during the 1960s, how they
responded to an activist first lady, and the diversity of issues that the
Johnson administration dealt with under the heading of beautification. Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson was a first lady of unusual influence
and range, and her important place in the history of her husband's
presidency is rooted in her commitment "to keep the beauty of the
landscape as we remember it in our youth ... and to leave this splendor for our grandchildren." 73
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Part 3 I Science and Public Policy

7 I The War on Disease
Clarence G. Lasby
ON APRIL 7, 1966, LYNDON JOHNSON entered the Cabinet Room
to receive the Special Albert Lasker Award for leadership in healtha gold statuette of the Winged Victory of Samothrace. The Greeks had
set up the statuette to honor Nike, goddess of victory; now a jury of
scientists was giving it to honor a president who, to an "unparalleled
degree," had sought victory over death and disease. The citation
saluted the recipient for his specific legislative achievements-bills
for Medicare, research laboratories and libraries, community health
centers, medical manpower, and the Regional Medical Program to
combat heart disease, cancer, and stroke. "We glory in your impatience
with things as they are," the medical experts told their president, and
they went on to predict new victories and greater glory: "We know
that children not yet born will one day venerate the name of Lyndon
Baines Johnson for leading this God-inspired crusade against needless
disability and death." 1
Years later, Lyndon Johnson was more restrained when he
surveyed the health accomplishments of his presidency. In The Vantage Point he spent seven pages describing the legislative history of
Medicare, a program of "overriding importance" because it
"foreshadowed a revolutionary change in our thinking about health
care." He was obviously proud to have given Medicare top priority,
and he was pleased that the nation "had begun, at long last, to
recognize that good medical care is a right, not just a privilege." But
he gave most of the credit to others, in his sense that "the times had
caught up with the idea" and that "the voters of America passed the
law." He did engage in one boastful flourish; he listed some other
achievements: raising health expenditures from $4 to $14 billion; extending the fruits of medical research to more people; fighting heart
disease, cancer, strokes, and mental retardation; eliminating measles
as a cause of serious concern; building new hospitals and nursing
homes; and training more doctors and nurses. "During my administration," he recorded, "forty national health measures were presented
to the Congress and passed by the Congress-more than in all the
preceding 175 years of the Republic's history." 2
Like the president, commentators have focused on Medicare as
the great health accomplishment of his administration. As early as
1966, journalist Richard Harris set the tone when he portrayed the
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long and bitter struggle for hospital insurance as a victory of reform
over reaction, culminating in the grand summer of 1965. Aides of the
president furthered that image. Larry O'Brien considered Medicare
"one of the glories" of the Great Society, and Jack Valenti deemed it
"worthy of hall-bursting applause." Scholars agreed. Eric Goldman saw
the program as "monumental" and "far-reaching," and William
O'Neill placed it among the best of the legislation that "established
Johnson's place in history." This initial interpretation of Medicare as
one of the "big three" legislative victories of the Eighty-ninth Congress persists in contemporary histories. Vaughn Barnet, for example,
though sensitive to its soaring costs, pays homage to the "memorable"
law. This interpretation, however, is under attack. Sociologist Paul
Starr, in his prize-winning study of American medicine, stresses the
limitations of Medicare-Medicaid and decries the "politics of accommodation" that give such unfortunate advantages to the hospitals and
doctors. Historian Allan Matusow, in his New American Nation Series
volume on the 1960s, is even harsher; he uses the program as a case
history of failure in the Great Society. For these influential revisionists,
yesterday's triumph seems tarnished. 3
Much as historians continue to reflect on Medicare, they cc:::itinue to ignore Lyndon Johnson's other hopes and accomplishments
in the field of health. From Goldman to Barnet, the president's
multifarious activities earn only passing mention, if any at all, and
then are consigned to a listing of a few bills passed. Only political
scientist Theodore Marmor, in a 1976 article, has touched meaningfully upon the president's "widespread effort to reach problems across
all the areas of health industry." But he is quick to point out, in his
two-and-one-half page summary of the administration's diverse initiatives, that all of them were starkly overshadowed, in budget terms,
by Medicare and Medicaid and that none of them "dramatically altered
the distribution of access to medical care services." On the rare occasion when a scholar has sought to add to the historical record, as in
Paul Starr's one-page assault on the President's Commission on Heart
Disease, Cancer and Stroke, the poverty of sources has led to confusion. Citing a misleading contemporary article and the preface to only
the first volume of the commission's report, Starr sets forth a series
of charges that are simply wrong. 4
The abundant collection of health papers in the Johnson
Library-which far surpasses similar collections in the Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy Libraries-proves conclusively that Lyndon
Johnson was more deeply committed to and achieved greater benefits
for his nation's health than did any other president. The papers also
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should lead scholars away from a single-minded emphasis on Medicare
to a broader conception of the president's interests, although with
varying results. For example, the papers do not significantly enlarge
our understanding of a number of activities-such as the construction of health facilities, the education of health manpower, the
establishment of community health centers-which were essentially initiatives from previous administrations but which expanded
dramatically in size and scope between 1963 and 1968. These were
not small accomplishments, but still they must depend for assessment on such statistical testimonials as the training of 100,000 doctors, nurses, and dentists; the treatment of 460,000 crippled children;
the addition of 123,000 new and improved hospital beds; and a 13 percent decline in infant mortality.5
What is new in the library and what serves as the basis for this
essay is a wealth of material in which Lyndon Johnson appears as a
"can-do dreamer," to use a phrase of Harry C. McPherson, who was
personally and politically involved in a crusade against disease. Johnson was not content merely to deliver the blessings of American
medicine to every citizen; he would deliver the world from every such
scourge as heart disease, cancer, stroke, malaria, and measles. Early
in his administration he entered a war that he sincerely believed he
could win, and for several years thereafter he summoned his people
to action. Assuming the role of commander in chief, he appointed
a special presidential commission to provide the strategy; he sponsored legislation of many kinds to further the cause; and he teamed
with health advocate Mary Lasker in an extraordinary, almost unique,
relationship to chastise the bureaucrats for their tactical errors and
their lack of faith. In this war against disease the president was a
visionary, a politician who spoke constantly of the miracles of modem
medicine. Obviously he won no final victory, and he came to know
the meanng of unfulfilled expectations. But more than any president
before or since, he sought to have his people suffer less and live longer. 6
On the Battleground against Disease

In August, 1965, President Johnson journeyed to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland, to sign the Health
Research Facilities Act. Dr. James Shannon was pleased; he had invited Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to visit, but they had shown
little interest and had declined. This president, in contrast, Wilbur
Cohen had told Shannon, "is very anxious to identify himself on the
whole development of health." The visitor made that evident. "Here
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on this quiet battleground our Nation leads a worldwide war on
disease," he said to the assembled scientists. "The experience of the
past 10 years assures us that war can be won." Johnson promised
leadership and vision at the onset of a "staggering era for medicine,"
mentioned "the miracles of which today we only dream," and set forth
some of his goals-the elimination of rheumatic heart disease among
children, the reduction of the tragic toll of heart disease among adults,
and the eradication of malaria and cholera from the entire world. He
was determined "that research and discovery yield results which not
only increase man's knowledge but the strength of his body and the
length of his life." In the days ahead, he vowed, the government and
Americans were "going to successfully conclude that war you have
declared on those ancient enemies." 7
The president's visit to Bethesda was largely symbolic; eighteen
months before he had already assumed leadership in the nation's war
against disease. That war had come to life out of another conflictWorld War II-with its victories over infectious diseases, its triumphs
of technology, and above all, the development of the atomic bomb.
On the day that U.S. planes bombed Nagasaki, a United States senator
asked President Truman to marshal the same stupendous scientific
and engineering effort to "discover causes and cures for the deadly
diseases of mankind . .. which have up to now baffled scientific effort." Harry Truman did not take the initiative, but he did respond
to a group of citizens who believed American science could accomplish everything. Foremost among them was Mary Woodward
Lasker, a successful businesswoman who founded Hollywood Patterns
during the depression and was the wife of Albert D. Lasker, who sold
his advertising firm in 1942 for a fortune that allowed them to pursue an interest in health. Mrs. Lasker was inspired by a perception
of disease as an enemy-she had experienced illness as a child, had
lost her parents to heart disease, and would lose her husband to cancer
in 1952-and by a belief that "the human being on fire can do so
much." As early as 1948, working with her close friends Anna Rosenberg, an assistant secretary for defense under Truman, and Florence
Mahoney, whose husband owned the Cox newspaper chain, she convinced Congress to establish the National Heart Institute. The
American people, she explained, "are assaulted by killers from within,
whose victims from these diseases total twice as many persons each
year as were lost by our armed services on all fronts during the last
war.118
During the 1950s, Mary Lasker had mobilized a remarkable group
of allies who were passionately committed to the war against disease
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and were eminently successful in winning ever-increasing budgets for
medical research. She hired, as her lobbyist, a crusading journalist,
Mike Gorman, one of the most proficient ev~r to serve in Washington;
she worked closely with Congressman John Fogarty of Rhode Island,
whose heart attack in 1953 had enhanced his concern about dread
diseases; she became a very close friend of Senator Lister Hill, who
controlled Senate health appropriations; and she benefited from the
support of Dr. James Shannon, who served as director of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) after 1955 and who could always make a
case for more money. She also organized a number of "citizen
witnesses" to appear before Congress-Dr. Howard Rusk, who was
famous for his work in rehabilitation; Dr. Sidney Farber, an authority
on cancer; and Dr. Michael DeBakey, the nation's leading heart
surgeon. Each year these or other experts testified before congressional
committees as to progress in their fields and opportunities for the
future. 9
The health lobby had a grand design, adorned in the analogue of
war. As the director of the National Heart Institute explained, "The
campaign must be carried on patiently, must consist of actions, skirmishes, attritions, as scientific knowledge encompasses first new conceptions, later practical applications on a modest scale, and finally
total victory." Mary Lasker coordinated that campaign with consummate skill. She used her financial resources to support responsive congressmen of both parties; she used the Albert Lasker Medical Research
Awards to honor scientific excellence; she published annual "fact
sheets" through her National Health Education Committee to inform
politicians and the public about the realities of the conflict; and she
served for eighteen years on citizen advisory committees for the National Heart and Cancer Institutes. The crusade was so effective as
to raise expectations dramatically. As early as 1956 the science editor
of the New York Times, Pulitzer Prize recipient William Laurence,
predicted that heart disease, cancer, and polio would be conquered
within a decade. "Ten years from now," he assured his readers, "we
will be 10 or even 20 years younger." 10
Lyndon Johnson enlisted in the war against disease even before
he became president. "Perhaps there is no more important problem
facing us,11 he wrote to a constituent in 1959, "than finding the solution to the dread diseases." He always supported increased funds for
medical research, and he explained why to a friend in Fort Worth: "I
have a personal interest in research on the problem of heart disease,
of course, and the death by cancer of Senator Taft a few years ago and
former Secretary of State Dulles this week, should certainly dramatize
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these needs." He had also become an ally of Mary Lasker. In 1948,
Albert Lasker had contributed $500 to the Johnson campaign (along
with a message that he would soon be sending recommendations in
the field of health), but it was not until the mid 1950s that Mrs. Lasker
met the senator. Within a few years they were on a first-name basis,
and in June, 1959, in the midst of a struggle with President
Eisenhower, who told his cabinet that "money alone isn't going to
keep him or anyone else from having a heart attack," Mary Lasker
approached Johnson: "I know you can get anything done that you
want . . . . I am convinced that in the area of medical research we are
pre-eminent in the world, and we must stay pre-eminent. We seem
to be lagging in other areas of science as compared with the Russians.
More breakthroughs in medical research will give us the energy, as
a Nation, to go forward and stay ahead in the other scientific fields!" 11
Soon thereafter the majority leader responded with a powerful
speech, written in large part by Mike Gorman, denouncing
Eisenhower's position. The nation should not try to balance the budget
at the expense of medical research, which had saved 1.8 million lives
since World War II, thereby providing the federal government with
$623 million in taxes every year. Disease was still cutting into our
economic system at an annual cost of $30 billion and was striking
"at the very core and strength of our posture in the free world." The
United States was facing a "medical Sputnik," the senator claimed,
for Russia had already launched a fifteen-year program to conquer heart
disease and cancer. Shortly after making his presentation, Lyndon
Johnson informed his friend of their victory for health research. "The
Senate certainly succumbed to the irresistible pleas of Mary Lasker"
and to the "words which were so very good because they reflected the
thinking and outlook of a great and fine lady." These expressions of
mutual interest and friendship were to become important several years
later, the more so because of the health advocates' disappointment
with John Kennedy.12
During the early 1960s the coalition of Lasker, Fogarty, Hill, and
Shannon continued to seek increased funds for the NIH, almost always
with success. But Mary Lasker and, to a lesser degree, her congressional allies became disenchanted because the scientists had failed
to produce victories. After more than a decade of accelerated research,
heart disease and cancer were claiming more lives. Now she wanted
to speed up the action by means of a massive national assault against
the two most dreaded diseases. To that end she induced the
Democratic National Committee to pledge, in its 1960 platform, that
a Democratic president would "summon to a White House conference
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the Nation's most distinguished scientists in these fields to map a
coordinated long-range program for the prevention and control of these
diseases." 13
John Kennedy did call the Conference on Heart Disease and
Cancer, but it was a disaster: the scientists failed to come forth with
any new ideas, and the president refused to make their recommendations public. Submitted on April 21, 1961, the results of the conference
survived in inner circles as a bad memory and came to be known as
the "Bay of Pigs Report." For the next two and one-half years, Mary
Lasker struggled to convince the administration-over the objections
of the surgeon general and of James Shannon-to appoint a presidential commission that would be empowered to seek the ultimate conquest of heart disease, cancer, and strokes (the latter having been added
to take cognizance of Joseph Kennedy's illness). President Kennedy,
whose interest in health was limited essentially to Medicare and mental retardation, remained lukewarm to Lasker's solicitations until
shortly before his death, when he promised to establish a commission sometime in the future.14
Lyndon Johnson became the true pioneer on this New Frontier
of medicine, in large part because of the influence of Mary Lasker.
Building upon her earlier association, she remained friends with the
Johnsons during the vice-presidential years and gained the most
precious asset of would-be policy makers-access. During the first two
months of Johnson's presidency, she met with him three times, spoke
with him on the telephone several times, had Mrs. Johnson for lunch
and the couple for dinner at her New York town house, and spent a
night at the White House. There is no record of their conversations,
but there is no question about the result. On February 10, 1964, in
his message on health, the president announced the establishment
of the Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke (HCSJ . He
acted, he explained later, "with the grim facts in mind"-over a
million productive citizens would die each year unless action were
taken-and "at the insistence of that lovely lady, Mrs. Mary Lasker." 15
Lyndon Johnson was also unusually amenable to such an initiative. On philosophic grounds he completely accepted the responsibility of government to fight mankind's ancient enemies, which he
defined in many speeches as disease, ignorance, poverty, and
discrimination. And from his own experience he believed it was possible for science to conquer disease; he had seen it happen on a grand
scale during his lifetime, with infectious diseases during the 1940s
and with polio a decade later. He was sympathetic, as well, to such
observations about the nation's priorities as in Mary Lasker's tren-
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chant comparison: "$51.2 billion to defend ourselves against possible enemy attack from without as compared to . . . $918.4 million
to defend ourselves against disease enemies within our bodies"; or
in David 0. Selznick's letter of complaint: "I am not alone in thinking that it is absurd that a nation that can spend countless billions
to reach the moon cannot devote some small fraction of this amount
to an all-out drive on the two great killers." 16
Above all, Johnson's family history of heart disease and stroke,
as well as his own heart attack, made him attentive to the future of
medicine. He spoke often about his gratitude to the doctors who had
"saved" his life, and he was ever mindful that such a day could come
again. As Lady Bird wrote on the ninth anniversary of his misfortune
(1964): "For the first few years we passed those milestones stepping
softly with great trepidation. Now we act almost as though the heart
attack had not been, though Lyndon and I will not forget." Nor could
they, for there were sobering reminders, such as the stomach pains
during a night in September, 1965, followed by the initial fright, as
the president was "stretched out on the bed with the wires of an electrocardiogram machine attached to his body," and finally the relief
in learning that it was only gallstones. It was little wonder that he
welcomed Mary Lasker's impatient search for a solution to cholesterol
or the message that he received on January 31, 1966: "Dr. DeBakey
predicts a fully functioning dacron heart in five years." 17
The president blessed the war against disease in the spirit of a
true believer on the morning of April 17, 1964, when he formally
greeted the members of his commission in the Rose Garden. "Health
is something that we treasure in this house," he assured the gathering, but his health meant little in the light of their opportunities.
"What can be more satisfying than to feel that you have preserved,
not a life, but millions of them, for decades?" So he called them to
the challenge, the "hardest fight" they would ever have. Departing
from his prepared speech, he asked them "to give their talents and
their energies and their imaginations, and stay awake at night and
roll over and go get a glass of water and come back and think some
more on how to get the results that we know are within our reach."
In an electrifying passage that stunned even the most sanguine of his
guests, he explained why they must find the answers and what it
would mean:
The point is, we must conquer heart disease, we must conquer
cancer, we must conquer strokes. This Nation and the whole
world cries out for this victory. I am firmly convinced that the
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accumulated brains and determination of this commission and
of the scientific community of the world will, before the end of
this decade, come forward with some answers and cures that we
need so very much. When this occurs-not "if,11 but "when," and
I emphasize "when"-we will face a new challenge and that will
be what to do within our economy to adjust ourselves to a life
span and a work span for the average man or woman of 100 years.18
The president was not alone in having grandiose expectations for
the commission. Mary Lasker was enthusiastic because in a fundamental sense the commission was hers. Her friends made up the
majority of the membership, and her ally Dr. Michael DeBakey, who
served as chairman, remembered that "whenever Mrs. Lasker would
call me to ask me to do certain things, I would drop what I was doing
to do it.11 With good reason she expressed hope that the commission
would be as historic in its province as the revolutionary Flexner Report
had been for medical education after the turn of the century. Presidential aide Myer Feldman told a plenary session that the advances should
constitute an achievement "so great that if nothing else was done this
would represent a major event in a successful administration." The
commission's executive secretary insisted that it could make a
smashing impact by stating flatly: "Dear American People. We are going to Bring the Wonders of Medical Science to You," and then really
doing so. "I think people are tired of reading about scientific marvels
and then watching Mom die." And at the first meeting of the Executive
Council, Dr. Sidney Farber interrupted a DeBakey pep talk about
challenge and imagination: "May I just read you in reference to your
imaginative approach the origin of the term 'Cloud 9,' which is where
you are now?" the doctor asked. "This comes from the Medieval idea
of the ninth heaven of Dante's Paradiso. This is the diaphanous spirit
of love that rules the action of all other spirits and is, therefore, beyond
time." There was silence, and then applause.19
The establishment of the HCS Commission (for which the
Johnson Library has an incomparable collection, including verbatim
transcripts of its deliberations) was the major health event of 1964.
Its members went to work with a surge of excitement, moved by a
need to go beyond the mere support of medical research to some new
strategy that would really make a difference. For seven months they
collected information, wrote comments, exchanged letters, gathered
at fifty-six meetings, and made a penetrating inquest into the conduct of. the war against disease. They saw theirs as the chance of a
lifetime to influence policy at the highest level, and they were in a
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hurry to give the president something to use in his next State of the
Union address, something practical, "something other than poetic expressions." But after all the discussions about prosaic topics-available
resources and facilities, the nature of research, the application of
knowledge, the education and training of manpower, research grants,
organizational deficiencies, and the diseases themselves-they ended
with a report that was filled with the promise of miracles. 20
At a meeting to approve the final draft of the commission's report,
Dr. Philip Handler of Duke University complained of its evangelical
fervor: "The word miracle I think occurs three different times and
on one page it says miracles are just around the corner . .. and that
just isn't fair because I don't know it is true and I don't think Presidential Commissions should make such statements in good conscience.
I am serious about this." Michael DeBakey took issue: "I am not sure
I would agree with you. Miracles have been around the corner for a
long time." Handler retorted that "when you say miracles, it is still
around the same comer, sir." "Yes," DeBakey conceded, "and they have
been going on for 20 years or more." After a few moments, Emerson
Foote, a former advertising executive with Albert Lasker's firm, ended
the discussion: "As far as promising people great things, what was
the Salk vaccine, penicillin, what is operating on an aorta aneurysm,
except a miraculous thing?" he asked. "I am sure people accept those
as miracles and I am sure there are more around the comer. . . . And
if you think this is evangelical, I refer you to President Johnson's
remarks about living to a hundred, which shocked even me. I was told
I should not have been shocked." 21
The commission's report, which was submitted on December 9,
opened with a detailed account of a national disaster: in 1962, heart
disease, cancer, and strokes had claimed 1.2 million American lives,
71 percent of the deaths in the country, at a cost of $40 billion. But
the prognosis was bright: the nation stood at the threshold of a historic
breakthrough. The people no longer needed to tolerate the loss of
several hundred thousand lives a year because "yesterday's hopeless
cause has become today's miracle cure." The commission set forth
a $2.94 billion prescription for the "ultimate conquest" of the three
killers, in the form of a five-year battle plan with thirty-five specific
recommendations. It asked for more research, more training, more
continuing education, more hospitals, more doctors, more nurses,
more state and community services, better communications, and a
new National Library of Medicine. 22
The commission's one "major innovative thrust" called for the
establishment of a national network of 60 regional centers, 550 diag-
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nostic and treatment stations, and 30 medical complexes to unite
the world of scientific research and patient care. Its members held
to an overriding assumption-namely, that a serious gap existed between discovery and application, between science and practice, between what experts knew in the great medical centers and what doctors delivered to patients across the land. And they argued that access was often a matter of money, for "medical miracles are in many
instances available only to the fortunate few who can get to the unique
medical institution or specialist who can perform that miracle." The
network of medical complexes would address that paramount issue;
it would make available the most advanced methods of diagnosis and
treatment to every doctor in America, and thus to all the people when
and where they needed them.23
The publicity surrounding the commission's report was extensive; in the words of a surprised cardiologist, "it rivalled one of the
better scandals." It was also overwhelmingly favorable. The press
described the report with such adjectives as bold, sweeping, vast, and
massive; praised it as a sneak preview of the way to health in a Great
Society; and seemed pleased, as the Boston Globe put in headlines,
that "LBJ Declares War on 3 Killer Diseases." There were some misgivings about the cost I"huge gobs of taxpayer money," to the dismay
of the Washington Daily News); about the approach l"an all-out
federally financed fight," in the words of the Wall Street [oumal); and
about the prospects !"Without the cooperation of the powerful AMA
... it will inevitably run into trouble," in the view of the New York
Herald Tribune). But DeBakey and his colleagues had inspired wonder
and hope, even among the skeptical. The prestigious New England
[oumal of Medicine, despite doubts, cynicism, and caution, wrote
nonetheless that the commission had "painted with such a broad,
sweeping brush and with such magnificent colors that the average
practicing physician, despite his sophistication, cannot but gasp in
awe at the picture the minds of men have wrought, and look upon
it with some embarrassment. For here in words and phrases is a
glimpse into an idealistic state of future well-being that he cannot
quite comprehend because of its magnitude.1124
The president joined the euphoric chorus when he accepted the
commission's report, proclaiming a "day of electric possibilities." The
three diseases "can be conquered," he asserted, "not in a millennium,
not in a century, but in the next few onrushing decades." His optimism
continued into the new year, and as part of his special health message
to Congress on January 7, he pledged to sponsor the most important
item of the commission's report-the five-year program for a system
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of regional medical complexes. Every American deserved access to the
newest, the most specialized and expensive services, whether of openheart surgery, high-voltage radiation, or advanced diagnostic techniques. The time had come to "turn otherwise hollow laboratory
triumphs into health victories." He fulfilled his pledge only twelve
days later, when he rushed to Congress, with high priority, the "Heart
Diseases, Cancer and Stroke Amendments of 1965." It would provide
$50 million the first year and whatever might be necessary for the
next four years to establish and operate "medical complexes," which
would be located at existing institutions or at newly constructed
facilities; would pay for such patient care as was incidental to research,
training, or demonstration; but could not interfere with the "existing
patterns or financing of patient care, professional practice or hospital
administration." 25
The president had high expectations for the HCS's regionalmedical-centers bill, which he believed would help the less fortunate
people of America. Its purpose, as he explained to Lady Bird, was to
set up "a bunch of little Mayos" around the country, "so Dale
Malechek and Alvin Sultemeier can get to them." Next to Medicare,
he considered it his most important health program, and during two
days of hearings before Lister Hill's Subcommittee on Health, senators
from both parties promised their support. Republican Jacob Javits
described the bill as a "most patriotic and honorable effort to add yet
another milestone thing to the great history which has been written
in recent years in this tremendous war of the Federal Government on
disease." But thereafter, during the next nine months, political combat and compromise marked the legislative history, until only a
semblance of the bill remained. Even Lyndon Johnson, in his best year,
could not translate this dream into reality.26
A Shortfall in Aspirations
The HCS bill, which came to be known as the Regional Medical
Program (RMP), was in trouble from the outset. On the day before
it went to Congress, the president's science adviser warned that its
overall intent "gives the American Medical Association (AMA) further grounds for contending that the Federal Government intends to
gradually take over medical care." Written primarily by two commission members, Dr. Michael DeBakey and Dr. Edward Dempsey, it had
two threatening provisions-the construction of a network of federal
hospitals and the government's payment of patients' fees. For several
months the AMA ignored the RMP, in part because of a single-minded
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devotion to the defeat of Medicare. And too, there was some risk in
an early attack on an extremely popular program. The Washington
Post had warned the organization not to try to halt this venture, for
it would constitute "a piece of folly which can end only in making
itself regarded as an enemy rather than a benefactor of mankind." But
late in April, when the course of Medicare was clear, the AMA issued
a three-page staff report denouncing the DeBakey Commission for
planning "to reorganize the American system of delivering medical
care" -a system that was already more advanced and more sophisticated than any other in the world. 27
Individual physicians expressed intense fears. Dr. Thomas Townsend of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, who was already "on the ropes" because
of Medicare, conjured up a frightful future for the likes of him. Skillful
young men from the huge federal medical complexes would appear
in the rural areas to tell doctors what to do, would take their patients
to distant centers with special facilities, and would then return to the
"boondocks" periodically, like "circuit riders," to entice patients away
from their own physicians. "This is what is driving us crazy," he explained to an unusually attentive congressional committee-the prospect of a team of salaried federal specialists infringing on the traditional fee for service practice, until there is "no place in medicine
for such as myself." And most of the medical practitioners resented
the central message of the legislation-that they were not keeping
up to date on new developments, thus short-changing their patients.
"What's wrong with the way we physicians and surgeons in Lake
Charles, Louisiana, treat or diagnose a heart attack, a stroke or a
cancer?" asked one of Senatpr Russell Long's constituents. And he offered some advice popular among his colleagues: "This country of
ours can declare war on poverty, war in Viet Nam, but not war on
cancer or strokes or heart attacks. It just doesn't work this way, and
I think it is cruel to so mislead the American people." 28
The legislation did pass the Senate in June, although it was
stripped of a crucial provision for construction funds, but by August
it was in trouble in the House. Congressman Oren Harris, the Democratic chairman of the Commerce Committee, blamed angry general
practitioners, expressed a preference for an abbreviated three-year program, decided to ignore the Senate bill, and predicted that he was two
votes short of getting the legislation out of his committee. A presidential aide blamed HEW itself, because its testimony "apparently has
been miserably vague and contradictory. And you could read anything
you want into the bill itself, which says nothing." Larry O'Brien portrayed the bill as "the big tough one." Harris is "all the way with
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us," O'Brien told the president, "but the AM.A. is working hard and
this bill obviously will require at least a couple of weeks work." He
was overly optimistic. HEW spent several weeks working with the Harris committee to make the House bill more specific and to sway undecided members, but with little success. Nor was the president able
to move the legislation. On August 18 he went out of his way at the
swearing-in ceremonies for John W. Gardner, his new HEW secretary,
to reaffirm his commitment: "This Administration intends to bring
the healing miracle of modern medicine to everyone in this country,"
Johnson said, "no matter how remotely they live from the city." But
when he asked Congress to act within the week so that he could
launch an all-out assault to "track down, isolate and destroy" the three
great killers, there was no response.29
The AMA would not retreat, and in late August it went on the
offensive. Dr. James Appel asked the administration to defer action
for a year, insisting that a bill of such far-reaching implications, which
"many physicians presently consider a greater threat" than Medicare,
needed more study and dialogue. If the president would desist, the
AMA would convene a National Congress on Regional Medical
Centers to seek a consensus. On the other hand, if the pending legislation should pass, Appel warned, it would compromise his efforts to
ensure the full cooperation of his colleagues in implementing
Medicare. The attempt at blackmail did not move Douglass Cater,
the president's aide on health matters; he asked permission to phone
the AMA and promise cooperation, but to refuse to surrender. The
president checked the yes box on his memorandum, and in one of
those rare occasions, added a handwritten comment: "Tell him for
weeks we have been seeing these would be stalling tactics. We will
work with them-for them but they stalled many health items for
years and we must act now and coordinate later. I'll spend all fall trying to help- L." 30
The help came much sooner. Within days, HEW officials met in
an afternoon session with the AMA to work out a compromise. Wilbur
Cohen, bargaining for the administration, rejected the .AMNs three
major requests: to delay action; to modify the program so that it wo:uld
affect only research and training; and to provide only such patient care
as was indispensable to research. Then, to pacify the doctors, he proposed ten amendments, the most important of which assured the participation of local physicians in planning and approving projects, and
restricted treatment to only those patients who were referred by practicing physicians. The AMA remained fearful. They could tolerate
Medicare, an official told Cohen, but the RMP was a "much more
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radical concept," and they insisted on talking with the president. Gardner, Cohen, and Harris agreed; at the least, a discussion would permit the doctors to tell their constituents that they had had their day
in court. On that same evening the president met with AMA leaders,
assured them that the RMP would be a cooperative effort, promised
that he had no intention of interfering with traditional medical practices, and instructed Cohen to work out the objections to the bill.
"We've got to pass this Heart, Cancer and Stroke bill," he told DeBakey.
"You know, you've just got to do everything you can to get this passed.
I know that we are only going to be able to have this good relationship with Congress for so long. Then it's going to be all over." 31
With the president's personal intervention, the negotiations proceeded swiftly and ended in a victory for the AMA. The RMP, or, officially, the Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke Amendments of 1965,
which emerged from the Harris Committee on September 8 and subsequently became law, differed substantially from the administration's
original bill. The revised legislation shortened the duration of the war
against disease from five to three years; decreased its costs from $1.2
billion to $340 million; and lowered its status from "program" to "pilot
projects." The war would proceed without any new construction,
without any diagnostic stations, and cleansed of the word coordination, because it smacked too much of federal control. The enterprise
even had a new name: the old "regional medical complexes," which
had aroused fears of newly constructed federal facilities scattered
across America, staffed with government employees, which had
threatening implications for patient care, gave way to the new
"regional cooperative arrangements," which were designed to ensure
local control and to protect traditional methods of financing medical
care. 32
When the president signed the RMP bill on October 6, there was
little of the Rose Garden excitement of eighteen months before. He
recited again the grim facts; he thanked DeBakey, Hill, Fogarty, Harris, and Mary Lasker; and he improvised engagingly about the hopes
for a longer life, "not just for ourselves, but for all the little ones that
look up with their trusting faces and expect us to do right by them."
Some of the old words were there-"to speed the miracles of medical
research from the laboratory to the bedside" -but much of the magic
was gone. The president had merely accepted the political reality; Congress would not create a network of federal hospitals that would be
open to the general public. But there was no way to put a pleasant
face on defeat. Nor could he deny the charges in the Chicago Daily
News-namely, that medical lobbyists had operated quietly for nine
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months to cripple the HCS Commission's sweeping national attack
on disease and that they had "succeeded dramatically." The administration, giving in to pressure, had helped to "gut" the bill until
it was a "mere shadow." 33
Two months later the president added to the disappointment with
his request for reductions in the 1967 budget. In order to support increases for defense and for the cost of Vietnam, there would be less
for the NIH, health-manpower training, and the regional medical complexes. When the news leaked to the press, letters and telegrams from
more than three hundred health advocates (among whom were his
friend Senator Lister Hill; his cardiologist, Dr. Willis Hurst; and his
family physician, Dr. James Cain) pleaded with him to reconsider the
budget cuts. A damning complaint appeared publicly on January 2 in
the New York Times and, surprisingly, from Dr. Howard Rusk, who
only months before had served as LBJ's special envoy to study health
problems in Vietnam. The doctor could sympathize and understand
the president's dilemma, with his dual commitments to the defense
of freedom and the Great Society, but he could not accept LBJ's attack on health, a common denominator of both: "It is inconceivable
that President Johnson, who is primarily responsible for the great gains
in the attack on death and disease, would give the indiscriminate
axe treatment to the budget that is necessary for this continuing
crusade." 34
On December 21, Mary Lasker and Michael DeBakey went to the
White House to complain to Douglass Cater about the RMP. They
told him that the reductions (from $90 to $45 million) and the
elimination of $90 million for the construction of health-research
facilities would be disastrous. Two days later, DeBakey sent a powerful and impassioned 15-page telegram to the LBJ Ranch. After voicing initial praise for Johnson's bold and imaginative program to launch
the nation into "a new era of action," DeBakey denounced the proposed cuts. They could shake the confidence of the people and the
scientists in the administration's commitment to health, they could
harm the national defense, and they would virtually destroy the RMP,
which had already been gravely compromised by the sacrifice of construction funds. "Should these prospective limitations indeed come
to be," he bemoaned, "it would be difficult to discern the sense of
attempting to initiate this critical venture." 35
The president's friends, who were now his critics, felt abandoned. They perceived him as having moved away from his earlier allout support, and they sensed that his war abroad was eclipsing theirs
at home. They tried to call him back to his earlier commitments: "I
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applaud the incredible progress in health legislation that your leadership has achieved in the past year," wrote Mary Lasker's sister, Alice
Fordyce. "Won't you please make it possible to implement the high
hopes you have stirred?" But the president did not waver; he was listening, instead, to his budget chiefs. In their view, the RMP had the potential for a far-reaching impact on American life; but it was also an excellent illustration of the kind of newly authorized program they
should "phase in slowly." As of early 1966, the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB) argued, medical groups were still in conflict and "maneuvering for power"; the NIH had not set forth the appropriate regulations;
the Advisory Council had met only once; the chief of the program
would not be at work until February; and the NIH likely could not
make a grant until May. It was a time for deliberate caution in spending, and the $40 million was "a pretty good allowance." 36
The president did not reply to most of his critics, but politics required a response to a five-page letter from John Fogarty. The old warrior for health waited until his subcommittee had finished its hearings on the budget, and then he told the president that the administration's budget would "fall far short." It could not meet the challenges
"outlined so eloquently in your three Health Messages and in the truly
historic health legislation which provides the blueprint for an unprecedented war upon disease." Fogarty was more specific: he wanted
additional funds for the regional medical centers, without which there
could be no all-out attack on heart disease, cancer, and strokes; and
he wanted additional funds for a task force on breast cancer, for a heart
drug study, and for the artificial heart. He reminded the president of
the latter's promise "to speed the miracles of medical research from
the laboratory to the bedside"; and he observed that the proposed
budget "does not provide for many miracles." The president sent a
letter prepared by BOB (with copies to Lasker, DeBakey, Cain, and
Hurst), which defended the "slower rate of advance" as being necessary
in order to meet "our international commitments" and to press forward confidently with the Great Society. 37
The Regional Medical Program limped along after the spring of
1966. Congress did not add to its appropriations, and, more important, the "Mike DeBakey pressure" failed to convince the medical profession or the BOB of the need for construction funds. As the months
passed, no one could challenge what one observer called "a short fall
in terms of the aspirations" regarding it. "Because the law and the
idea behind it are new, and the problem is so vast," the president explained to Congress in November, 1967, "the program is just emerging from the planning stage." A few months later, in his special
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message "Health in America," he was more specific: fifty-four regions,
spanning the nation, had begun planning, but only eight had action
programs. The gap between the high expectations and the lack of accomplishment was stunning. Four years before, Mary Lasker had
hoped for a massive assault on heart disease, cancer, and strokes; by
1968 the bureaucracy had been able to spend only $90 million of the
$340 million that Congress had authorized. Three years before,
Michael DeBakey had submitted a blueprint for a system of federal
complexes; in 1968 there were only eight cooperative arrangements.
The president was alert to the developments. When Congress approved
a two-year extension of the RMP in the fall of 1968, he ignored it.
There would be no special signing ceremony and no words of hope.
Three years before, in announcing the program, he had aspired for
miracles; now he accepted the mundane-notwithstanding the RMP,
the great killers remained abroad in the land, stubborn and
unyielding. 38
In recognizing the realities, the president did not abandon the
war against disease; he merely extended the timetable for victory. In
October, 1968, while celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the National Heart Institute, he conceded that the murderous disease was
not ready for "a knockout blow." He asked his audience to pledge
themselves to be "missionaries of progress in health legislation" for
the next twenty years. "If you do these things I have no doubt that
when we meet again in the East Room, God willing, twenty years from
now, we will have an even happier birthday celebration," he predicted.
"On that day, I believe we can boast not only to have slowed down
the killers . .. but we can brag that we have banished them and all
the fear and the waste and the tragedy that went along with it is no
longer with us." Always the optimist, he would not give up on the
miracles of modern medicine. He was hopeful, too, because of another
of his initiatives.39
"Results Are Better"

Shortly after leaving office as secretary of HEW, Wilbur Cohen
was reminiscing about how things "got done" in the Johnson administration. He mentioned four individuals who, in order of importance, were more influential with the president than almost any
others-Lady Bird Johnson, Mary Lasker, Mathilde Krirn, and Florence
Mahoney. "I was more successful in working through these four
women," Cohen recalled, "than I was with the White House staff."
The president sought their advice, but sometimes he got "sick and
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tired" of their pressure: "Oh, you're getting all these women to talk
to me, and they're talking and talking and talking. And look, Wilbur,
they don't know what they're talking about." Lyndon Johnson's ambivalent moods-from inviting advice to fuming about it-were
especially evident with Mary Lasker. "Several times the President indignantly said to me," Cohen remembered, " 'I wish Mrs. Lasker
wouldn't try to interfere and pressure me to do this and do that,' but
I'm quite sure that if Mrs. Lasker didn't do it for about a week he'd
probably call her up and say, 'Where have you been? Why haven't you
been telling me what you think?' 1140
Rarely did Mary Lasker wait for a telephone call to offer advice.
She had extraordinary access to the White House by virtue of the
respect that Lyndon Johnson accorded to her as an expert on health,
the appreciation that the first lady felt for her help on beautification,
and the friendship of both. Mary Lasker consulted many times with
the president alone or in small groups; she was present at dozens of
parties and ceremonies; she was on occasions an overnight guest at
the White House and at the ranch; and she opened her home in New
York to the Johnson family. The relationship was mutually beneficial.
She gave the president the Lasker Award, and he gave her the Medal
of Freedom. He supported her proposals, and she praised his accomplishments. Their friendship survived the strains of the policy
process. "The greatest joy of passing years is that friendships, too, grow
older," the president wrote to her in 1968. "Happiness in life is
measured by many things-but friends like you are foremost on the
list." 41
Johnson relied on several experts on health-notably, Wilbur
Cohen; oftentimes, Douglass Cater; on particular issues, Michael
DeBakey; and sometimes, specialists in BOB and HEW. Mary Lasker
had a singular role; she became the "spark plug" for health with the
president, and as a mutual friend saw it, she "prodded him a lot." On
no occasion was she more persistent and the final results more unsettling than when she induced the president to involve himself, deeply
and personally, in her struggle to obtain more practical benefits from
the biomedical scientists. Through that partnership he aligned himself
against his NIH-HEW bureaucracy, and he challenged the bias of the
larger scientific community. One research cardiologist, Julius H. Comroe, Jr., was so shocked that he spent the rest of his life in a quest
to discover "whether President Johnson was correct when he implied
in 1966 that we then knew all we needed to know and that all we
had to do was apply it." Shortly before his death in 1984 the scientist
concluded that there was "no real basis for the President's view" and
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that the government cannot "order up specific medical discoveries on
a specific schedule as one would order up a McDonald's hamburger
or even as one would plan for the takeoff of a space shuttle." Thus
did the elite get its historical revenge against a practical-minded president; they created the image of a man who was beyond his depth in
matters of the mind. 42
For years, as she sought ever-increasing budgets for medical
research, Mary Lasker tried, through congressional allies, to force the
NIH to place more emphasis on "breakthroughs" to bring immediate
health benefits. In particular, she wanted task forces to study specific
forms of cancer, and she wanted clinical trials to find a drug to control cholesterol. "I am depending upon you," she wrote to Congressman Fogarty about drug trials in 1962, "I am really desperate
about it, and people's lives are being lost because of the lack of information on what these drugs will do." Even though she convinced
Fogarty and Hill to appropriate the funds, she could not move James
Shannon, who disliked any peripheral and expensive enterprise that
might detract from his primary devotion to basic research. Her failure
to move the NIH was the primary motive in her desire for a presidential commission. Indeed, in her one appearance before the President's
Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer and Strokes (HCS Commission)-a dramatic Sunday-evening session in the Governor's Room at
the New York Hospital-she expressed concern about what "you do
for people who are already very arteriosclerotic, to prevent the ravages
of it." She presented her case through the testimony of two supporters,
Dr. Jessie Marmorston of the University of Southern California, who
had spent a decade experimenting with female hormones to control
cholesterol, and Dr. Jeremiah Stamler of Northwestern University, who
was renowned for his work in preventive medicine and who wanted
the NIH to "proceed with speed" on a national cooperative test of
antiatherosclerotic drugs.43
Shannon, a devotee of pure science, was a powerful opponent. He
intended for the NIH to focus its efforts on a broad program in the
investigation of life processes, rather than on a search for the direct
cure or prevention of a specific disease. In his appearance before the
commission, he deplored the work of "conventional scientists
therapeutically oriented," who wanted quick answers for small parts
of the problem, rather than the pursuit of the fundamental problem
of the "vessel wall." When a colleague pointed out that a diet study
that would take care of 20 percent of the coronary disease problem
could save about one hundred thousand lives a year, he replied: "I
might say that I don't take figures very seriously because everybody
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has to die of something . . . . And before you go further, I do not say
it is unimportant to save 20% of the coronaries, but I use this as an
example of group emphasis in the field at the amelioration of the condition rather than causation." Even if a drug could modify a disease,
it would not answer the ultimate questions.44
The HCS Commission surprisingly gave little satisfaction to Mary
Lasker. Its report ignored the need for task forces, made only passing
reference to the importance of clinical field trials of drugs, and had
an astonishing omission-it never mentioned the word cholesterol.
She tried to influence the RMP legislation by asking Senator Hill to
include task forces when the bill went to conference. "Without such
specific aims," she wrote to Hill, "the Centers may not get organized
with sufficient focus and on a large enough scale to bring us the information to save people's lives in the next few years." When the House
ignored the Senate bill, she sent Cater a statement for the president
to incorporate in his speech upon signing the bill, or even for use in
an executive order. It would have had him get tough: "It is, therefore,
the policy of this Administration to urge the spending of at least 15%
of these Institutes' budgets for clinical trials. It is my policy to make
these diseases targets for intensive task force clinical and basic
research efforts in order to prolong the prime of life of our people."
Again Mary Lasker lost. The experts in HEW deemed it unwise to
make a flat 15 percent commitment, and the president made no mention of task forces or clinical trials. 45
It was not until early 1966 that Mary Lasker went to work on
the president again. In reply to his Christmas greeting, she sent a
powerful New Year's message from her farm in upstate New York, in
which she set forth her dream of a decade:
New eras in saving of lives through medical research can be
started if you go ahead with present plans of 1965. The average
age can be brought to 75 in your administration, before 1972, if
you will call the directors of the National Institutes of Health
to give you specific plans to put ideas now at hand to the test,
in clinical trials with patients, on a large scale. Some funds now
being used in other ways could be diverted to this if you will ask
for plans to reduce the death rate; and prolong the prime of life.
Doctors must be told this is urgent by you.
For the next six months, during which time the president held to his
budget cuts and accepted the Lasker Award, nothing happened. But
Mary Lasker was persistent. At the President's Club Ball at the Waldorf
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Astoria Hotel on June 11, she sat at LBJ's table and, during the evening, urged him again to meet with the NIH directors and to ask them
to review their plans for reducing death and disability during his administration. She followed up with her usual detailed memorandum,
and she won a convert.46
On June 15, at an East Room gathering with several hundred
medical and hospital leaders, called solely and specifically to arrange
for the launching of Medicare, the president dropped a bombshell. He
would soon call a meeting of the secretary of HEW, the surgeon
general, the director of NIH, and the directors of nine institutes ("I
want to serve notice on Secretary Gardner publicly because I don't
want to give him a chance to object privately"), so that "in the days
ahead we can put as much effort into prolonging the prime of man's
life as we are in extending our knowledge of outer space." The president wanted to hear "what plans if any, they have for reducing deaths
and for reducing disabilities and for extending research in that direction." He was not primarily interested in basic research; he had been
supporting those appropriations for years. "But I think the time has
now come to zero in on the targets by trying to get this knowledge
fully applied." Until we spend more money on clinical research to
test new drugs and treatments, "we won't have any major new ways
of reducing deaths and disabilities." 47
This was no timid commander in chief, content to leave the
strategy of his war to the experts in the field. Presidents, he declared,
need to show more interest in the specific results of medical research
during their lifetimes, during their administrations. He would do so:
"Whether we get any or not I am going to show an interest in them."
He would watch the NIH scientists and bureaucrats, and he would
return in several months with his "checksheet" to see just what they
had accomplished, "like when you take a car in to get it filled withthe tires filled and the radiator checked and all those things-we will
go down their checklist and we will see what specific efforts they are
going to make to reduce deaths among the leading killers, especially
arteriosclerosis of the heart and brain, and various forms of cancer,
and to reduce disabilities such as arthritis and severe mental and
neurological diseases or illness." Then, for whatever time was allotted to him in the White House, he would come back about every six
months to ensure that the scientists were investing their funds as wisely as possible to "prolong the prime of life for all of our people." With
a president showing such sympathy, interest, and leadership, "we will
be able to get more results for the survival of our people than anyone
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else has ever done in the history of mankind. Think about what a
laudable objective that is." 48
In less than two weeks, armed with an agenda that had been
prepared by Cater, Lasker, and Gorman, the president held his first
meeting with the NIH. He called the twenty medical doctors and five
administrators to the Cabinet Room, named them his "health strategy
council" in the war against disease, asked for their help, and outlined
his concerns: the life expectancy of the average American was not increasing, the child mortality rate was higher than in many other countries, and the killing and crippling diseases continued to take their
heavy toll. The solution, he told them, was not simply more money;
it was also a better selection of priorities. They were already spending more than $800 million a year, and he was "keenly interested to
learn not only what knowledge this buys but what are the payoffs in
terms of healthy lives for our citizens." Then, with words that were
sure to provoke and that soon sent shock waves throughout the scientific community, he continued: "Some of my friends tell me that too
little effort is going into clinical research to test new drugs and new
treatments. They say there is too much love of research simply for
the sake of research. In my judgment, research is good, but results
are better." 49
The president pressed his point with a series of tendentious questions that had been written by Mary Lasker and were aimed at each
of the directors. He forced Dr. Kenneth Endicott to admit that
technical problems had delayed the creation of task forces for research
on solid tumors, and he forced Dr. Robert Grant to concede that his
National Heart Institute was spending only 4.5 percent of its budget
for drug studies, a proportion that the president observed was rather
small. Only Dr. Shannon fought back. He insisted that drug studies
to lower blood fats, no matter how successful they might be, would
"contribute nothing to the prevention of heart disease." But the president had the last word through the official statement issued at the
end of the meeting. "We began a review of the targets and the timetable
they have set for winning victories in the war," he told the American
people. "We must make sure that no life-giving discovery is locked
up in the laboratory." so
The president's meeting evoked intense reactions. Dr. Shannon
admitted that it "was surely an historical event," but be was angry,
so be went to work on a report to show that there was already a balance
between basic and targeted research within the NIH. Scientists in all
fields were stunned; they considered that basic research was synon-
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ymous with prestige and freedom, in contrast to the less rarefied
and highly directed area of applied research. They could respond only
with shock to the politician with his practicality, the mechanic with
his checksheet. And only a fool could believe that numerous
discoveries of importance to health were hidden away in some
laboratory. Scientists reacted so negatively that the administration,
sensitive to the outcry, wondered at first if the NIH was organizing
the protest and then, as if in retreat, sent forth Secretary Gardner to
soothe the ruffled feathers. Only Mary Lasker was content, and excited. The president had sanctioned her strategic design; now she
would provide the tactics. In October she and other members of the
National Advisory Cancer Council sent their chief an "ideal" budget,
with an increase of $41 million, to support a series of new task forces
to attack the most common forms of cancer and thus speed up the
progress years sooner than would be possible through individual
efforts.51
Two months passed, and Lasker, seeing no action, sought an audience with her friend. "I want to avoid this if I can," the president
told his staff. "I'll have to see her if she just has to, but I much prefer
that she give me a memo. See if Bird can't handle it. I'll be busy with
other things." Mary Lasker was not content to talk with Gardner or
Cater; she insisted on conveying her ideas directly to the president,
if only for ten minutes. It was a measure of her influence that the
president relented, and on December 14 she assured him that an intensified attack was feasible and that it would come about much more
quickly if he directed it be done. She even provided a draft letter to
the surgeon general for Johnson's signature. "I direct the National
Cancer Institute to establish Task Forces in lung cancer, cancer of the
intestines and colon, cancer of the uterus and ovary, cancer of the
stomach and cancer of the prostate, which annually cause over 142,000
deaths, and in other major types of cancer." She followed the meeting
with a letter two days after Christmas: the task forces would be a
benefaction to "change the average length of life of mankind" from
a president who was "deeply sympathetic" to "people's suffering." Her
persistence finally paid off. Johnson, in his health message to Congress in February, directed John Gardner to appoint immediately a
Lung Cancer Task Force. 52
In May, 1967, Mary Lasker was at the White House again, accompanied by Lister Hill, to suggest a replacement for James Shannon,
who would reach compulsory retirement age in the summer of 1968.
She wanted a successor who would be publicly committed to translating the results of research into health benefits. To accentuate
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her concern, she proposed that the president meet a second time with
the NIH to review their progress. She stayed afterwards to tell him
privately about a new drug-Atromid-S-for which Shannon had
delayed trials for six years but which might lower cholesterol and
might be a breakthrough in dealing with heart disease. She wanted
LBJ's physician to consider it.53
Unbeknownst to Mary Lasker, her timing was ill-fated. There
were different forces at work in the White House. John Gardner and
his highly respected assistant secretary, Dr. Philip Lee, had already
approached Cater about another meeting, one in which they wanted
the president to express strong support for basic research, praise the
contributions of the universities and their medical schools, and pay
tribute to the leadership of Dr. Shannon. Their conviction echoed that
of Donald F. Hornig, the president's science adviser, who wanted to
combat the "unhappy feeling" and "deep suspicion" among scientists,
which was based upon the 1966 meeting and budget restrictions, that
the administration was suppressing basic research in favor of practical applications. Hornig spoke with the passion of a convert. In 1964
he had advised the president to improve the nation's health through
the application of existing data and techniques; by 1967 he had come
to believe the "treatment of disease is limited by a lack of basic
know ledge." 54
Douglass Cater, who had been one of Mary Lasker's foremost
allies, decided to quell the political fallout through another presidential meeting with the NIH. But this time, in setting the agenda, Cater
ignored Lasker and Gorman; instead, he consulted with Gardner,
Shannon, and Lee. The contrast with 1966 was dramatic. The president flew to Bethesda, accompanied by a host of press and
photographers, and made a grand tour of the open-heart-surgery amphitheater, the new computerized laboratory, and a new nuclear
medical facility. From there he went to the board room to listen to
the directors' progress reports on infant mortality (the most significant drop in ten years occurred in 1966); on heart disease (the nation
was about to see the first leveling off in mortality in its history); on
cancer (prevention is no idle dream); and on blindness (further advances were under way with the establishment of eleven clinical
centers for eye research). 55
In the auditorium, flanked by cameras, the president made his
peace with the scientific community. He had come this time to renew
his commitment to the "world's greatest research enterprise" and to
applaud the efforts of its directors; indeed, he elevated them to "Chiefs
of Staff" in the war against the ancient enemies. Progress was "going
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up instead of down," he declared; and departing from his prepared
speech, he took issue with the "hotshots" who "think we have reached
what you might call a stalemate, because we have not found all the
answers to all the questions in all the 365 days since we last ran our
check-our final exam." To ensure that no cloud should darken his
day of reconciliation, he omitted from his prepared speech any potentially provocative comments about the need for the "swift application of knowledge" and the formation of the long-delayed Task Force
on Lung Cancer. In final obeisance he gave basic research a "first and
foremost" position in a healthy society. "Because we are human, we
explore; we seek to understand the deepest mysteries of our world,"
he told the practitioners of pure science. "The government supports
this creative exploration because we believe that all knowledge is
prtcious; because we know that all progress would halt without it."
And twice he told them, in words that would thunder across the nation, that the NIH was "a billion dollar success story." 56
The meeting at Bethesda had several effects. It mollified the NIH.
Before the president left, a friendly Dr. Shannon presented LBJ with
some sun-tan lotion and with the report that had been requested a
year before, a 200-page volume entitled The Advancement of
Knowledge for the Nation's Health, which could only elicit praise for
the research programs. But the rapprochement did not extend to the
scientific community. A September poll in Science reported diminished support for the president, because of the war in Vietnam, among
the "Scientists and Engineers for Johnson" of 1964. "The fact that
the President has passed more legislation and given more realistic support for science and education than any other President," Michael
DeBakey complained, "is .apparently completely disregarded by some
of these scientists and engineers." He considered their lack of appreciation "unforgiveable," but there was no changing it.57
The president's foray into the field of biomedical policy did not
earn him plaudits, then or later. In a seminal article in the Atlantic
Monthly at the end of 1967, journalist Elizabeth Drew portrayed him
as the victim of a "do-gooder" who was "too covetous of power, too
insistent on her own pursuits, too confident of her own expertise in
the minutiae of medicine," and who led him into "distortions" of
health policy. Reflecting the bias of James Shannon and the NIH, the
journalist found fault with the HCS Commission, the cancer chemotherapy program, the field trials of drugs, and above all, the idea to
push for "payoffs" from research. The latter was too complex a problem to be "decided on the basis of who has the President's ear," and it
damaged the chief executive by causing scientists to see him as "an
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anti-intellectual, unsophisticated president who could never understand such things." 58
Experts in the politics of science have cited Drew as their primary
source in evaluating the Johnson administration, although with differing degrees of emphasis. Paul Starr, for example, repeats Drew's
strictures against Mary Lasker-and, by implication, the presidentalmost verbatim. Sociologist James Katz, in the best of the policy
studies, accords Johnson a more aggressive role as the chief policy
maker and describes his pro-Lasker bias toward practical results and
his "dressing down" of the NIH as parts of LBJ's broader desire to bring
biomedical science under executive control. Katz's portrait is
nonetheless negative: a populist president who possessed little
understanding of the world of science and who, lacking the sympathy
and understanding of Eisenhower and Kennedy, "completely ruptured"
the intimate relationship that had existed between scientists and
government since World War II. Julius Comroe, Jr., writing from the
perspective of the scientists and after having made a seventeen-year
study of innovation in research, could not forgive the president for
having made "unreasonable" billion-dollar decisions on the basis of
"personal opinions or prejudices, gut reactions, pressure from special
interest groups, and a few fascinating, convincingly spun anecdotes." 59
On this issue, President Johnson has had consistently unfair
evaluations. He was not an unschooled pragmatist who was opposed
to pure science and who had been misled by a dilettante into meddling with the experts. He continued to support fundamental scientific research even when he was pushing for practical results. And
although there can be no certainty as to the proper balance between
targeted and basic research, he and Mary Lasker were almost surely
correct in pressuring the NIH to conduct trials of heart drugs and to
establish task forces for cancer. The Coronary Drug Project, which
got under way in 1967, tested four lipid-influencing drugs; eight years
later it concluded that none of them was effective. But in 1972 the
National Heart Institute began a randomized double-blind study of
a potent cholesterol-lowering drug, cholestyramine, and in 1984 it
issued a landmark report, which demonstrated conclusively that lowering cholesterol could reduce coronary heart disease and thereby
promised a reduced risk for tens of millions of Americans. 60
There has been no equally startling result for cancer, but the current optimism of the National Cancer Institute gives new meaning
to the words of Dr. Kenneth Endicott, its director in 1967. Endicott,
who was slow in getting started on the president's order to establish
the Lung Cancer Task Force, promised to have a substantial program
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ready by 1969. "I think we should probably emulate the Manhattan
Project and simultaneously explore the various perceived alternatives,"
he wrote, "in the hope of emerging with a definitive answer in a period
of twenty years instead of having the thing drag on for fifty." His
acknowledgment that a greater effort might bring earlier results was
a tribute, albeit private, to the president and to Mary Lasker. A
breakthrough in less than fifty years would be their testimonial. 61
"Pretty Visionary"

In 1966, when presenting John Fogarty with the Heart-of-the-Year
Award, President Johnson remarked that some people considered him
to be "pretty visionary," and he admitted, "We cannot conquer all
disease" and "We cannot educate all humanity." But his philosophy
of progress demanded that "we can hope for them and we can work
for them and we can give what we have to them, and we can urge them
and provide leadership and try to move along." For five years the president served as an indefatigable booster to conquer disease and "move
along" the nation's health. He made his case not only through his
presidential commission but also with the White House Conference,
numerous task forces, five special health messages, and more than
fifty relevant statements and signing ceremonies. Over and over again
he stressed the basic themes. His generation of Americans had arrived
at a historic moment of challenge and opportunity. If they had the
will and would make a commitment, they could revolutionize their
way of living. The war on disease would call a halt to the wholesale
murder of the past and would extend human life to one hundred years.
The effort made sense from a strictly business standpoint, for it would
save the nation $32 billion a year; but it was more a matter of necessity, for "the health of our people is, inescapably, the foundation for
fulfillment of all our aspirations." 62
The president's leadership elevated the war against disease to a
far-more-permanent position in American life, both for the people and
for the government. He admittedly used extravagant rhetoric and promised far more than he could deliver; but this was not necessarily
unfortunate. Unrealized expectations have a different effect in areas
such as civil rights and health. In the former they can lead to anger
and frustration and can even erupt in public violence; in the latter
they can lead to disappointment and sadness but can endure as private
sorrow. For Johnson, the promise of the miracles of modem medicine
was essentially a challenge. If he could raise the expectations of the
American people and the scientific community, they would persist
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in his war. And they did. His years of rhetoric helped set the stage
for a renewed effort. Indeed, President Richard Nixon, under the
tutelage of the Lasker forces, would have the nation declare a "war
on cancer." 6 3
One of Johnson's favorite health stories was about his heart attack. "I know what it is to have your blood pressure go to zero and
go into shock," he told an audience shortly before leaving office. "I
know it well enough that I would like to see the day come when that
did not happen to anybody, and if it did ... that you would have the
implements to get the same result that the Good Lord and Lady Bird
and Dr. Hurst all working together back in 1955 had." He could not
provide such a benign setting, even for himself. In retirement, when
his angina returned, there was no drug to control cholesterol and no
fully functioning dacron heart. The experts at the Mayo Clinic told
him that there was nothing they could do, and Michael DeBakey in
Houston explained that his heart was too damaged to risk the newest
"miracle," coronary by-pass surgery. In early 1973, racked by sharp
pains and with an oxygen tank next to his bed, he moved toward death.
But he had left a health legacy that the American people would embrace. In the most humane and compassionate sense, he wanted
everyone to have what he could afford, and more.64
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SI Lyndon B.

Johnson
and the Politics of Space

Robert A. Divine

ON OCTOBER 4, 1957, THE SOVIET UNION began the space age
with the launching of Sputnik, the first man-made satellite to orbit
the earth. Lyndon Johnson, who was then serving as Democratic majority leader in the Senate, exploited the sluggish response of the
Eisenhower administration to this dramatic breakthrough and thus
established his own credentials as the nation's leading political
spokesman on the challenge of outer space. From that tihle on, LBJ's
political career would be closely associated with every major policy
decision relating to space, from the creation of the National
Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) to the development of
the Apollo program to put men on the moon.
Although nearly all observers agree that Johnson became identified in the public mind with the effort to conquer space, there is
considerable controversy over the exact nature of his role. In his
memoir The Vantage Point, LBJ asserted that from the first moment
he learned about Sputnik until Americans landed on the moon in July,
1969, he was personally involved in every aspect of the American space
program. Other commentators, notably George Reedy, disagree, claiming that Johnson initially seized on space for political advantage and
that he never developed the deep commitment to this issue that he
did to civil rights, education, and the war on poverty.1 In fact, LBJ did
develop a strong interest in America's space program, but it came
about haltingly and only reached its full potential after he had become
president. And even then, the competing demands of the Vietnam War
prevented him from doing all that he could to advance the American
effort in space.

I

Johnson's initial involvement in space issues reflects the ambiguity that marked his entire approach in this area. He was slow to
respond to the opportunity presented by Sputnik, but once he had
grasped its potential, he exploited it skillfully to gain maximum
political advantage.
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LBJ was at his Texas hill-country ranch when the Russians sent
up Sputnik on Friday October 4, 1957. In The Vantage Point, Johnson
claimed that on that very evening he conferred by telephone with aides
in Washington, telling them to begin gathering data on the American
missile and satellite programs. In a 1969 interview with Walter
Cronkite, Johnson recalled having stared up at the sky that once
seemed so friendly and now "seemed to have question marks all over
it because of this new development" and realizing "that this country
of mine might, maybe, perhaps not be ahead in everything." 2 Yet the
record indicates that it was his mentor, Senator Richard R. Russell
of Georgia, who urged him to take the lead in investigating the
American failure to be first in space and that it was George Reedy,
his chief Senate political aide, who pointed out the historical and
political significance of Sputnik.
At his home in Winder, Georgia, Senator Russell, chairman of
the Armed Services Committee, was bombarded with telegrams from
other senators who demanded that his committee investigate the
American missile program. Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri,
who was already a possible Democratic presidential candidate in 1960,
wired Russell on October 5, 1957, that he considered Sputnik "proof
of growing communist superiority in the all-important missile field"
and urged Russell to hold "complete hearings" before the full Armed
Services Committee so that "the American people can learn the
truth." 3 Symington, a former secretary of the air force in the Truman
administration, had long been a critic of the Eisenhower defense program, and Russell apparently feared that Symington would turn Sputnik into a partisan crusade. The Georgia senator had long considered
Lyndon Johnson as his protege, a relationship that LBJ had nurtured,
so Russell now decided to let the majority leader frame the Democratic
response. As he explained later, "I had more or less turned this whole
matter over to Senator Johnson." 4
At Russell's suggestion, Johnson reactivated the moribund
Defense Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee in order to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
American satellite program. On Monday, October 7, Johnson telephoned members of his Senate staff, instructing them to notify the
Pentagon of his intent; and on the same day, Russell told Symington
and others who were calling for hearings before the full committee
that he had authorized Lyndon to have the staff of his subcommittee
"look into this matter and assemble all available facts for evaluation." 5
Over the next ten days, Johnson took full command. At his direction, Preparedness Subcommittee staff members Solis Horwitz and
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Gerald Seigel received a preliminary Pentagon briefing on missile and
satellite programs and made arrangements for a fuller presentation
to Senator Johnson and other key members of the subcommittee in
early November. Meanwhile, Johnson flew back to Washington and
met with the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee,
Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, and assured him that he
would not turn the inquiry into a partisan attack on the Eisenhower
administration. Johnson made the same point to Secretary of Defense
Neil McElroy, telling him that Russell wanted to cooperate with the
administration in an orderly inquiry that would have "a rather stabilizing effect" on Symington and other senators who were still demanding a full-scale committee investigation under Russell's leadership. 6

n
Johnson shifted from behind-the-scenes maneuvering to public
advocacy on Sputnik in mid October, largely under the prodding of
George Reedy. Reedy himself was slow to grasp the impact of Sputnik until Charley Brewton, a former aide to Senator Lister Hill, flew
to Texas to persuade Reedy that Sputnik offered both the Democrats,
who were on the defensive because of the desegregation issue in the
public schools after the Little Rock crisis, and Lyndon Johnson, personally, a chance to seize the initiative. On October 17, 1957, Reedy
sent LBJ a long memo, urging him "to plunge heavily into this one."
Reedy stressed two points. First, Sputnik marked the opening of
a new age in history: "The Russians have left the earth and the race
for control of the universe has started." Just as the Romans had used
roads to establish their dominion, the British had used control of the
sea, and Americans had used their mastery of the air, the nation that
could conquer outer space would dominate the world of the future,
Reedy argued. In view of the importance of the issue and the failure
of President Eisenhower to reassure the American people after Sputnik, it fell to Lyndon Johnson to take the initiative in educating the
public on space by leading a copgressional inquiry into the American
missile and satellite program, By identifying himself with the new
age of space, Johnson could advance his own political career and at
the same time perform a vital national service. Above all, Reedy
counseled, LBJ must rise above partisanship to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry, one that would be directed at uncovering the facts,
not at assigning blame. "This may be one of those moments in
history," Reedy concluded, "when good politics and statesmanship are
as close to each other as a hand in a glove." 7
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Johnson quickly followed Reedy's shrewd advice. In two speeches
in Texas, one at Tyler on October 18 and another at Austin on the
next day, LBJ staked his claim to leadership on the space issue. In both
addresses he spoke about the magnitude of the Russian achievement,
declaring that the "Soviets have beaten us at our own game-daring,
scientific advances in the atomic age"-and that "the Communists
have established a foothold in space." He repeated, almost word for
word, Reedy's comparison to the Roman and British empires to stress
the importance of catching up with the Russians in space. And then
he made space "a direct responsibility of mine," stating that he
planned to use his Preparedness Subcommittee to "take a long careful
look" at the American missile and satellite program. Finally, Johnson
promised an impartial investigation, one that would be devoid of
"charges and counter-charges . ... Our need is to put aside our angers
and to work together as we step into a new age of history.118
Two weeks later, after a long Pentagon briefing on the American
satellite effort that Johnson, Russell, and Bridges attended, Russell
authorized LBJ to "launch an all out investigation into all aspects of
our missile and satellite programs" in hearings before his Preparedness
Subcommittee. In private, Russell explained to Johnson that he had
chosen LBJ over Symington, who "has a lot of information and would
raise a lot of Hell, but it would not be in the national interest." 9 In
his public statement on November 4 that announced these hearings,
Johnson said they were not intended "to fix blame or put anybody
on trial." Instead, the hearings would focus on "the question of what
is to be done" and the search for "bold, new thinking in defense and
foreign policy.1110
In a telephone conversation with Bridges on the next day,
November 5, Johnson lamented the administration's refusal to take
Sputnik seriously, claiming that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
had told him that there had been no adverse reaction abroad. LBJ said
that while he was not going to search for scapegoats, he was not going to cover up any wrongdoing either. And he added, "There is no
question but to admit the Russians are ahead of us on this." When
Bridges asked what he should say to the press about the hearings, LBJ
replied, "Say you are in complete agreement with Senator Johnson
and that this should be a national investigation instead of a partisan
one." 11
Thus, in the first month after Sputnik, Johnson, after a slow start,
had taken control of the space issue. He used his close relationship
with Richard Russell to outmaneuver his potential rival in 1960, Stuart
Symington, who actually had better credentials in the missile field,
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and LBJ capitalized on Reedy's advice to take a nonpartisan approach
to win over Republican Styles Bridges. Most important, Johnson was
establishing himself as the nation's leading political spokesman on
space.

m
Lyndon Johnson moved quickly to organize the Preparedness Subcommittee's hearings. He asked Donald C. Cook, a utility executive
who had worked with him on an investigation during the Korean War,
to head the staff. When Cook declined, Johnson followed Cook's suggestion of Edwin L. Weisl, Sr., a partner in a prestigious New York
City law firm, who accepted when Johnson stressed the importance
of the inquiry to national security. LBJ allowed Weisl, who brought
his son, Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., and a younger partner in his firm, Cyrus
R. Vance, as his assistants, to plan the hearings and to select the
witnesses. Johnson maintained close supervision over the preparations, with two trusted staff members, Solis Horwitz and George
Reedy, working closely with Weisl. At the same time, LBJ kept Richard
Russell informed about the subcommittee's plans.12
Once again it was Reedy who supplied Johnson with the best advice on procedure. Reedy reiterated the need to keep the proceedings
strictly bipartisan in spirit, and he laid out the basic strategy that
Johnson would follow at the hearings. To avoid excessive defeatism
over Sputnik yet not to engage in the apparent complacency of the
Eisenhower administration's reaction, Reedy suggested that Johnson
present Sputnik to the American people as a challenge-one that
would require "a call to action instead of a summons to a siesta." Comparing the Soviet achievement to Pearl Harbor, Reedy wanted Johnson
to point out that the initial defeat had led ultimately to victory over
Japan; "We lost the battle but we won the war." And so, Reedy argued,
there was still time for the United States to rally from the shock of
Sputnik and to beat the Russians in space.13
Johnson also received more practical advice on how to proceed.
Reedy urged him to open the hearings with testimony by well-known
scientists, who could suggest ways in which the United States could
move ahead in its space program. In particular, Reedy warned against
becoming bogged down in details of the missile program and advised
him to avoid air-power advocates such as General Curtis E. LeMay.
Instead of focusing on the issue of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), the hearings should explore "what we can do to raise our
level of technology and place ourselves in a position where we can
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meet any Soviet challenge." But another of Johnson's advisers, lawyer
James H . Rowe, Jr., also reminded LBJ of the political necessity of
creating "a sense of urgency to counteract the complacency of the
administration .... Lyndon Johnson's greatest contribution can
be-and should be-to carry on psychological warfare against
Eisenhower." 14
Johnson displayed his mastery of the situation at a meeting of
the subcommittee on November 22, 1957, three days before the hearings were due to open. He gained quick approval for his staff appointments, deftly outmaneuvered Symington's attempt to include General
LeMay in the list of witnesses, and succeeded in limiting each senator
to only ten minutes of questioning for each witness by what he termed
"a gentleman's agreement." Above all, despite Rowe's advice, Johnson
stated his intention of keeping politics out of the hearing chamber.
Praising Styles Bridges for his cooperation, Johnson declared that "the
sole objective of the inquiry is to determine ways and means of securing the defense of the United States." Appealing to patriotism, he
vowed that there would be "no 'guilty party' in this inquiry except
Joe Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev." The material that the subcommittee's staff had assembled, he warned, was so "deeply disturbing"
that even "the most hardened ward-heeler would forget politics if he
knew the facts." Therefore, Johnson promised, he would do nothing
to embarrass the "one man who can give the orders that will produce
the missiles. That man is the President of the United States." 15
In stressing a bipartisan approach, Johnson was heeding Reedy's
initial observation that Sputnik was a case in which good politics and
statesmanship were "as close to each other as a hand in a glove." Undoubtedly, Johnson knew that the facts that he would bring out in
the hearings would reflect badly on the Eisenhower administration
and would force it to admit that mistakes had been made. But he also
believed that he would be performing a patriotic service in forging
a new national consensus to meet the Soviet challenge in space. He
expressed his hope to President Eisenhower that the hearings "will
make a constructive contribution to the security of our country." 16
IV

Whatever Johnson's motives may have been, he conducted the
hearings in such a way that the entire country would be fully aware
of his role in responding to Sputnik. From the opening session in late
November until the hearings concluded in January, 1958, LBJ was at
center stage. He introduced each witness, made sure he was the first
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senator to engage in cross-examination, and summarized the
highlights of each day's testimony in his closing remarks. When
witnesses discussed classified information in secret sessions, it was
the chairman who briefed reporters afterwards about what had been
said behind closed doors.
Senator Johnson set the tone for the hearings in his opening statement on November 25, 1957. Calling Sputnik a threat to the nation's
security, "perhaps the greatest that our country has ever known," he
cautioned against excessive pessimism. Asserting that the nation
should accept the Soviet action in space as a challenge, LBJ asked
Americans "to respond with the best that is within them." Again he
stressed bipartisanship by declaring, "There were no Republicans or
Democrats in this country the day after Pearl Harbor." Declaring that
Sputnik was "an even greater challenge than Pearl Harbor," he expressed his belief that the facts that would be disclosed at the hearings
would "inspire Americans to the greatest effort in American history." 17
Johnson shrewdly allowed prominent scientists such as Edward
Teller and Vannevar Bush to monopolize the early sessions, postponing testimony on the military implications of Sputnik and the tangled
missile program until December. Teller was especially effective, advocating a trip to the moon, which he said would "have both amusing and amazing . .. consequences." Other witnesses, notably General
James Gavin and Wernher von Braun, favored large rocket boosters
that would be capable of sending a spacecraft to the moon. Such an
ambitious effort, Gavin claimed, would require "the solution of many
complex, difficult, challenging, scientific problems that all in
themselves will contribute a great deal to understanding about the
environment of man on the earth." Von Braun was even blunter, arguing that the conquest of space was of "tremendous military importance." In launching Sputnik, the Russians were in effect saying, "If
we want to control this planet, we have to control the sp;lce around
it," von Braun concluded.18
While the hearings continued, Johnson developed a carefully
thought-out position on space, which he articulated in press conferences, public addresses, and letters to his constituents. The basic
theme was familiar-the United States was facing "the most serious
challenge to its security in our history" as a result of Sputnik, "a
disaster ... comparable to Pearl Harbor." Opportunity accompanied
the danger, however. "The world is entering the Age of Space," he
declared again and again, and there was still time for the United States
to regain its rightful role of leadership. Comparing Sputnik to the
Alamo, Johnson told a Texas audience that "history does not reward
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the people who win the battles but the people who win the war." By
rising above partisanship and pulling together, Americans could turn
the new space era into "our finest hour." Johnson always closed his
letters and speeches on a positive note. "The unknown is beckoning
to us," he proclaimed. "Flights to the moon are just over the threshold,"
as the Age of Space gave promise of stirring times that "made his blood
tingle." 19
LBJ's attempt to identify himself as the nation's foremost
spokesman on space came to a climax in early January. In an effort
to preempt President Eisenhower's annual State-of-the-Union message
on January 8, 1958, Johnson called a special caucus of Democratic
senators for January 7, explaining to Richard Russell, "I cannot overemphasize what I believe to be the importance of this meeting." 20
At this Democratic conference, Johnson made his boldest statement yet on the space race with the Soviet Union. In contrast to
Eisenhower's attempts to play Sputnik down, LBJ pointed out the high
value that the Russians were placing on outer space. In a rare partisan
thrust, he blamed the administration's concern over a balanced budget
for limiting the American satellite program; but Johnson's focus was
on the future, not the past. "Control of space means control of the
world," he stated bluntly. "From space, the masters of infinity would
have the power to control the earth's weather, to cause drouth and
flood, to change the tides and raise the levels of the sea, to divert the
gulf stream and change temperate climates to frigid." He went on to
warn that Soviet control of space, "the ultimate position," would be
more dangerous than "any ultimate weapon." There was only one
possible American response to the Russian effort to seize "the ultimate
position," he concluded; "our national goal and the goal of all free
men must be to win and hold that position." 21
After this deliberate effort to seize the initiative from the administration on the space issue, Johnson moved to block efforts both
by the staff of the Preparedness Subcommittee and by Senator Symington to issue a minority report that would be critical of the
Eisenhower administration. Instead LBJ prepared a seventeen-point
program that stressed such future goals as building large rocket motors
for space flights and creating a new federal agency to direct the nation's space program. In what Cyrus Vance later described as "one of
the most skillful pieces of diplomatic statesmanship that I have run
across," Johnson won approval for his report in the course of one morning's subcommittee meeting, making only a few slight changes to ensure unanimity. Then he overcame a final roadblock by calling Stuart
Symington, who had missed the crucial meeting, and reading him
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the report over the telephone. Warned that if he dissented he would
be alone, the Missouri senator, who was in the bathtub at the time,
had no choice but to agree.22
By the time the subcommittee had completed its hearings in late
January, 1958, Lyndon Johnson had succeeded in turning Sputnik into a personal political triumph. In their astute account of Johnson's
techniques as Senate majority leader, Rowland Evans and Robert
Novak cite this episode as a "minor masterpiece" in the larger Johnson
tactic of advancing the interests of the Democratic party without
directly confronting a popular Republican president. Yet the beauty
of Johnson's approach was that he wrapped his political purposes so
artfully in bipartisanship that someone as close to the scene as Edwin Weisl, Sr., could argue that LBJ had scrupulously avoided playing
politics with the Preparedness Subcommittee hearings. "I admired
your passion for unity," Weisl wrote to Johnson, "on matters concerning the survival of our beloved country." 23
Johnson, quite rightly, gave much of the credit to Richard Russell,
especially for serving as a "brake" on his "impetuosity." In a letter
to the Georgia senator in late January, 1958, LBJ expressed his "heartfelt thanks for the way you stood by me during a very difficult and
trying period." 24 Johnson's private correspondence also suggests that
he was moved by more than purely political concerns. Apparently he
did feel that Eisenhower's lack of concern over Sputnik was endangering the nation. As he wrote to a friend on the eve of the hearings, "It
may be essential to infuse boldness into those who have not exhibited
it in the past, but who are obviously the only people in a position
to act." And after the hearings were over, he took pride in "arousing
our people to the implications of the present danger.... There is certainly more a sense of urgency in Washington now than there was
several months ago." 25
In responding to Sputnik, Johnson appears to have been moved
both by political expediency and by a genuine sense of national
peril. As George Reedy had pointed out, this was one of those rare
times when what was good for Lyndon Johnson politically was also
good for the nation. From this time forward, Johnson would be identified in the public mind as an advocate of an expanded American
effort in space. Unfortunately, LBJ's fondness for hyperbole had led
him to overstate the military importance of exploring outer space
and to play down its scientific value. As a result, Johnson was responsible for popularizing the concept of a space race with the Soviet Union that would distort the American space effort in the
1960s.
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In 1958, Johnson adopted a more statesmanlike pose as the leading
architect of the new American space agency. Shifting his attention
from the contest with the Russians to the control and direction of
the national effort in space, LBJ once again used his legislative skill
to serve both the nation and his own growing political ambitions.
On February 6, 1958, the Senate voted to create the Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics, which was to frame legislation for
a permanent space agency. Johnson packed the committee with senior
senators, all busy with their own committee chairmanships and all
heavily indebted to LBJ. It was not surprising, therefore, that at the
first meeting of the special committee on February 20, LBJ was
unanimously chosen as its chairman and was given free rein to select
its staff and to decide on its agenda. The key question to be resolved,
Johnson explained to his colleagues, was who in government "should
have jurisdiction over scientific aspects of space and astronautics." 26
In his dealings with the Eisenhower administration about the formation of the new space agency, LBJ displayed his usual deft touch.
Careful not to overplay his hand, he let the administration take the
lead in proposing new legislation; he would prefer to be a watchdog,
looking out for loopholes and weaknesses to correct. As he explained
to the president, the American effort in space could not be "wrapped
into one neat little package. It reaches into practically every aspect
of human endeavor and it is going to require an extraordinary effort."
But Johnson did promise "wholehearted cooperation" in "what we
anticipate will be a joint enterprise." 2 7
President Eisenhower responded on April 2 with draft legislation
that would expand the thirty-year-old National Advisory Committee
for Aeronautics (NACA) into the new National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) . A director, who would be appointed by the
president, would head the new agency, aided by a seventeen-member
advisory board, which would have no administrative responsibility.
The staff of Johnson's special committee immediately focused on the
chief weakness of this clumsy arrangement-the failure to provide
for a central policy-making body that would resolve potential conflicts between civilian and military space projects. Aware of the
jurisdictional disputes that had plagued the American missile program, Johnson's aides warned that the administration's proposal did
not give NASA the clear-cut "authority over the entire space program
so that it can be handled with foresight rather than on a troubleshooting basis." Therefore they recommended that the Senate insist
on a small "Policy Board" of five to seven members, which would be
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charged with formulating "the aeronautic and astronautic policies,
programs and projects of the United States." 28
In the ensuing legislative process, which included brief public
hearings and protracted redrafting sessions, Johnson let his staff do
most of the work. He became absorbed in other issues, especially attempts to alleviate heavy unemployment, which had been caused by
the 1958 recession. Gerald Seigel and Edwin Weisl, Sr., did the actual
legislative drafting, aided by George Reedy, who was distressed by
Johnson's lack of interest. "We'd shove the bills into Johnson's hands
and get him to introduce them and that's the way the act emerged,"
Reedy recalled twenty-five years later.29
Johnson, however, did involve himself personally; he insisted
on a central board to set policy and to decide between conflicting
civilian and military proposals about space. At the special committee's hearings, he grilled administration witnesses on this point,
asking the director of NACA, "Under this bill . . . , who is going to
make the decision as to who controls what? Now who . .. is going
to decide what is civilian and what is military?" At Johnson's insistence, the Senate bill included a provision for the nine-member
Space Council, including the secretaries of State and Defense, the
director of NASA, and the head of the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC), to set comprehensive space policy and to designate specific
programs.30
President Eisenhower refused to accept the Space Council at first,
fearing that it would be a powerful body, on the order of the National
Security Council, that would consume too much of his time and attention. When the legislation became stalled in a conference committee, Ike finally asked for a personal meeting with LBJ in order to
explain his desire for a purely advisory body, "not one which makes
decisions." The two men met on Sunday July 7, 1958, and quickly
reached agreement. When Eisenhower expressed his concern that the
Space Council would make too many demands on him, Johnson suggested making the president chairman of that body. Ike accepted this
compromise, telling James R. Killian, his science adviser, that he did
so "in order to see the bill move ahead." 31
President Eisenhower signed the act creating NASA on July 29,
1958. Lyndon Johnson could take pride that it contained the Space
Council that he had fought so hard to create. Ike knew, however, that
he had outmaneuvered Johnson. Over the next three years, the Space
Council met on only rare occasions, and then with Killian, not
Eisenhower, presiding. Johnson could not force the president to use
the Space Council to give central guidance to the nation's space pro-
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gram, but he did have enough power to block an administration move
in 1960 to eliminate this body entirely.3 2
In the long run, Johnson was once again the real winner. He had
continued to enhance his reputation as the nation's leading
spokesman on space by appearing to be the father of NASA. At the
same time, he had softened his image by toning down his hard-line
rhetoric on the space race with Russia. Instead, he had gone out of
his way to speak about working for a space effort that "will bring peace
in our time." At the opening of the spring hearings, he had spoken
of striving "to convert outer space into a blessing for mankind, rather
than a threat of the destruction of civilization," adding that he had
"no intention of rattling sabers among the stars." His real goal, he
told one correspondent in April, 1958, was to engage in "the greatest
of mankind's adventures" by promoting programs aimed at "searching
out new galaxies of human thought." He even accepted the president's
invitation to give a speech before the United Nations in November,
1958, in which he stressed American support for the peaceful exploration of outer space. In contrast to his nationalistic response to Sputnik, Johnson used the creation of NASA to develop a constructive approach to the challenge of space. 33
VI

Lyndon Johnson's next major contribution to the American space
program came in 1961, when he was serving as vice-president under
John F. Kennedy. During his last three years in office, Dwight Eisenhower had kept careful budgetary limits on NASA, approving the Mercury program for manned flights around the earth in the early 1960s
but rejecting plans for a lunar landing, which was estimated to cost
$30 billion. When NASA advocates compared it to Columbus's voyage,
Ike replied that he was "not about to hock his jewels" to send men
to the moon. Although neither Kennedy nor Johnson made space a
major issue in the 1960 election, most observers expected the new
administration to speed up the American effort to catch up with the
Russians in space. 34
Even before JFK had taken office, he had decided to put his running mate in charge of the space program, both to exploit Johnson's
reputation as a leading authority on space policy and to give him
something useful to do. On December 20, 1960, after a meeting in
Palm Beach, Kennedy announced that he would ask Congress to make
the vice-president the head of the Space Council. Congress approved
this change in April, 1961, enabling LBJ to become the formal head
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of the agency that he had forced on Eisenhower and that now could
begin to frame the comprehensive program that Johnson felt had been
so conspicuously lacking in the previous administration.35
LBJ's first task was to help Kennedy find a new head for NASA.
Jerome Wiesner, the president's science adviser who favored scientific experiments over manned space flight, had originally been given
this assignment, but the scientists whom he asked to serve all declined, in part because they feared that Johnson would not give them
a free hand in running NASA. In late January the vice-president conferred with Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, who had succeeded LBJ
as chairman of the Senate Space Committee. At Kerr's suggestion,
Johnson met with James E. Webb, an experienced bureaucrat who had
served in the Truman administration and who subsequently had
managed one of Kerr's oil companies in Oklahoma. A shrewd "offthe-ballot politician," as Tom Wolfe has described him, Webb at first
resisted LBJ's blandishments. But when Johnson persisted and Kennedy made a personal request, in which he assured Webb that he would
be free to run NASA, subject only to the president's wishes, Webb
agreed to serve. In time a close bond would develop between Webb
and Johnson, but the new head of NASA made sure from the outset
that the vice-president would not interfere with the way in which he
ran the agency. Also, as Webb noted later, he sensed that while Kennedy wanted to use Johnson's expertise and reputation on space, the
president was determined to make all the important policy decisions
himself.36
Johnson quickly learned the limits of his power. In a memo to
the president shortly after the inauguration, LBJ proposed that Kennedy delegate supervision over all national-defense and space agencies to the vice-president. On January 28, 1961, after a face-to-face
meeting in the Oval Office, JFK sent Johnson a formal reply, turning
him down gracefully. Instead of the general supervision that LBJ had
requested, Kennedy asked Johnson to preside over National Security
Council meetings when the president was out of Washington and to
maintain close liaison with all governmental agencies that were concerned with national defense and space. To help Johnson carry out
these duties, Kennedy told Johnson that he had asked these agencies,
including NASA, "to cooperate fully with you in providing
information." 3 7
The first major decision on space policy during the Kennedy administration came in late March, 1961. James Webb, after spending
six weeks in studying NASA's programs and budget, submitted a request for a 30 percent increase in NASA's Fiscal Year (FY) 1962 budget,
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so as to permit a possible moon landing, tentatively scheduled for the
mid 1970s, to take place before the end of the decade. David E. Bell,
the director of the Bureau of the Budget, immediately raised objections, pointing out that such a large increase, slightly more than $300
million, could only be justified if Kennedy wanted to reverse
Eisenhower's decision and make a moon landing part of JFK's effort
"to catch up to the Soviet Union in space performance."
This dispute forced the president to turn his attention to the space
program for the first time since taking office. In White House meetings
that Johnson attended on March 21 and 22, 1961, Webb and Bell
debated the question of expanding the space effort to include a moon
landing in the 1960s. Johnson spoke out strongly in behalf of Webb's
plans for a bigger program, but Kennedy finally decided to delay any
decision on a moon shot. Instead, he compromised by approving $125
million in additional funds for NASA, which would be enough to speed
up the work on the big boosters that would be necessary for flights
to the moon. 38
Events soon forced the president to act more quickly than he had
intended. On April 12, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the
first man to orbit the earth; once again, the United States, which had
postponed its first suborbital flight until May, had been outstripped
by the Russians in space. Two days later, Kennedy discussed the
possibility of an American flight to the moon as a way to get ahead
of the Soviets, but he delayed making any decision when Webb told
him that such an effort would require a program on the order of the
Manhattan Project and might cost as much as $40 billion. 39
A week later, after the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs had added a new
sense of urgency to the effort to restore American prestige, Kennedy
called Johnson to the White House to ask him to convene the Space
Council and to consider how the United States could catch up with
the Russians in space. In a brief memo the next day, April 20, the president spelled out the issues that he wanted LBJ to address. As part of
"an overall survey of where we stand in space," Kennedy specifically
wanted to know if "we have a chance of beating the Soviets ... by
a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man. Is there any other
space program which promises dramatic results in which we could
win?" 40
Although the president would wait for Johnson's report before announcing his decision, it is clear that Kennedy had already made up
his mind. His criticism of the Eisenhower administration for having
fallen behind the Russians in missiles and space, his campaign theme
of getting the nation moving again, and his intense sense of competi-
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tion with the Soviets in the Cold War-all pointed to a moon shot
as the only possible way of recapturing the respect of the world. And
the choice of Johnson, the foremost advocate of an expanded American
space effort, to conduct the study and to make the recommendations
suggests that Kennedy was only ensuring that the moon shot would
bear the stamp of authority. Johnson's role was to confirm a decision
that the president had already made.
Whether or not LBJ understood the part that he had been asked
to play, he performed it with skill and enthusiasm. Over the next two
weeks, he met regularly with the Space Council to ponder the questions that Kennedy had asked. For technical advice, Johnson relied
heavily on NASA officials, especially Dr. Hugh Dryden, a strong advocate of the moon-landing program that Eisenhower had refused to
promote but that was still being planned for the 1970s as Project
Apollo. On April 22, Dryden informed Johnson that there was "a
chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon and
return him to earth if a determined national effort is made." The
earliest possible date would be 1967, Dryden wrote, and the cost would
be about $33 billion, $10 billion more than the projected NASA budget
for the next ten years.41
LBJ then set out to develop a consensus for an accelerated Project Apollo. He expanded the Space Council deliberations to include
Senators Robert Kerr and Styles Bridges, the chairman and the ranking GOP member of the Senate Space Committee, and he personally
chose three private citizens to represent the general public-Frank
Stanton of CBS, Donald Cook of American Electric Power Service,
and George Brown, head of Brown and Root, the major Houston construction firm. All three were businessmen, and two, Cook and Brown,
had been closely associated with Johnson in the past. LBJ also went
outside the Space Council to consult with the leaders of the House
Space Committee and with three key governmental military and scientific spokesmen, General Bernard A. Schriever of the air force, Admiral John T. Hayward of the navy, and NASA's Wernher von Braun.
The advice that Johnson received from these different sources all
pointed to the same conclusion. Speaking for the businessmen, Cook
stressed the importance of gaining "leadership in space," commenting that to strive for anything less would mean "a second-rate program, worthy only of a second-class power." General Schriever
thought that it was "overridingly important" for the United States
to win the space race with the Russians. Johnson at first kept relatively silent, letting others air their views, but as the meetings of the
Space Council progressed, he began to speak out for a vigorous ap-
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proach, and he challenged those who expressed doubts by asking,
"Now, would you rather have us be a second-rate nation or should
we spend a little money?" 42
Johnson gave a clear indication of the direction in which he was
moving in an interim report to Kennedy on April 28, 1961. Stating
that nothing less than "world prestige" was at stake in the space race,
LBJ admitted that the Russians were still clearly ahead. But he added,
"The U.S. can, if it will, firm up its objectives and employ its resources
with a reasonable chance of attaining world leadership in space during this decade." The way to do this, he concluded, would be through
"manned exploration of the moon," which would have "great propaganda value" as well as providing the United States with the chance
to develop the experience and technology for "even greater successes
in space." Then, following Dryden's recommendations, Johnson told
Kennedy that a moon shot was possible by "1966 or 1967," at a cost
of an additional $10 billion over a ten-year period.43
With the April 28 memo to the president, Johnson's role in the
Apollo decision was essentially over. He had done precisely what Kennedy had wanted: LBJ had built a strong case for a moon landing and
had produced a unanimous recommendation from the bureaucracy.
On May 8, Johnson submitted a much-longer document to Kennedy;
this was a detailed budgetary analysis, prepared by NASA and the Pentagon, of the costs that would be involved in an accelerated moonlanding program. Then Johnson left on a three-week trip to Southeast
Asia. On May 25, two days after he returned, Kennedy announced his
decision in a speech to the Congress. Citing the support of LBJ and
the need to overtake the Russians in space, the president declared,
"I believe this Nation should commit itself to achieving the goal,
before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to earth." 44
There has been considerable speculation about one final aspect
of Johnson's contributions to the space program during his vicepresidency-the choice of Houston for the manned space center for
Project Apollo. Johnson and Webb have repeatedly denied that the vicepresident was responsible for building this $60 million facility south
of Houston, claiming instead that any political influence could be attributed to Congressman Albert Thomas of Houston, who chaired the
appropriations subcommittee that funded NASA. While undoubtedly
Thomas did exert his influence independently of LBJ, a recently released memorandum from Webb to Johnson on May 23, 1961, two days
before Kennedy announced his Apollo decision, offers new insight into
Johnson's role. Bringing LBJ up to date after his return from Southeast
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Asia, Webb pointed out that both Thomas and George Brown "were
extremely interested in having Rice University make a real contribution" to the Apollo program. Noting that Rice had 3,800 acres of land
available and that NASA needed to establish a new research facility
for Apollo, Webb told Johnson that he believed it would serve the national interest to build up a strong science and engineering center in
the Southwest, similar to those that had grown up around Harvard
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in New England and
around the University of California on the West Coast. Noting the
availability of easy water transportation of heavy rockets by barge to
Florida, Webb saw the Houston location near Rice as very attractive,
adding, "George Brown has been extremely helpful" in bringing this
possibility to his attention. 45
On September 19, 1961, NASA announced that it had chosen a
site south of Houston on which to build its manned spacecraft center
for Apollo, on one thousand acres acquired from Rice University.
Friendly journalists repeated NASA's explanation for the choice: "The
availability of year-round water transportation between centers gives
the United States a major advantage in the race for the moon with
the Soviet Union." Johnson had wisely followed Webb's advice to keep
a low profile: avoid any "end-runs," and let "the merit of this program"
permit it to move through Congress "with minimum political infighting."46 The choice of Houston for the manned space center was
not the result of crude political pressure by Lyndon Johnson; instead
it resulted from LBJ's foresight in involving George Brown in the
Apollo decision and in choosing a man as sensitive to political considerations as James Webb to head NASA. In his own indirect way,
LBJ played as important a role as Albert Thomas in making Texas the
focal point of the nation's expensive new effort in space.
VII

After Kennedy's tragic death in 1963, Lyndon Johnson was in a
position, as president, to carry through on the original Apollo decision. Yet once in the White House, he found that many other issues
competed with space for both attention and funding. Johnson never
abandoned his determination to beat the Russians to the moon, but
the course of events, especially the Vietnam War, forced him to impose some very real limits on the American effort in space.
Within a month of becoming president, LBJ had to face up to the
very high cost of the decision to land men on the moon. In December,
1963, Budget Director Kermit Gordon explained that an increase of
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$583 million in the NASA budget for FY 1965 made up almost onethird of all budget increases proposed for that year. Although Johnson
had promised Virginia's Senator Harry F. Byrd, whose support was vital
for pending legislation to cut taxes, that he would hold NASA spending to no more than $5 billion in 1965, the president finally told Webb
that he would receive $590 million in new funds, in order "to give
NASA a 'fighting chance' to accomplish the lunar landing within this
decade." Although NASA would exceed the $5 billion ceiling by nearly
$250 million, Webb promised to keep actual expenditures in 1965 just
under that magic figure. Congress finally appropriated $5.25 billion
"to maintain the lunar landing program and other manned space flight
programs on schedule," in the words of Budget Director Gordon.4 7
This expensive commitment made Johnson fearful that the
Republicans would hammer away at the Apollo program in the 1964
presidential campaign. In June, before the GOP convention, Milton
S. Eisenhower wrote to Johnson, on behalf of a Republican study group
that Eisenhower headed, to urge that the 1970 deadline for putting
a man on the moon be dropped so as to permit a "sounder program
for manned lunar exploration" at a much lower annual cost. Johnson
tactfully replied that while he would not let the target date become
a "straightjacket," he did not see any reason "to slacken in our nationally approved effort to reach the moon as soon as we can." 48
The nomination of Barry Goldwater led to considerable activity
in the White House in regard to space issues. Aware that Goldwater
had called Apollo "a terrible waste of money" and had declared that
"all manned space research should be directed by the military,"
Johnson's aides, led by press secretary George Reedy, prepared long
memos defending the space program and developed breakdowns of
NASA spending by congressional districts to show its beneficial effect. Campaign statements that were prepared by the Space Council
declared that under Kennedy and Johnson, the United States "has narrowed the space gap" inherited from Eisenhower; they also repeated
Johnson's May 20, 1963, statement, 11 I do not believe that this generation of Americans is willing to resign itself to going to bed each night
by the light of a Communist moon." 49
In the fall campaign, Johnson stressed other themes, notably
economic abundance and a responsible foreign policy, but he did make
occasional references to the continuing space race with the Soviet
Union. Citing the danger of letting "those who would destroy
freedom" achieve mastery of the universe, LBJ told a St. Louis audience
on October 21 that the United States "must maintain a leadership
for the free world in outer space." A week later, he declared in Los
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Angeles, "You cannot be first on earth and second in space." Yet earlier
that month the Russians had once again surpassed the United States
by sending the first three-man spaceship into orbit. Warned in advance
of the upcoming Soviet feat, Johnson had declined to issue a public
statement promising that the two-man American Gemini would be
launched early in 1965. 50
Once he had safely been returned to the White House, Johnson
took full advantage of the successful Gemini program to reinforce his
public image as the leading architect of the American space effort.
His aides planned Rose Garden ceremonies honoring the astronauts
and trips to space facilities as ways to achieve what one aide termed
"visible identification with the Space Program at a period of conspicuous successes." When Virgil I. ("Gus") Grissom and John W.
Young made the first Gemini flight in March, 1965, LBJ telephoned
them after their safe return. In a later visit to the manned space center
in Houston, Johnson claimed that the United States was no longer
behind in space; but he then went on to stress his peaceful goals: "The
race that we of this generation are determined to be first in is the race
for peace in the world." By the time of the fourth and fifth Gemini
flights in December, 1965, Johnson was telling the astronauts that
they had taken the nation "one-step higher on the stairway to the
moon" and that this effort not only increased "our knowledge of
technology" but also would lead "to a better life for all." 51
Despite this high-flown rhetoric, Johnson was aware of the danger
of overplaying his role. When aides asked him to approve of White
House ceremonies to honor the astronauts after each Gemini flight,
LBJ responded cautiously: "Let's play it by ear." He refused to be
pinned down by the television networks, which wanted to have cameras recording all of his telephone conversations with the astronauts
while in orbit. As he told Reedy, "I don't want overexposure attached
to me." Yet the president was aware of Trendex polls that documented
the strong public interest in the space program, with 69 percent approving the commitment to put a man on the moon before 1970.52
In his own shrewd way, LBJ was trying to continue to extract the maximum political benefit from a program that he still believed was serving the national interest.

vm
Throughout his presidency, Lyndon Johnson faced two major and
closely related questions concerning space policy. The first dealt with
the future: What goal should the United States seek beyond the moon

236

I

ROBERT A. DIVINE

landing? The answer to that question increasingly came to depend
on the available funding. Two developments in the mid 1960s-the
expensive Great Society domestic programs and the unexpectedly high
expenditures for the Vietnam War-caused a serious financial squeeze
that tested LBJ's commitment to winning the space race and led to
a sharp reduction in NASA's budget.
The issue of future space programs grew inescapably from the
budget process itself. On January 30, 1964, the president asked James
Webb to "review our future space exploration plans" and give him a
progress report by May 1 and final recommendations by September
1. Johnson acted at the suggestion of his new science adviser, Donald
F. Hornig, who pointed out the need to have a clearer idea of the nation's space goals in making decisions about specific budget items,
such as a controversial nuclear rocket. The goal, Johnson told Webb,
was to match "hardware and development programs to prospective
missions." 53
In his interim report in May, Webb began by stressing the progress that had already been made on a "ten-year $35 billion program"
that was directed toward a moon landing by the end of the decade.
Then in very broad terms, he sketched out possible future efforts, ranging from manned exploration of the moon to unmanned flights to the
nearer planets, including "the landing of an instrumented payload on
the Martian surface," a step that could help in "unraveling the longterm history and evolution of the solar system." Webb promised that
in his September report he would evaluate these various possibilities
and make some specific recommendations for the president to
consider. 54
After requesting several extensions, Webb sent LBJ his final report
in February, 1965. It was brief, cautious, and quite conservative in its
conclusions. There was no mention of manned flights to the planets
or even of an orbiting space laboratory. Instead, Webb focused on two
projects: The first would be "the exploration of Mars through the use
of large unmanned soft-landing spacecraft." Calling this "a major
undertaking" that would eventually cost more than $1 billion, Webb
recommended aiming for a 1971 flight, with a possible fly-by of Mars
in 1969. The second, which was soon termed Apollo Applications,
was "a systematic program" of manned flights around the earth and
to the moon, which would use the Saturn rockets and the Lunar
Module that had been developed for Apollo. The result, Webb explained, would be "to extend into the new medium of space the leadership we now have an aeronautics."
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Although Webb did attach a report by the Future Programs Task
Force, which outlined longer-range missions for the 1970s and 1980s,
such as orbiting space stations and the manned exploration of Mars,
he limited his recommendations for the present to the unmanned
Mars soft landing and the Apollo applications. These projects would
not require any new rocket boosters, would "round out and strengthen
our basic on-going space effort," and would do so "efficiently and at
acceptable cost." This last consideration was clearly uppermost in
Webb's thinking; presumablY, it was what he thought Johnson wanted.
White House aide Jack Valenti summed up Webb's report in an accompanying memo to LBJ in which he pointed out, "These recommendations require no major new launch vehicle systems ... and
assume that resources on the order of those currently programmed
($5¼ billion per year) will continue to be available." 55
Webb's report reflected Johnson's determination to make the
Apollo program his administration's primary goal in space and to avoid
making any other commitments for the future. A report that was
prepared by two Space Panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee in 1966 reinforced this position by calling simply for "a balanced effort" for the post-Apollo space program. While this report
mentioned lunar exploration and unmanned planetary probes that
would lead ultimately to manned flights to nearby planets, science
adviser Hornig carefully added, "The Panels considered and rejected
the idea of setting a new dominating space goal, such as a manned
landing on Mars by a specific date."
Lyndon Johnson clearly had no interest in setting the agenda for
the space program of the future. Instead, faced with growing budgetary
pressures, he was intent on achieving the goal that he and Kennedy
had set for the nation in 1961-landing men on the moon before the
end of the decade. He would do everything he could to advance that
goal through Project Apollo, even if it meant sacrificing vital first steps
toward more ambitious space ventures.56

IX
The first financial squeeze on NASA came in the fall of 1965,
when the administration began to plan its budget for the 1967 fiscal
year. Space spending had reached its peak in newly appropriated funds
in FY 1965 at $5.25 billion; the amount for FY 1966 was only slightly
less, $5.17 billion. These figures were deceptive, however, for actual
expenditures in FY 1966 were running at an annual rate of $5.6 billion
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as Project Apollo began to reach full stride, using money that had been
committed but had not been spent in previous years.
The timing was unfortunate. The heavy NASA spending coincided
with the far-larger sums that were suddenly needed by the escalation
of the Vietnam War in 1965. On November 22, 1965, Budget Director
Charles Schultze, who had replaced Kermit Gordon earlier in the year,
informed Johnson that FY 1966 expenditures were running at a projected rate of $108.8 billion, more than $8 billion in excess of the $99. 7
that had been budgeted. Vietnam accounted for more than half of this
increase; but the space program, with an overrun of $500 million, was
the next-largest contributor, costing much more than any of the
domestic reform programs. 57
Table 8.1. The United States Space Budget, 1959-69 (in $ millions)

Fiscal Year
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Appropriations
for NASA
305.4
523 .6
964.0
1,824.9
3,673.0
5,099.7
5,249 .7
5,174.9
4,967.6
4,588.8
3,990.9

Expenditures
by NASA
145.5
401.0
744.3
1,257.0
2,552.4
4,171.0
5,092.9
5,933 .0
5,425 .7
4,723.7
4,251.7

Sources: Homer Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 382; Richard Hutton, The Cosmic Chase (New
York: New American Library, 1981), p. 201.

On the next day, Johnson sent a memo to the heads of all departments and agencies. Citing "the current expenditure outlook and all
the uncertainties in Southeast Asia," he asked them to hold spending
"to the absolute minimum required for carrying out essential responsibilities." Equally important, he summoned these officials to his
ranch in Texas in mid December to review their FY 1967 budget requests. The need for fiscal restraint was reinforced by a memo from
Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, who
told Johnson that the only way LBJ could avoid asking Congress for
an immediate tax increase would be to keep spending for 1967 under
$ll0 billion. 58
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The economy drive that was necessitated by the Vietnam War led
Budget Director Schultze to propose a cut of approximately $300
million in NASA's requested allotment. Giving "the manned lunar
landing schedule" the highest priority, Schultze made most of the cuts
in post-Apollo programs, notably Apollo Applications and the 1971
Mars soft landing. Webb fought hard for these future programs, forcing the budget director to acknowledge that his cuts would have
"political repercussions" with both Congress and the aerospace industry. Johnson backed Schultze by agreeing to the $300 million cut,
which put the NASA budget at an even $5 billion, but the president
drew the line there. When Schultze submitted a plan for reducing the
total budget by another $2 billion that would include a $300 million
further reduction for NASA, Johnson refused, because the additional
cut would mean delaying the moon landing until the 1970s.59
The FY 1967 budget cuts put James Webb in a very difficult position. Within the administration, he fought hard for a large-enough
NASA budget to fund unmanned flights to the planets and to conduct basic scientific research as well as to carry out Project Apollo.
Yet the scientific community, which favored unmanned flights and
was skeptical about the moon landing, pushed hard for more money
for space science. And in Congress, advocates of the space program
on the key appropriations committees sought even more funding, both
out of conviction and out of political consideration for the economic
stimulus that the space program was providing for their constituents.60
The situation became particularly difficult during the spring of
1966 as Webb sought to persuade Congress to approve the lower appropriations bills for NASA in FY 1967. Space "hawks" in Congress
resented cuts in the unmanned Mars flights and feared that the
Republicans would accuse the administration of permitting the Russians to move "permanently ahead in the space race." At the same
time, Webb asked Johnson for guidance on how to implement the
budget cut, since it would mean releasing "some 20,000 people . ..
from NASA operations, plus 60,000 from research and development
and an additional five to ten thousand from construction by July 1,
1967." 61
Although the two men conferred, there is no evidence of how LBJ
instructed Webb to handle these firings. By May, 1966, Webb was resorting to his ultimate weapon, the fear of Russia's beating the United
States to the moon. Claiming that he had done his best "to minimize
any political risk to your Administration" from the cuts in NASA's
budget, Webb warned that it would be impossible to maintain "a forward thrusting effort in space" in view of the reduced budget. Ap-
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parently referring to Luna 9, an unmanned Russian spaceship that
made a soft landing on the moon in early 1966, Webb added, "This
is particularly true in light of what the Russians are doing and are
going to do." The only way to regain the lead, he concluded, would
be for the United States to increase spending dramatically. "My judgment is that the 1968 budget will be a major turning point," Webb
concluded, "with indicated requirements on the order of $6 billion
of new obligational authority." 62
Although he must have known there was little chance of getting
$6 billion in the FY 1968 budget for NASA, Webb fought hard for this
goal. When Budget Director Schultze set a guideline of only $5.1
billion for NASA, Webb made his case for an additional $1 billion in
a letter to the president on August 26, 1966. He reminded Johnson
that in 1961, LBJ "had almost had to drive me" to recommend the
expensive moon-landing program to Kennedy. Yet in just five years,
with an expenditure of over $22 billion, they had built a space program that promised to reach the moon by 1969. Another NASA budget
in the $5 billion range for 1968, however, would be disastrous, leaving Webb with "no choice but to accelerate the rate at which we are
carrying on the liquidation of some of the capabilities which we have
built up."
It was not the fate of Apollo that was at stake, Webb continued;
rather, it was the future of the American space program. "There has
not been a single important new space project started since you
became President," he told Johnson. Although Webb was aware of the
heavy burdens that were being imposed by the competing demands
of the Great Society and the Vietnam War, he still felt that this failure
to prepare new space ventures was "not in the best interests of the
country." He regretted being so blunt, but the White House had recently asked him to draft a presidential speech on space, charting a course
"that would constitute a ringing challenge for the next half century,"
and he felt that he had to let LBJ know his true feelings. If the president chose to make such a "ringing challenge," Webb would back him
to the hilt; but such a commitment would require annual NASA
budgets on the order of $6 billion for the next few years. 63
Several weeks later, Charles Schultze sent to Johnson his rebuttal to Webb's August letter. He agreed with the director of NASA that
the issue was future space programs, not the moon landing. Affirming the need to "maintain its capability in manned space," including
such possibilities as earth orbital stations and even a manned flight
to Mars, Schultze still questioned the assumption that the United
States, for fear of falling behind the Russians, should do everything
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in space that was technically feasible. Above all, he challenged the
idea that it was necessary to strive to keep "the peak level of industrial
manpower" that had been achieved during the Apollo build-up. "The
space program," he reminded LBJ, "is not a WPA.
Schultze claimed that a continuation of a $5-billion annual
budget for NASA would carry only a slight risk of delaying Apollo
beyond 1969 by reducing the production of Saturn V boosters from
six to three a year. It would involve a setback for what he termed
"NASA's ambitious plans for unmanned scientific flights," pushing
back the soft landing on Mars to 1973, but still permitting Apollo Applications to proceed on schedule. The budget director specifically
denied that a $5-billion figure would force "the liquidation" of some
NASA capabilities, as Webb claimed. Instead, Schultze compared this
sum to the $2 billion that was being budgeted in 1968 for elementary
and secondary education and the meager $1.8 billion for the war on
poverty. "I don't believe," Schultze concluded, "that in the context
of continued fighting in Vietnam we can afford to add another $600
million to $1 billion in the space program in 1968." 64
Johnson finally resolved the dispute over the space budget in
December in a meeting at his Texas ranch, which was attended by
Webb, Schultze, and White House aid Joe Califano. This conference
was held after Webb had told Califano that out of loyalty to LBJ he
was ready to "fit the space program" to whatever "budget number"
that "Charlie [would] give him." In fact, the two antagonists had narrowed down their differences from approximately $1 billion to less
than $300 million. Schultze and Webb agreed that "we must continue
our manned space flight capability, . . . that we should not announce
a major new goal-like sending a man to Mars, that we can mount,
at a reasonable cost, a useful series of Post-Apollo flights" involving
"a number of important long-duration earth-orbit experiments."
They disagreed on two issues-namely, the cost of these future
programs and the budgetary margins that would be required in order
to ensure success. Schultze proposed limiting the amount that would
be budgeted for post-Apollo efforts in 1968 to $455 million, while
Webb wanted an additional $182 million for further tests of the equipment and for more scientific experiments. Webb placed ever greater
emphasis on his request for $100 million more for Apollo. He wanted
the money for insurance, as a cushion to provide financial flexibility
in case of any unexpected setbacks in the moon-landing program. All
the space flights to date, he pointed out, including the ten Gemini
missions, had gone well, but "the margins between success and failure
in these flights had been very thin." The budget cuts in 1966 and 1967
11
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had forced NASA to "steadily draw down our margins." He pleaded
for the extra $100 million for Apollo, as well as the $182 million for
future programs, so as to build in a greater margin of safety. "I realize
that these additional amounts are large," he concluded, "but I believe
that the impact of an unsuccessful space program-which we would
be risking unless they are provided-would be even more costly." 65
Despite this ominous warning, Johnson sided with Schultze and
held the NASA budget for FY 1969 to just over $5 billion. Webb took
this setback gracefully, telling LBJ that he would "strike a very positive
note" in explaining the administration's decision to the press and to
Congress, calling it part of a continuing effort "to deny the USSR a
hostile hegemony in space." Webb then sent the president the outline
of a proposed public statement, which referred to "a strong space program of which Americans can be proud." But the future, Webb explained, was not so certain. "The manned lunar landing schedules
must today assume the virtually total success of each test, each
delivery, each flight if we are to meet the target date." And unless the
administration were to begin building more Saturn boosters than was
currently planned, "we will have, at best, a costly gap; at worst, a lack
of space flight capability in the years to come." Thus Webb raised the
specter of a space gap in the 1970s, reminiscent of the very situation
that Johnson had warned the nation about after Sputnik. 66
Webb's fears reflected the zeal of the bureaucrat, not a measured
assessment of the Johnson space program. Despite the onset of the
Vietnam War in 1965, the amounts spent on space, as opposed to the
budget figures, actually rose in 1966 to $5.9 billion and remained at
a relatively high level of $5.4 billion in 1967. The ~ditors of Aviation
Week and Space Technology recognized this fact in praising Johnson
in January, 1967, for having resisted growing pressure from Congress
to make sharp cuts in space spending. 67
In fact, Johnson was pursuing what he perceived to be the continuing national consensus on space. A White House survey of the views
of congressional leaders in late 1966 revealed strong sentiment for cutting NASA's budget, especially the post-Apollo program. But no one
wanted to limit Apollo. Thus, Republican Congressman Gerald Ford
commented, "Do not touch the moon program," while Democrat Carl
Albert warned that the administration could not "take the risk of losing the race to the moon." Webb told associates that he thought LBJ
was beginning to lose "his original enthusiasm" and even had "become
indifferent" to the space program under the strain of Vietnam and the
resulting antiwar turmoil. 68 But LBJ's commitment to Apollo never
wavered. As a realist, he was forced to sacrifice the less-popular post-
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Apollo program in order to preserve his enduring priority-sending
an American to the moon ahead of the Russians.
X

What Webb had feared most finally occurred on January 27,
1967-a fire swept through the Apollo command module during a stationary test at Cape Kennedy, killing astronauts Roger B. Chaffee, Edward H. White ill, and Virgil I. Grissom. Johnson learned of the tragedy
that evening from Webb, who then took charge of the subsequent investigation and report, which was critical of NASA's procedures. By
letting his agency shoulder the blame, Webb spared the president from
political damage, but the space program never fully recovered. From
this time forward, there was growing resistance from the public and
Congress in regard to heavy spending for NASA, and there was increasing skepticism about the need to beat the Russians to the moon.69
A crisis in fiscal policy during the summer of 1967 proved to be
an even greater problem. Faced with a potential budget deficit of $29
billion as a result of the Vietnam War, Johnson decided to ask Congress for a 10 percent increase in income taxes. Even then, warned
economic adviser Gardner Ackley, without corresponding cuts in spending, the nation would face a runaway inflation that "would make
it almost impossible ... to sustain prosperity and job opportunities
after Vietnam. Aware that Congress would not raise taxes without
making major reductions in spending, Johnson decided to pare down
the FY 1968 budget, which was still in the appropriations stage in
Congress. 70
Johnson and Schultze quickly agreed that NASA spending in 1968
should be held to just under $5 billion, almost $600 million less than
the 1967 expenditure for space. To accomplish this goal, Schultze said
it would be necessary to reduce the 1968 appropriation by $500
million, cutting it from $5 billion to $4.5. Webb at first resisted, claiming that Apollo was "just now getting back to speed" after the fatal
fire and warning that the Russians would be "flying vehicles larger
than the Saturn V by next year." But once he understood that Johnson
was giving the tax increase highest priority, the NASA director agreed
to go along with the reduced appropriation, though he still hoped to
receive at least $4.6 billion.
Two issues remained to be settled. First, there was the question
of where to make the reductions in NASA's budget. Charles Schultze
outlined two alternatives: abandoning the 1969 target date for the
moon landing or cutting back sharply on all of the post-Apollo pro11
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grams. The budget director favored the first alternative, arguing that
it would be better not to sacrifice long-term goals in order to land on
the moon in 1969 when "technical problems" might make achieving
this goal impossible. "Why not make a virtue out of necessity," he
asked. But for Johnson there could be no abandonment of his and Kennedy's pledge to put men on the moon before the end of the decade;
at the president's insistence, the half a billion dollars that was cut
from NASA's budget came from such future programs as Apollo Applications and the soft landing on Mars.71
There was even more disagreement on how best to handle the
cuts in Congress. In the House, strong pressure had built up over the
summer to reduce NASA's budget by $400 million. Democratic leaders
were willing to fight against such cuts, but Budget Director Schultze
advised LBJ against such tactics, pointing out that the administration itself now planned to pare NASA spending by $500 million in
1968. "If the space program has to be cut this much," Schultze argued,
"it would be better to have the Congress do it." Moreover, the administration's acceptance of congressional cuts would "help in the
fight over the tax bill" by winning over conservatives who insisted
on reductions in spending and even by pleasing "some of the liberals
who have urged cuts in the space program rather than in the Great
Society program."
Webb once again found himself in opposition. He claimed that
any administration statements approving congressional reductions in
NASA's budget would be viewed as a betrayal by those who had loyally supported Johnson's space program from the beginning. "The
friends of the program," such as Republican Senator Margaret Chase
Smith of Maine, would deeply resent it if the president " 'knifed' the
very activities he had previously been urging them to support." At
the very least, Webb wanted the administration to remain silent and
let NASA "make the cuts internally."
Johnson sided with Schultze, issuing a pu,b lic statement endorsing the congressional cuts. Citing the threatened deficit of $29 billion
and the need for a 10 percent tax surcharge, LBJ declared, "The times
demand responsibility from us all." Much as he regretted the circumstances, he agreed that "we must now moderate our effort in certain space projects," but he reaffirmed his ultimate goal: "to master
the challenge of space." 72
The $500 million slice in NASA's budget caused Johnson great
personal anxiety. In late September, when Webb was about to go before congressional committees to endorse the budget cut, LBJ sent
him a confidential telegram. "Be sure to make abundantly clear that
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I do not choose or prefer to take one dime from my budget for space
appropriations for this year," the president told Webb. He only did so
because Congress "forced me to agree to effect some reductions or
lose the tax bill." 73
The outcome confirmed the conflicting views of Johnson's advisers. As Webb had predicted, space advocates in Congress felt
betrayed by the administration's about-face, with Senator Smith
declaring that LBJ had "literally pulled the rug from under those who
direct the space program." But after some delay, Congress did enact
the 10 percent income-tax surcharge, which Schultze felt was so
crucial to the economy. When Congress appropriated $4.59 billion for
NASA, Webb was able to cut enough from the future programs to hold
actual 1968 expenditures down to $4.83 billion, a reduction of almost
$500 million from his original estimate. And although Webb felt that
"confidence" in the achievement of the moon landing before the end
of 1969 had been lowered by the cuts, Johnson could still take comfort in Webb's assurance that "the goal of the manned lunar landing
in this decade is preserved." 74 Despite the Vietnam-induced increase
in taxes, LBJ's commitment to Apollo had survived intact.
XI

Lyndon Johnson's last year in the White House witnessed both
the continued decline in the space budget and the first tangible sign
that the United States would, in fact, land men on the moon by the
end of the 1960s. With little debate, the administration accepted congressional cuts that reduced NASA's funds in FY 1969 from $4.3 billion
to just under $4 billion. Although these reductions further weakened
future space programs, they did not affect the moon-landing schedule.
Before the end of 1968, two NASA flights put that effort on target:
in October, Apollo 7 successfully tested the spacecraft for the moon
shot on 165 orbits of the earth, and in December, Apollo 8 saw three
astronauts fly around the moon and return to the earth without
incident. 75
James Webb, unfortunately, was not able to preside over these
triumphs. In mid September, frustrated by growing opposition in Congress and by continuing budget cuts, he submitted his resignation to
President Johnson, who quickly accepted it. For the first time, Webb
felt free to make public his fear that cuts in the post-Apollo programs
would enable the Russians to win the space race. Commenting on
a recent unmanned Soviet flight to the moon, Webb claimed that
it proved that the Russians were developing capabilities in space
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"that could change the basic structure and balance of power in the
world." 76
Two of Johnson's assistants voiced sharp disagreement to the
president. Donald Hornig, the president's science adviser, called
Webb's statement "grossly exaggerated," arguing that the Russians,
who had not yet developed a booster as large as Apollo's Saturn V,
were at least a year behind the United States. Edward Welsh, head of
the Space Council, was almost as blunt, calling Webb's comment on
the Russian lead "inaccurate" and maintaining that "the U.S. has had
more successful missions to the Moon and to the planets than has
the USSR and has obtained more information about outer space in
these missions."
The president, who realized that his own role in cutting back on
NASA's budgets was involved, backed Webb to the hilt. His response
to Hornig's suggestion that the President's Science Advisory Committee make a public report in regard to Webb's charges was negative: "Drop
it! That is my feeling," he instructed his staff. He sent both Homig's
and Welsh's memos to Webb for a "prompt reply," suggesting that he
have "all his scientists ... support him and me." In his responses, Webb
reiterated his belief that the cuts that Congress had forced upon the
president, coupled with evidence of Soviet advances "across a broad
spectrum," meant that "the present trends are against the United
States." Johnson echoed this argument in his formal reply to Hornig
on October 10, in which he turned down a public report by the Science
Advisory Committee and defended Webb for loyally submitting to budget cuts which had been dictated by "overall fiscal requirements." 77
No one knew better than did Lyndon Johnson how hard Webb had
fought to preserve the post-Apollo programs; it was the president, not
the director of NASA, who had decided to sacrifice future space programs to ensure the success of Apollo. The attacks on Webb served
only to strengthen the bond between the two men. In his formal letter of resignation, Webb expressed his appreciation for LBJ's trust and
then added, "You never failed to base your actions on a deep understanding that the space program, perhaps more than any other, opens
mankind's door to the future." LBJ was equally appreciative. At a
ceremony marking the success of Apollo 7, he awarded to Webb
NASA's Distinguished Service Medal, and after the flight of Apollo
8 to the moon and back, Johnson termed Webb "the single man most
responsible" for the success of the space program and "the best administrator in the Federal Govemment." 78
Apollo 8 did in fact mark a triumphal finale for Johnson's contributions to the American space effort. During the six-day flight to
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the moon, the president spoke both to the astronauts and to their
wives by telephone, as TV cameras recorded the scene in the Oval
Office. On December 26, with the Apollo spacecraft on its way back
to earth, Joe Califano told LBJ that this mission indicated "the near
certainty that we will be the first to land on the moon." Johnson apparently agreed, telling Webb the next day that "I have never been
more proud of American scientific accomplishment than I am today."
Apollo 8 touched off what one NASA official described as an "unprecedented wave of popular enthusiasm"; Time magazine even
scrapped its original choice for "Man of the Year" in favor of Frank
Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. Anders, the three
astronauts who had flown around the moon.
For Johnson, Apollo 8 was a fitting climax to all of his endeavors
since Sputnik. In a White House ceremony on January 9, 1969, honoring Borman, Lovell, and Anders, LBJ recalled the early days of the
struggle: "There were those men in our government who ten years
ago fought to guarantee America's role in space .... I am glad that
I was one of them." Noting that this was the last time he would take
part in a space ceremony as president, Johnson concluded, "I am proud
that I have stood with the space effort from its first days-and I am
so glad to see it now flower in this most marvelous achievement." 79
His pride was justified. From the time that he chaired the
Preparedness Subcommittee hearings through his service as head of
the Space Council under Kennedy, he had set forth the goal of achieving American preeminence in space. One can question the sincerity
of his initial motivation, mixing, as it did, poiitical expediency with
concern for the nation's welfare. And one can also argue that Johnson
placed too strong a nationalistic emphasis on the new frontier of space,
reducing a vital scientific quest to a Cold War cliche. But Johnson's
steadfast dedication to the goal of putting a man on the moon can
never be doubted. His determination overcame all the obstacles, even
the competing claims of the disastrous Vietnam War, to making good
on the pledge that he and Kennedy had made to the nation.
In addressing Congress after Apollo 8, Frank Borman said that
Archibald MacLeish had best captured "the feelings that we all had
in lunar orbit" in a prose poem that MacLeish had written for the
New York Times in December, 1968, as Borman, Lovell, and Anders
were circling the moon. Lyndon Johnson must also have appreciated
the poet's tribute to his finest achievement:
To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in
that eternal silence where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders
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on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the
eternal cold-brothers who know now they are truly brothers.8 0
Notes
1. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the
Presidency, 1963- 1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart&. Winston, 1971), passim;
George Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews &. McMeel,
1982), p. 13; George Reedy oral history interview, Dec. 20, 1983, by Michael
Gillette, tape 11, p. 36. All cited manuscripts and oral history interviews are
in the Johnson Library unless otherwise noted. Alfred Steinberg, Sam Johnson 's
Boy: A Close-up of the President from Texas (New York: Macmillan, 1968),
pp. 479-80.
2. Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 272; transcript of interview with President
Johnson by Walter Cronkite, July 5, 1969, pp. 2- 3.
3. Telegram, Symington to Russell, Oct. 5, 1957; telegram, George
Smathers to Russell, Oct. 7, 1957, Richard Russell Papers, University of
Georgia Library, ser. 15, box 403; transcript of telephone conversation between
LBJ and Neil McElroy, Oct. 21, 1957, Reedy: Subcommittee, Senate papers,
box 433.
4. Russell to Carl Marcy, Jan. 9, 1958, Russell Papers, ser. 1, J. General,
box 9.
5. Solis Horwitz to Russell, Oct. 7, 1957, Russell to Symington, Oct. 7,
1957, and Russell to Smathers, Oct. 7, 1957, Russell Papers, ser. 15, box 403.
6. Enid Curtis Box Schoettle, "The Establishment of NASA," in
Knowledge and Power: Essays on Science and Government, ed. Sanford A.
Lakoff (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 185-86; Solis Horwitz oral history
interview, June 9, 1969, by Paige Mulhollan, pp. 15-16; Horwitz to Neil
McElroy, Oct. 11, 1957, and Horwitz to Johnson, Oct. 11, 1957, Preparedness
Subcommittee, Senate papers, box 355; Johnson-McElroy telephone transcript,
Oct. 21, 1957, Senate papers, box 433.
7. Reedy to Johnson, Oct. 17, 1957, Reedy: Memos, Senate papers, box
420.
8. Johnson speeches, Tyler, Texas, Oct. 18, 1957, and Austin, Texas, Oct.
19, 1957, Statements file, box 22.
9. Russell to Robert B. Troutman, Nov. 9, 1957, Russell Papers, ser. 15,
box 403; Reedy to Johnson, undated, Reedy office files, Senate papers, box
421; telephone conversation, Johnson and Styles Bridges, Nov. 5, 1957, Congressional file, LBJA (Lyndon Baines Johnson Archive), box 40.
10. Johnson press release, Nov. 4, 1957, Statements file, box 23.
11. Telephone transcript, Johnson and Bridges, Nov. 5, 1957, Congressional file, LBJA, box 40; Dulles to Johnson, Oct. 26, 1957, and Johnson to
Dulles, Oct. 31, 1957, Famous Names, LBJA, box 3.
12. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise
of Power (New York: New American Library, 1966), pp. 204-5; Donald C. Cook
oral history interview, June 30, 1969, by Thomas H. Baker, p. 25; Edwin L.
Weisl, Sr., oral history interview, May 13, 1969, by Joe B. Frantz, p. 10; Cyrus
R. Vance oral history interview, Nov. 3, 1969, by Paige Mulhollan, pp. 1-2;

JOHNSON AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE

I

249

Horwitz oral history, p. 17; Reedy oral history, tape 11, p. 34; Johnson to Russell,
Nov. 8, 1957, Russell Papers, ser. 15, box 403.
13. Reedy to Johnson, Nov. 23, 1957, Reedy: Memos, Senate papers, box
421.
14. Reedy to Johnson, undated, Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate
papers, box 355; Reedy to Johnson, undated, Reedy to Johnson, Nov. 11, 195 7,
and Rowe to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1957, Reedy: Memos, Senate papers, box 421.
15. Minutes of Preparedness Subcommittee meeting, Nov. 22, 1957,
Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate papers, box 405.
16. Reedy to Johnson, Oct. 17, 1957, Reedy: Memos, Senate papers, box
420; Johnson to Eisenhower, Dec. 6, 1957, Famous Names, LBJA, box 1.
17. "Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs," Hearings before the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on the Armed
Forces, U.S., Senate, 85th Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 1-3.
18. Ibid., pp. 22- 23, 505- 6, 614-15.
19. Press releases, undated, Preparedness Subcommittee, Senate papers,
box 355; Johnson to E. L. Kelly, Jan. 23, 1958, Johnson to John L. Dore, Jan.
9, 1958, and Johnson to Mrs. Thomas E. Whitehead, Jan. 16, 1958, Armed
Services, 1958 Subject files, Senate papers, box 588; speeches to Dallas Chapter,
American Jewish Committee, Nov. 29, 1957, to Wichita Falls Junior Chamber
of Commerce, Nov. 30, 1957, and to Waxahachie Luncheon Clubs, Dec. 10,
1957, Statements file, box 23.
20. Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1958, Estes Kefauver Papers, University of
Tennessee Library, Knoxville, Tenn., ser. 11, box 5; Johnson to Russell, Dec.
23, 1957, Russell Papers, ser. 15, box 403.
21. Johnson speech to Democratic Caucus, Jan. 7, 1958, Statements file,
box 23.
22. Edwin L. Weisl, Jr., oral history interview, May 23, 1969, by Joe B.
Frantz, p. 2; Steinberg, Sam fohnson 's Boy; p. 482; Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1970), p. 120; unsigned and undated memo, Siegel office files, Senate papers,
box 405; Vance oral history, p. 6; Booth Mooney, LB[: An Irreverent Chronicle (New York: Crowell, 1976), p. 102.
23. Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. fohnson, p. 208; Edwin Weisl, Sr., oral
history, p. 13; Weisl to Johnson, Feb. 3, 1958, Famous Names, LBJA, box 9.
24. Johnson to Russell, Jan. 29, 1958, Congressional file, LBJA, box 53.
25. Johnson to Anthony Marcus, Nov. 19, 1957, Satellite, 1957 Subject
files, Senate papers, box 355; Johnson to Vic Lindley, Jan. 28, 1958, Armed
Services, 1958 Subject files, Senate papers, box 588.
26. Alison Griffith, The National Aeronautics and Space Act: A Study
of the Development of Public Policy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1962), pp. 19-24; Gerald W. Siegel oral history interview, May 26, 1969, by
Thomas H. Baker, p. 40; Record of Organization of Special Senate Committee on Space, Feb. 20, 1958, Space Committee, Senate papers, box 357.
27. Johnson to Eisenhower, Mar. 25, 1958, 1958 Subject files: Space,
Senate papers, box 630.
28. Robert L. Rosholt, An Administrative History of NASA, 1958- 1963
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 10-11; Schoettle,

250

I

ROBERT A. DIVINE

"Establishment of NASA," pp. 229-39; Analysis of S.3609 with Proposed
Modifications, May 8, 1958, Russell Papers, ser. 9, A, box 3.
29. Edward C. Welsh oral history interview, July 18, 1969, by Thomas
H . Baker, p. 3; Edwin Weisl, Sr., oral history, p. 13; Reedy, Lyndon B. fohnson ,
p. 13; Reedy oral history, tape 11, p. 39.
30. "National Aeronautics and Space Act," Hearings before the Special
Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics, 85th Cong., 2d sess.
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 91, 258; Griffith,
National Aeronautics and Space Act, p. 93.
31. Siegel oral history, p. 45; Walter Jenkins to Johnson, June 25, 1958,
1958 Subject files : Space, Senate papers, Box 630; Johnson, Vantage Point,
p. 277; James R. Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir
of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 137-38.
32. Killian, Sputnik, p. 138; Johnson, Vantage Point, p. 277; Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, p. 170.
33. Griffith, National Aeronautics and Space Act, p. 18; "NASA," Senate
Hearings, pp. 6-7; Johnson to Ben F. Smith, Apr. 27, 1958, 1958 Subject files:
Space, Senate papers, box 630; Johnson speech to United Nations, Nov. 17,
1958, Space Committee, Senate papers, box 359. For further information on
the background and reaction to LBJ's UN speech see Statements file, box 27.
34. John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the Moon: Project Apollo
and the National Interest (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 35, 64-66.
35. Ibid., pp. 67-68; Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 278-79; Ken BeLieu to
Johnson, Dec. 17, 1960, Vice Presidential Security file, box 17; Welsh oral
history, pp. 5, 10.
36. Steinberg, Sam fohnson's Boy; p. 559; Leonard Baker, The fohnson
Eclipse: A President's Vice Presidency {New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp.
127-29; Cronkite interview transcript, p. 25; Tom Wolfe, The Right Stuff {New
York: Farrar Strauss &. Giroux, 1979), p. 226; James E. Webb oral history interview, Apr. 29, 1969, by Thomas H. Baker, pp. 3-10.
37. Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. fohnson, pp. 326-27; Reedy, Lyndon B.
fohnson, p. 133; Kennedy to Johnson, Jan. 28, 1961, John F. Kennedy, 1961,
White House Famous Names file, box 4.
38. Welsh to Johnson, Mar. 22, 1961, and Agenda for NASA-BOB Conference with the President, Mar. 22, 1961, Vice Presidential Security file, box
15; Webb oral histocy, pp. 14-15; Johnson, Vantage Point, pp. 279-80; Logsdon,
Decision, pp. 88-91, 95-100; Jay Holmes, America on the Moon: The Enterprise of the Sixties {Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1962), pp. 195-97.
39. Logsdon, Decision, pp. 101-6; Hugh Sidey, fohn F. Kennedy; President {New York: Atheneum, 1964), pp. 117-23.
40. Logsdon, Decision, pp. 108-10; Kennedy to Johnson, Apr. 20, 1961,
John F. Kennedy, 1961, White House Famous Names file, box 4.
41. Logsdon, Decision, pp. 59-61, 112-14; Welsh oral history, pp. 11-12;
Dryden to Johnson, Apr. 22, 1961, Vice Presidential Security file, box 17.
42. Logsdon, Decision, pp. 120-21; Holmes, America, pp. 199-200; Cook
oral history, p. 27; Welsh oral history, p. 14.
43. Johnson to Kennedy, Apr. 28, 1961, John F. Kennedy, 1961, White
House Famous Names file, box 4.

JOHNSON AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE

J

251

44. Holmes, America, pp. 201-2; Welsh oral history, pp. 16-19; Logsdon,
Decision, pp. 123-28.
45. Baker, fohnson Eclipse, pp. 126-27; Webb oral history, pp. 18-21; Webb
to Johnson, May 23, 1961, Vice Presidential Security file, box 17.
46. Rosholt, Administrative History of NASA, p. 214; Holmes, America,
p. 32; Webb to Johnson, May 23, 1961, Vice Presidential Security file, box 17.
47. Gordon to LBJ, Dec. 14, 1963, and Jan. 23, 1964, White House Central Files (hereafter cited as WHCF), Ex FI 4, box 21; Webb oral history, pp.
38-39; LBJ to Gordon, Dec. 23, 1963, WHCF, Ex FI 4/ FG 260, box 30; Edward Welsh to LBJ, Aug. 14, 1964, WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
48. Milton Eisenhower to Johnson, June 2, 1964, and Johnson to
Eisenhower, June 29, 1963, WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
49. "Statements of Barry M. Goldwater on Space Exploration," George
Reedy office files, box 29 (1498); undated memos by Reedy, "Space 1963-1964,"
Reedy office files, box 19 (1404); Richard Callaghan to Paul Southwick, Mar.
16, 1964, Space, Fred Panzer office files, box 519; Welsh to Southwick, Apr.
27, 1964, Space, Panzer office files, box 516; Space Council brochure, undated,
Space (Outer), Bill Moyers, office files, box 134.
50. Public Papers of the Presidents: fohnson, 1963-64, 2 vols. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), 2:1397, 1496 (hereafter cited as Public
Papers); Hayes Redmon to Moyers, Oct. 11, 1964, C.F. OS 2, box 75.
51. Horace Busby to Johnson, Feb. 24, 1965, NASA Visit, Horace Busby
office files, box 31; transcript of telephone conversation between Johnson and
Grissom and Young, Mar. 23, 1965, Space, Panzer office files, box 493; Jack
Valenti to Johnson, June 15 and Sept. 13, 1965, WHCF, Ex OS 4-1, box 8; text
of LBJ speech, June 11, 1965, Astronauts, Busby office files, box 35; Johnson
to Webb, Dec. 15, 1965, WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
52. Webb to Johnson, May 25, 1965; William Monroe to Reedy, May 18,
1965; Reedy to Johnson, undated; LBJ to Reedy, undated; Julian Scheer to
Moyers, Oct. 11, 1965-all in WHCF, Ex OS, box 6; Welsh to Johnson, Oct.
24, 1964, WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
53. Johnson to Webb, Jan. 30, 1964, and Hornig to Johnson, Jan. 29, 1964,
WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
54. Webb to Johnson, May 20, 1964, Space (Outer), Moyers office files,
box 134.
55. Webb to Johnson, Feb. 16, 1965, and Valenti to Johnson, Feb. 17, 1965,
WHCF, Ex OS, box 1.
56. Hornig to Johnson, Dec. 22, 1966, Donald Hornig papers, box 4; Welsh
oral history, p. 31.
57. Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space
Science {Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 381;
Schultze to LBJ, Nov. 22, 1965, WHCF, Ex FI 4, box 22.
58. Johnson memo, Nov. 23, 1965, Joe Califano to Johnson, Dec. 8, 1965,
and Ackley to Johnson, Dec. 17, 1965, WHCF, Ex FI 4, box 22.
59. List of Major Dollar and Politically Sensitive Items, WHCF, Ex FI 4/FG
260, box 30; Schultze to Johnson, Jan. 14 and 24, 1966, WHCF, Ex FI 4, box 22.
60. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, pp. 380-81; John Noble Wilford,
We Reach the Moon {New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 147-50; Welsh oral history,
pp. 29, 31.

252

I ROBERT A.

DIVINE

61. Edward Welsh to Johnson, Mar. 18 and Apr. 8, 1966, WHCF, Ex OS,
box 2; Joe Califano to Johnson, June 25, 1966, Henry Wilson to Johnson, Mar.
25, 1966, and Marvin Watson to Johnson, Mar. 16, 1966, WHCF, Ex FI 4, box
22.
62. Webb to Johnson, May 16, 1966, WHCF, C.F. OS, box 74; for information on the lunar soft-landing program see Clayton Koppes, f PL and the
American Space Program: A History of the Tet Propulsion Laboratory,
1936-1976 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 172-84.
63. Webb to Johnson, Aug. 26, 1966, WHCF, Ex OS, box 2.
64. Schultze to Johnson, Sept. 1 and 20, 1966, WHCF, Ex OS, box 2.
65. Califano to Johnson, Dec. 15, 1966, WHCF, Ex FI 4, box 23; Schultze
to Johnson, Dec. 16, 1966, and Webb to Johnson, Dec. 14, 1966, WHCF, Ex
FI 4/FG 260, box 30.
66. Webb to Johnson, Dec. 17, 1966, WHCF, Ex Fl 4/FG 260, box 30.
67. Preliminary Expenditure Figures for 1968 Budget, Dec. 17, 1966,
WHCF, Ex FI 4, box 23; clipping, "The Aerospace Budget," Aviation Week
and Space Technology, Jan. 30, 1967, in WHCF, EX FI 4/FG 260, box 30.
68. Survey of congressional opinion by Charles Schultze and Sam Hughes,
undated, WHCF, Ex Fl 4, box 23; Webb oral history, pp. 39, 42; Newell, Beyond
the Atmosphere, p. 380.
69. Jim Jones to Johnson, Jan. 27, 1967, President's Appointment file,
box 53; Bob Fleming to Johnson, Jan. 28, 1967, WHCF, Ex OS 4-1, box 8;
Wilford, We Reach the Moon , pp. 119-33.
70. Ackley to Johnson, Aug. 3, 1967, WHCF, Ex FG 11-4, box 62. For the
debate and decision to seek a tax cut see Chapter 2.
71. Schultze to Johnson, Aug. 11 and 14, 1967, WHCF, Ex FI 4/FG 260,
box 30; Webb to Johnson, Aug. 10, 1957, WHCF, Ex FI 4/FG 200, box 29.
72. Schultze to Johnson, Aug. 14 and 19, 1967, and Webb to Schultze,
Nov. 6, 1967, WHCF, Ex Fl 4/FG 260, box 30.
73. Johnson to Webb, Sept. 29, 1967, WHCF, C.F. FI 4/FG 260, box 43.
74. New York Times, Oct. 7, 1967, in National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Panzer office files, box 384; Schultze to Johnson, Nov. 3, 1967,
WHCF, Ex FI 4/FG 260, box 30.
75. Edward Welsh to Johnson, May 10 and Sept. 20, 1968, WHCF Ex OS,
box 3; Wilford, We Reach the Moon, pp. 193-96, 215-29.
76. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere, p. 285; New York Times, Oct. 1,
1968, and Greenville (S.C.) Herald Banner, Sept. 24, 1968, in National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, Panzer office files, box 384; Donald
Hornig to Johnson, Sept. 26, 1968, WHCF, Ex OS, box 3; Thomas Paine oral
history interview, Mar. 25, 1969, by Harry Baker, p. 8.
77. Hornig to Johnson, Sept. 26, 1968, Welsh to Johnson, Sept. 30, 1968,
William Hopkins to Webb, Oct. 1, 1968, Webb to Johnson, Oct. 1, 2, and 5,
1968, and Johnson to Hornig, Oct. 10, 1968, WHCF, Ex OS, box 3. The president's memo to Webb was never sent; instead, White House aid Larry Temple read it to Hornig's assistant over the telephone (Temple memo, WHCF,
Ex OS, box 3).
78. Webb to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1968, WHCF, Ex FG 260/A, box 294; unsigned memos, Nov. 2, 1968, and Jan. 9, 1969, President's Appointment file,
boxes 114 and 120.

JOHNSON AND THE POLITICS OF SPACE

I

253

79. Tom Johnson to Johnson, Dec. 26, 1968, Califano to Johnson, Dec.
26, 1968, and Johnson to Webb, Dec. 27, 1966, WHCF, Ex OS 4, box 4; Wilford,
We Reach the Moon, pp. 230-31; Thomas Paine to James Jones, Dec. 26, 1968,
and text of Johnson remarks, Jan. 9, 1969, President's Appointment file, box
120.
80. Wilford, We Reach the Moon, pp. 231, 232.

About the Contributors

Charles DeBenedetti received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois
and taught at the University of Toledo from 1968 until his death in
early 1987. He had a special interest in the relationship between
domestic peace and antiwar movements and U.S. foreign policy. He
was the author of The Peace Reform in American History (1980) and
the editor of a volume of essays entitled Peace Heroes in Twentieth
Century America (1986). The essay in this book was part of a larger
study of the antiwar movement in America from 1955 to 1975 that
he had been working on for many years.
Robert A. Divine is the George W. Littlefield Professor in American
History at the University of Texas at Austin, where he has taught since
1954. A specialist in American diplomatic history, his publications
include Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate,
1954-1960 (1978) and Eisenhower and the Cold War (1981) . He is
presently working on a study of Eisenhower and the Sputnik crisis.
Lewis L. Gould is the Eugene C. Barker Centennial Professor in
American History at the University of Texas at Austin. His most recent book is Reform and Regulation: American Politics from Roosevelt
to Wilson (1986). He is at work on a book about Lady Bird Johnson
and her beautification campaigns in the 1960s, which grew out of the
research for his essay in this volume.
Burton I. Kaufman received his Ph.D. at Rice University in 1966. He
is presently Professor of History at Kansas State University, where
he has taught since 1973. His areas of specialization are American
foreign policy and post-World War II America. Among his publications are Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy,
1953-1961 (1982) and The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command (1986). He is currently working on a history of the
Carter presidency and a study of U.S. foreign economic policy during
the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Donald F. Kettl is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. He earned a Ph.D. in political
science from Yale University; his publications include Government

256

I

ABOUT THE CONTRIBU1DRS

by Proxy: Performance and Accountability in American Government
and Leadership at the Fed (1986) . His research interests include public
administration and economic policy. Kettl currently is working on
as book investigating the management of the Pentagon and its relations with defense contractors.
Clarence G. Lasby is Professor of History at the University of Texas
at Austin and the author of Project Paperclip: German Scientists and
the Cold War (1975) . He is currently at work on a history of coronary
heart disease in twentieth-century America and a book about Lyndon Johnson's health policies.
Martin V. Melosi is Professor of History and Director of the Institute
for Public History at the University of Houston. His major research
fields include urban technology, environmental studies, energy history,
and public-policy history. His most recent book is Coping with Abundance: Energy and Environment in Industrial America (1985 ). His current research projects include a biography of Thomas Alva Edison and
a study of hazardous waste in the United States.

Index

Abell, Bess, 150, 154
Accidental President, The (Robert
Sherrill), S0n. 20
Acheson, Dean G., 41
Ackley, Gardner, 54-55, 57, 86, 238,
243; favors tax increase, 58-59, 61-68
Advancement of Knowledge for the
Nation's Health, The, 208
Africa, 81
Agency for International Development,
80, 83, 85, 100
Air Pollution, National Conference on,
135
Air Quality Act (1967), 136
Albert, Carl, 68, 242
Albert Lasker Medical Research Award,
183, 187, 201, 203
Algerian War, 28
Alliance for Progress, 80-81, 103-4
America in Vietnam (Guenther Lewy),
15
American Federation of Labor, 87
American Forestry Association, 165
American Friends of Vietnam, 36
American Medical Association, 193-97
American Petroleum Institute, 166
American Planning and Civic
Association, 129
American Roadbuilders Association, 165
America's Hidden Success: A
Reassessment of Twenty Years of
Public Policy (John E. Schwarz), 19n.
30
Anders, William A., 247
Antiwar movement, ll5, 165-66; and
civil-rights movement, 29; and
decision to deescalate, 43-44;
Johnson administration opposes,
39-42; Johnson administration's
tolerance of, 30-39; literature on,
45-48, 53 n. 74; and the media,
47-48; in Nixon-Ford years, 45;
political bases of, 24-27; public
opinion of, 27-28; tactics of, 28-29.
See also Johnson, Lyndon Baines;
Vietnam, North; Vietnam, South

Apollo, Project. See Project Apollo
Appel, James, 196
Arab-Israeli war (1967), 93
Army Engineers, Corps of, 124, 126,
132
Asia, 81
Asian Development Bank, 105, 109 n .
86
Aspinall, Wayne, 128
Astor, Brooke 160, 162
Atlantic Monthly, The, 54, 208
Atomic Energy Commission, 227
Audubon Magazine, 122
Aviation Week and Space Technology,
242
Ball, George W., 13, 17, 33, 92-93
Bank of America, 89
Bates, Leonard J., 114
Bator, Francis, 86
Bay of Pigs invasion, 230
Beautification campaign: appraisals of,
150-51; and the Great Society, 156;
and highways, 167-71; impact of,
164, 172; national, 164-67; origins
of, 153-54; in Texas, 171-72; and
Vietnam War, 165-67; in Washington,
D.C., 155-64 (see also Johnson,
Claudia Taylor; National Capital,
First Lady's Committee for a More
Beautiful)
Bell, David E., 230
Bennett, Hugh H., 114
Berger, Peter, 46
Berman, Larry, 13-15, 17-18
Berrigan, Daniel, 26
Berrigan, Philip, 26
Best and the Brightest, The (David
Halberstam), 54-55
Billboard Bonus Act of 1958, 167
Black, ·David S., 138
Boehringer, Gene, 151-52
Boggs, Hale, 68
Borman, Frank, 247
Bornet, Vaughn Davis, 8-9, 151, 184
Boston Globe, 193

258

I

INDEX

Bradlee, Benjamin C., 40
Braestrup, Peter, 47
Braun, Wernher von, 223, 231
Brewton, Charley, 219
Bridges, Styles, 219-20, 222, 231
Bridwell, Lowell K. , 168
Brown, George, 6, 231, 233
Brown, Herman, 6
Brown and Root Construction
Company, 6, 231
Bryce, Lord, 157
Budget, Bureau of the: and
appropriations for Vietnam, 60-61;
and health policy, 201; and proposed
Department of Natural Resources,
124; and the Regional Medical
Program, 199; and Task Force on the
Preservation of Natural Beauty, 129;
and water policy, 132
Bundy, McGeorge, 13, 17, 36, 86
Bush, Vannevar, 223
Byrd, Harry F., 234
Cain, James, 198-99
Caldwell, Lynton K., 122-23, 140-41
Califano, Joseph, 59, 119, 125, 132; and
income-tax surcharge, 64, 67-68, 70;
and space program, 241, 247
Cannon, Clarence, 84
Caro, Robert A., 4-7, 13
Carpenter, Elizabeth S. ("Liz"), 154,
163, 165; as first press secretary to
the First Lady, 150; and highway
beautification, 169-70
Carson, Rachel L., 113, 115-16, 121
Castro, Fidel, 26
Castro, Nash, 159
Cater, Douglas, 160, 198, 201, 203; and
American Medical Association, 196;
and medical-research policy, 205-7
Catholic Worker, 25
Central Intelligence Agency: and
antiwar movement, 35-36; and
Operation Chaos, 40-41
Chaffee, Roger B., 243
Chayes, Antonia, 155
Chicago Daily News, 197
Chiefs of Staff, Joint, 14-15, 17, 38
China, 24-25, 31, 38
Christian Century, 171
Church, Frank, 35
Civilian Conservation Corps, 115
Civil Rights Act: of 1957, 7; of 1964,
10; of 1968, 10
Civil-rights movement, 26

Clark, Clifford M., 43
Clark, Ramsey W., 40
Clean Air Act: of 1955, 135; of 1963,
136
Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966,
137
Clements, Earle, 154
Clergy and Laity Concerned about
Vietnam, 46
Cohen, Wilbur, 185; and the advisory
process, 200-201; and the Regional
Medical Plan, 196-97
Cold War, 24, 231, 247
Columbia Broadcasting System, 171
Commoner, Barry, 116
Communist party (U.S.A.), 26
Comroe, Julius H., Jr., 201-2, 209
Congressional Record, 170
Connor, John T., 168
Conservation, White House Conference
on, 118
Conservation Foundation, 116
Cook, Donald C., 221, 231
Cooley, Richard A., 123
Coronary Drug Project, 209
Council of Economic Advisers, 71, 86,
238; David Halberstam on, 54; and
LBJ, 57; recomends tax increase,
63-65; and tax cut of 1964, 55-56;
and Vietnam expenditures, 58
Council on Environmental Quality,
126-27
Cousins, Norman, 25, 36
Cox newspapers, 186
Credibility gap, 16, 38
Crevelli, John P., 123, 130
Cronkite, Walter, 218
Cuban missile crisis, 23, 25
Currier, Stephen, 162-63

Daily Texan, 152
Day, Dorothy, 25
DeBakey, Dr. Michael, 187, 201; on
LBJ's heart, 211; on LBJ's record, 208;
and President's Commission on
Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke,
190-93; and Regional Medicaf Plan
bill, 194-95; and Regional Medical
Plan implementation, 197-200
Defense Research and Engineering,
Office of, Director of, 127
de Gaulle, Charles, 85
Dellinger, David, 29, 46
Democratic National Convention
(1968), 44

INDEX
Dempsey, Edward, 194
Dickerson, Nancy, 150
Dickinson, Emily, 152
Diem, Ngo Dinh. See Ngo Dinh Diem
Dillon, C. Douglas: and advisory
process, 57; and balance-of-payments
deficit, 87; and tax cut of 1964, 56.
See also Dillon Committee
Dillon Committee: and gold crisis, 95;
and international monetary reform,
91
DiMattina, Vincent, 36
Dodd, Thomas, 36, 100
Dole, Robert J., 169
Dominican Republic, U.S. intervention
in, 38
Douglas, Paul H ., 40
Draper, Theodore, 48
Drew, Elizabeth, 208-9
Dryden, Hugh, 231-32
Dugger, Ronnie, 5-8, 50n. 12
Dulles, John Foster, 187, 220
Dunlap, Thomas, 133
Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 184
Eckardt, Wolf von, 155
Ecology Action, 116
Economic Advisors, Council of. See
Council of Economic Advisers
Economic policy, domestic
-and the advisory process, 55-60, 63,
67; David Halberstam on, 54-55, 63;
and fiscal 1967 budget, 60-62; and
inflation, 54, 63, 66, 73; and
monetary policy, 59, 61 - 62, 64-66,
72-73; and the "new economics,"
57-58, 61, 67, 72; and Vietnam
expenditures, 58, 60, 72. See also
Council of Economic Advisers;
Federal Reserve Board; and Johnson,
Lyndon Baines
-and income-tax surcharge of 1968,
54, 97; and advisory process, 63-66;
congressional opposition to, 67-69;
effectiveness of, 72; LBJ and, 63, 65,
67-69; passage of, 70-71; public
opinion of, 66
-and tax cut of 1964: LBJ and, 56;
origins of, 55-56; passage of, 56-57
significance of, 54, 57-58
Economic policy, foreign
-and balance-of-payments: Congress
and, 97; deficit in-1958-1964,
84-86, in 1965, 88, in 1966, 90, in
1967, 94; European reaction to, 87,

I

259

92; and gold drain, 84-85; and gold
crisis, 93-96; impact of deficit on,
85; and Interest Equalization Tax of
1964, 86-87; and International
Monetary Fund, 85-86, 91; and
Special Drawing Rights, 91-92, 96;
and sterling crisis, 93-94; and Trade
Expansion bill of 1968, 97; and
Vietnam War, 88-91, 97
-evaluation of, 96-97, 103-6; and
international monetary policy, 91-97;
103-4; LBJ on, 80-82; and Vietnam
War, 80, 97, 103-6. See also Agency
for International Development;
Federal Reserve Board; and Johnson,
Lyndon Baines
-and foreign aid: congressional
opposition to, 80, 97-103; under
Eisenhower and Kennedy, 79-81; in
fiscal 1964, 82-83; in fiscal 1965,
83-84; in fiscal 1966, 88; in fiscal
1967, 98-100; in fiscal 1968,
100-102; in fiscal 1969, 102-3; and
Great Society, 101; and presidential
authority, 100-102; significance of,
104; and Vietnam War, 84, 88,
97-100, 103
Eighty-ninth Congress, 131, 184
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 126, 185, 230;
and balance-of-payments deficit, 89;
and environmental policy, 118-19;
and fiscal policy, 56; and foreign aid,
79-81, 84; LBJ compared to, 209;
Library, 184; and missile hearings,
218-19, 222, 224, 230; and NASA,
creation of, 226-27; rejects lunarlanding program, 228; and "space
gap," 234; and Sputnik, 225
Eisenhower, Milton S., 234
Endangered Species Act: of 1966, 133;
of 1973, 133
Endicott, Kenneth, 205, 208-9
Environment: A Challenge for Modem
Society (Lynton K. Caldwell), 122-23
Environmental Defense Fund, 116
Environmental policy: administration
of, under LBJ, 124-28; and citizens
groups, 114-16; the courts and, 146n.
48; and the Great Society, 122-23,
128, 130, 134; historiography of, 113,
116-17; and JFK, 118-19; and Lady
Bird Johnson, 119-20; LBJ on,
121-23; and land management,
128-31; and legislation, 128, 131,
137-39; and New Conservation, 113,

260

I

INDEX

117-18, 121, 123- 24, 130-32, 140-42;
and New Deal, 114-15; and pollution
control, 134-38; in Progressive Era,
114; in urban areas, 138-40; and
Vietnam War, 123, 130, 140; and
water resources, 131-33; and wildlife,
133-34; since World War II, 115-16.
See also Beautification campaign;
Johnson, Claudia Taylor; Johnson,
Lyndon Baines; Udall, Stewart L.
Environmental Protection Agency,
126-27
Environmental Quality, Council on,
126-27
Evans, Roland, 58, 225, 248 n . 12
Exploring the fohnson Years (Robert A.
Divine, ed.l, vii, 18 n. 1
Export-Import Bank, 82, 105
Farber, Sidney, 187
Farr, Fred, 170
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 35, 40
Federal Power Commission, 124-26,
146n. 48
Federal Reserve Board, 54, 58; and
fiscal policy, 72-73; and gold crisis,
95 - 96; monetary policy of, 59,
61 - 62, 64-65
Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration, 133, 137, 145 n. 35
Federal Water Recreation Act, 132
Fishel, Wesley, 36
Fogarty, John, 187-88, 197, 199, 202,
210
Food for Peace (PL 480), 85, 105
Food for Work, 98
Foote, Emerson, 192
Ford, Gerald R., 41, 45, 242
Fordyce, Alice, 199
Foreign aid. See Economic policy,
foreign
Foreign economic policy. See Economic
policy, foreign
Forest Service, 124, 129
Fortas, Carolyn A., 160
Fowler, Henry, 57; on Asian
Development Bank, 105; and balance
of payments, 90-92; and Congress,
69; and fiscal policy, 61-62, 64-66;
and gold crisis, 93-94
Fowler, Mrs. Henry, 165
France, 92, 96
Francis, Sharon: and beautification,
157-60, 162-63, 170; on Lady Bird
Johnson, 166, 171

Friends of the Earth, 116
Fulbright, J. William, 24, 28, 38; and
foreign aid, 88, 98-102; and LBJ,
33- 34
Gagarin, Yuri, 230
Gardner, John W.: and medical-research
policy, 204, 206-7; opposes
Department of Natural Resources,
125; and Regional Medical Plan,
196- 97
Gaud, William S., 100
Gavin, James M., 28, 223
Gelb, Leslie, 47
Gemini, Project, 235, 241
Giant Food, 166
Gitlin, Todd, 48
Goldman, Eric, 184
Goldwater, Barry M., 25, 31, 58, 153,
234
Goodwin, Richard, 34
Gordon, Kermit, 57, 233-34, 238
Gorman, Mike, 187-88, 205, 207
Graham, Hugh Davis, 19 n . 5
Graham, Katharine, 156
Grant, Robert, 205
Great Britain, 93-94
Great Depression, 114-15
Great Society: and antiwar movement,
37; and environmental policy, 119,
122-23, 128, 134, 156, 164; and fiscal
policy, 61, 70, 72, 74; historians on,
8-13; and space program, 236, 240,
244; and Vietnam War, 14, 54-55
Grissom, Virgil I., 235, 243
Group of Ten, 92-93
Gulf of Tonkin incident, 17, 36
Halberstam, David, 54-55, 59, 63-64
Hallin, Daniel C., 47
Halprin, Lawrence, 160, 162-64, 172
Halstead, Fred, 46
Handler, Philip, 192
Harris, Louis, 66
Harris, Oren, 195-97
Harris, Richard, 183-84
Harry S. Truman Library, 184
Hays, Samuel P., 114, 116-17
Hayward, John T., 231
Head Start program, 154
Health Research Facilities Act, 185
Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke,
President's Commission on: LBJ
establishes, 189-92; literature on,
184; and medical-research policy,

INDEX
202-3; report of, 192-94
Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke
Amendments of 1965. See Regional
Medical Plan
Heart Disease and Cancer, Conference
on, 189
Heart-of-the-Year Award, 210
Heineman, Ben, 124
Heller, Walter, 55-57, 59, 65-66
Helms, Richard, 40
Highway Beautification Act, 151,
167- 71
Hill, Lister, 187-88, 219; and medicalresearch policy, 202-3, 206; and
Regional Medical Plan, 194, 197-98
Historic Sites Act of 1935, 139-140
Ho Chi Minh, 41
Hodges, Luther, 153, 167
Hollywood Patterns, 186
Hornig, Donald F., 127, 207, 236-37,
246
Horwitz, Solis, 218, 221
Housing Act of 1961, 139
Howar, Barbara, 150
Humphrey, Hubert H., 11, 32-33
Hurst, Willis, 198-99, 211
Ickes, Harold L., 114
Indochina, 25, 44
In Pursuit of Power: Southern Blacks
and Electoral Politics, 1965-1982
(Steven F. Lawson), 19n. 21
Inter-American Development Bank, 104
Interest Equalization Tax, 86-87
International Development, Agency for,
80, 83, 85, 100
International Development Association,
104
International Hydrological Decade, 132
International Monetary Fund, 85-86,
91-92
Intervention: How America Became
Involved in Vietnam (George McT.
Kahin), 16
Iraq, 101
Jackson, Henry M., 128
Jacobs, Jane, 153
Japan, 104
Javits, Jacob, 194
Jett, Sutton, 159-60
John F. Kennedy Library, 184
Johns Hopkins University, LBJ speech
at, 105
Johnson, Claudia Taylor (Lady Bird),

I

261

190, 194, 211; beautification of Texas,
171-72; and beautification of
Washington, D.C., 155-64;
conservation tours of, 165; criticism
of, 119-20, 170; description of,
153- 54; diary of, 17 4 n. 9; early
interest of, in beautification, 152-53;
early life and marriage of, 151-52;
and Highway Beautification Act of
1965, 168-71; ipfluence of, on LBJ,
119-21, 123, 128, 141, 156, 167-68,
200; literature on, 150-51, 173n. 4;
national beautification campaign of,
164-67; political style of, 166, 172;
record of, 171- 72; staff of, 154,
15 7-58. See also Beautification
campaign
Johnson, Lyndon Baines:
- and antiwar opposition, 33- 42
-and balance-of-payments policy,
85-97
-and beautification campaign, 156,
167-69
-biographers on, 3-8, S0n. 20
-and budgetary politics of space,
238-46
-and Commission on Heart Disease,
Cancer and Stroke (HCS), 189-91,
193-94
-economic record of, criticized, 54-55,
63-64
-elusiveness of, in public record,
viii-ix
-and environmental issues, 130-40
-environmental record of, 140-42
-and fiscal 1967 budget, 59-62
-and foreign aid, 80-84, 97-103, 106n.
15
-foreign economic policy of, assessed,
103-5
-health-care policy record of, 183-85,
209-11
-on history, 72-73
-and implementation of Regional
Medical Plan, 198-200
-and income-tax surcharge, 67-74
-and Latin America, 80-81
-on McCarthyism, 3 7
-and Manned Spacecraft Center, site
selection of, 232-33
-medical history of, 190, 211
-and medical-research policy, 201-10
-and missile program hearings, 220-25
-and NASA, establishment of, 226-28
-and New Conservation, 121-23

262

I

INDEX

-and "new economics," 63-67
-prepresidential career of, 4-8, 30-31,
80-81, 220-33
-and Project Apollo, initiation of,
228-31
-recent literature on, characterized,
17-18
-and Regional Medical Plan bill,
194-97
-and scientific community, 201-2,
207-8
-and space policy, assessment of,
246-47
-and space policy during
prepresidential career, 223-24
-and space policy for post-Apollo
period, 236-37
-and space race, 225
-and Special Albert Lasker Award,
183-84
-and speech at United Nations (1958) ,
228
-and Sputnik, reaction to, 217-18
-and tax cut of 1964, 55-58
-and Vietnam War management,
13-17, 43- 45
-on Vietnam War, 30-33
-and War on Disease during
prepresidential career, 18 7-88
-and Wise Men of foreign affairs,
41-43
-See also Antiwar movement;
Economic policy, domestic;
Economic policy, foreign;
Environmental policy; Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library; Space policy; War
on Disease
Johnson, Sam Houston, 35
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14-15, 17, 38
Joseph, Paul, 46
Kahin, George M ., 16-17
Karnow, Stanley, 3
Katz, James, 209
Kearns, Doris, 3
Kennan, George F., 28
Kennedy, Jacqueline, 150, 152
Kennedy, John F.: assassination of, 9,
82, 233; and balance-of-payments
deficit, 84-89; compared with LBJ,
10, 209; and environmental policy,
118-20, 139; and foreign aid, 79-82;
Library, 184; and Office of Science
and Technology, 126; and round of
tariff negotiations, 105; and space

policy, 228-33, 237, 240, 247; and
tax cut of 1964, 55-57; Vietnam
commitments of, 17; and War on
Disease, 185, 189
Kennedy, Robert F., 29, 34, 42, 44
Kennedy, Cape (Fla.), 243
Kerr, Robert, 229, 231
Khrushchev, Nikita, 222
Killian, James R., 227
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 39-40, 44, 164
Kintner, Robert, 40
Kluczynski, John C., 169
Korean War, 54, 60, 221
Kraft, Joseph, 34
Krim, Mathilde, 200
Lady Bird Johnson Park, 171
Land and Water Conservation Fund
Act, 130, 133
Lasker, Albert D., 159, 183, 186, 188,
192
Lasker, Mary W., 172, 185; and
beautification of Washington, D.C.,
156, 159-61; and Commission on
Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke,
188-91; and LBJ, 189, 197-201,
203-4, 206-7, 210; and medicalresearch policy, 202- 7; and Regional
Medical Plan, 197-200; and War on
Disease, origins of, 186-88
Latimer, Gene, 5
Latin America, 80-81
Laughing All the Way (Barbara Howar),
150
Laurence, William, 187
Lawrence, D. H ., 152
Lawson, Steven F., 19 n. 21
Lee, Philip, 207
LeMay, Curtis E., 221-22
Lewy, Guenther, 15
Lippmann, Walter, 24, 33, 36
Little Rock (Ark.) crisis, 219
Long, Huey P., 31-32
Long, Russell, 195
Losing Ground (Charles Murray), 12
Louchheim, Katie, 154, 158-59
Lovell, James A., 247
Luna 9, 240
Lynd, Staughton, 38
Lyndon B. fohnson: A Memoir (George
Reedy), 7-8, 248 n. 1
Lyndon B. fohnson: The Exercise of
Power (Rowland Evans and Robert

Novak), 248 n. 12
Lyndon B. Johnson Foundation, vii

INDEX
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library,
materials in: on administrative
history, 145 n. 36; on beautification,
172, 175n. 17, 175-76n. 31, 176n.
36; on economic policy, 55, 77-78;
on environmental policy, ll8, 144n.
21, 146n. 47, 148n. 73; on Lady Bird
Johnson, 151; on the media, 16; on
War on Disease, 184-85, 191,
2ll-12n. 3
Lyndon fohnson and the American
Dream (Doris Kearns), 3
Lyndon fohnson's Dual War: Vietnam
and the Press (Kathleen J. Turner), 16
McCarthy, Abigail, 150-51
McCarthy, Eugene, 29, 42, 44
McCarthy, Joseph, 7
McCarthyism, 31-32, 37
McCormack, John W., 82
McElroy, Neil, 219
McCrory, Mary, 34
MacLeish, Archibald, 247
McNamara, Robert S.; and fiscal policy,
55, 59-60, 64; and Vietnam policy,
13, 17
McPherson, Harry C., 185
Macy, John W., Jr., 166
Mahon, George H., 68, 169
Mahoney, Florence, 186, 200
Malechek, Dale, 194
Man and Nature (George Perkins
Marsh), ll4
Mansfield, Mike, 33
March on the Pentagon to Confront the
Warmakers, 29
Marin, Peter, 46
Marmor, Theodore, 184
Marmorston, Jessie, 202
Marsh, George Perkins, ll4
Marshall Plan, 80, 103
Martin, William Mcchesney, Jr., 56,
58-59, 64, 96
Matusow, Allen J., 10-12, 184
Mayo Clinic, 211
Meany, George, 87
Medal of Freedom, 201
"Me decade," 3
Medicare, 14, 183, 189, 204; and
American Medical Association,
194-96; literature on, 12, 183-84
Mills, Wilbur D., 60-64, 67-72
More Power Than We Know (David
Dellinger), 53n. 70
Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., ll4

I

263

Morse, Wayne, 33
Moss, Frank E., 124
Moyers, Bill, 30, 54, 72-73, 168
Muir, John, ll4
Mundt, Karl E., 82
Murphy, Robert D., 41
Murray, Charles, 12- 13
Muskie, Edmund S., 125, 128, 136-37
Muste, A. J., 25
Mutual Security Act, 80
Nash, Roderick, 129
National Advisory Cancer Council, 206
National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics, 226-27
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 217, 226-33, 237-46
National Audubon Society, ll6
National Cancer Institute, 187, 206,
209
National Capital, First Lady's
Committee for a More Beautiful, 171,
174n. 9; established, 155-57; and
Washington, D.C., beautification, 163
National Capital Housing Authority,
161
National Capital Planning
Commission, 154
National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy (SANE), 25, 28
National Congress on Regional Medical
Centers, 196
National Council of State Garden
Clubs, 165
National Environmental Policy Act,
113, 117
National Geographic, 162
National Health Education Committee,
187
National Heart Institute, 186-87, 200,
205, 209
National Historic Preservation Act,
139-40
National Institute of Health, 185,
18 7-88; and medical-research policy,
201-2, 204-8; and Regional Medical
Plan, 198-99. See also War on
Disease
National Institute of Mental Health,
155
National Library of Medicine, 192
National Park Service, 113, 139-40, 159
National Register of Historic Places,
140
National Security Council, 227, 229

264

I

INDEX

National Survey of Community Solid
Waste Practices, 139
National Trail System Act, 130
National Wildflower Center, 172
National Wildlife Federation, 116
National Youth Administration, 5-6,
152
Natural Beauty, White House
Conference on: and beautification,
119, 156-57, 168; the First Lady and,
166-67
Natural Beauty and Conservation,
National Youth Conference on, 167
Natural Resources, Department of,
124-25
Natural Resources Advisory
Committee, 118
Natural Resources Defense Council,
116
Nelson, Gaylord, 127-28
New Conservation. See Environmental
policy
New Deal, 5-6, 11, 31, 106, 114-15,
117, 122-23, 141
New England Journal of Medicine, 193
New Hampshire, 1968 primary election
in, 42
New York Herald Tribune, 193
New York Times, 33, 35, 38, 187, 198,
247
Ngo Dinh Diem, 99
Nimetz, Matthew, 119
Ninetieth Congress, 131, 133
Nixon, Richard M., 44-45, 71, 211
North Vietnam. See Vietnam, North
Novak, Robert, 58, 225, 248 n. 12
O'Brien, James, 46
O'Brien, Lawrence, 68, 168, 184,
195-96
Okun, Arthur, 67
O'Neill, William, 184
On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the
Vietnam War (Harry G. Summers,
Jr.), 20n. 37
Operation Chaos, 40
Outdoor Advertising Association of
America, 168-69
Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission, 130
Owings, Nathaniel, 158, 172
Parker, Dorothy, 152
Passmann, Otto, 82, 106n. 15
Patillo, Effie, 151

Peace with Freedom in Vietnam,
Committee for, 40
Pearl Harbor, 221, 223
PL 480. See Food for Peace
Planning a Tragedy: The
Americanization of the War in
Vietnam (Larry Berman), 13-14
Podhoretz, Norman, 16, 46
Politician: The Life and Times of
Lyndon Johnson: The Drive for
Power, from the Frontier to Master of
the Senate, The, 5-6, SOn. 12
Politics, Science, and Dread Disease: A
Short History of the United States
Medical Research Policy, 212 n. 9
Post, Marjorie Merri.weather, 160
Poulain, Simone, 154
Powers, Thomas, 4 7
Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson , The
(Vaughn Davis Bornet), 8-9
Price, Donald K., 124
Pride, Project, 161
Progressive Era, 113, 116-17
Progressive Labor party, 26
Project Apollo, 217, 231-33, 237-42,
245-47. See also Space policy
Project Gemini, 235, 241
Project Pride, 161
Project Trail Blazers, 161
Prologue, 130
Public Health Service, 126, 137
Public Roads, Bureau of, 167-68
Pueblo, USS, 42

Quiet Crisis, The (Stewart Udall), 121
Rayburn, Sam, 5, 8
Reagan, Ronald, 3
Reclamation, Bureau of, 126, 132
Recreation and Natural Beauty,
Citizen's Advisory Committee on,
166
Reedy, George, 7-8, 217-22, 225, 227,
234-35, 248 n . 1
Regional Medical Plan (Heart Disease,
Cancer and Stroke Amendments of
1965), 183; and American Medical
Association, 194-96; enactment of,
195-97; implementation of, 198-200,
203; origins of, 192-94. See also
Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke,
President's Commission on; War on
Disease
Reliance Insurance Company, 166
Resources for the Future, 116

INDEX
Reston, James, Jr., 35, 153
Reuther, Walter P., 168-69
Roche, John, 50 n . 20
Rockefeller, Laurance S., 116, 155-57,
160-61, 172
Rockefeller Foundation, 163
Roosevelt, Eleanor, 150
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 118, 154; and
environmental policy, 114, 118; and
LBJ, 8, 10, 18, 88, 122-23
Roosevelt, Theodore, 114
Rosenberg, Anna, 186
Rostow, Walt, 34
Rowe, Elizabeth, 154-55
Rowe, James H ., Jr., 222
Rubin, Jerry, 29
Rumoshosky, Adam, 166
Rusk, Dean, 23, 43, 96, 99, 101 -2
Rusk, Howard, 18 7, 198
Russell, Richard, 218, 220-21, 225
Russia. See Soviet Union
Sanders, J. Barefoot, Jr., 69
SANE (National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy), 25, 28
Santa Barbara (Calif.) oil spill, 113, 138
Scalapino, Robert, 46
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Federal Power Commission, 146n. 48
Schandler, Herbert Y., 15
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 34
Schriever, Bernard A., 231
Schultze, Charles L., 57; and NASA
budgetary politics, 238 - 45; and tax
policy, 59-62, 64-69
Schwarz, John E., 19n. 30
Science Advisory Committee,
President 's, 127, 139, 237, 246
Science and Technology, Office of,
126-28
Seigel, Gerald, 219, 227
Selznick, David 0., 190
Sevareid, Eric, 171
Shackleton, Clifton, 163
Shackleton, Polly, 159, 161-62, 164
Shaffer, Robert, 89
Shannon, James, 185, 187-89, 202,
205-8
Sherrill, Robert, 50n. 20
Sidey, Hugh, 30
Sierra Club, 114, 116, 129
Silent Spring (Rachel L. Carson), 113,
115, 121
Smith, Margaret Chase, 244-45
Sochen, June, 150

I

265

Socialist Workers party, 26
Social Transformation of American
Medicine, The (Paul Starr), 211 n. 3
Society for a More Beautiful National
Capital, 159-61, 164, 171
Soil Conservation Service, 124
Solid Waste Disposal Act, 139
South Vietnam. See Vietnam, South
Soviet Union: foreign policy of, 24-25,
35, 37; and space race, 239-40,
242-45
Space Council, 227-28, 230-31, 234,
246-47
Space policy: and budgetary politics, for
fiscal 1967 to 1969, 237-46; and
early missile program, 218-19; and
election of 1964, 234; and Great
Society, 236, 240, 244; LBJ's role in,
assessment of, 246-47; and Manned
Spacecraft Center, site selection of,
232-33; and post-Apollo planning,
236-37, 240-42, 245; and Project
Apollo, 228-32, 237-42, 245-47;
Senate hearings on, 220-25; and
Vietnam War, 233, 236, 238-40,
242-43, 245, 247. See also Johnson,
Lyndon Baines; National Aeronautics
and Space Administration; Space
Council; Sputnik; Webb, James E.
Spock, Dr. Benjamin R., 25, 41
Sports Illustrated, 119
Spring Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam, 28
Sputnik, 217, 222, 228, 242, 247;
compared to the Alamo, 223;
compared to Pearl Harbor, 221, 223;
LBJ's initial reaction to, 218;
significance of, 219-20, 224
Stalin, Joseph, 222
Stamler, Jeremiah, 202
Stanton, Frank, 231
Starr, Paul, 184, 209, 211 n . 3
Stevenson, Adlai E., 25
Strickland, Stephen, 212 n . 9
Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee, 26
Students for a Democratic Society, 26,
28, 48
Suez Canal, 93
Sultemeier, Alvin, 194
Summers, Harry, 15
Sundquist, James L., 119
Symington, Stuart L., 218, 220, 222,
224-25
Taconic Foundation, 162

266

I

INDEX

Taft, Robert A., 187
Task forces: on environment, list of,
149; on environmental pollution,
135; on foreign aid, 100; on
governmental organization, 124; on
lung cancer, 206, 209; on natural
resources (1964), 122; on naturalresource studies (1966), 127, 129; on
preservation of natural beauty,
128-29, 156; on quality of
environment, 127; on resources and
recreation; 132-33; on space, future
programs in, 237
Tax policy. See Economic policy,
domestic
Taylor, Maxwell D., 17, 45
Taylor, Minnie Patillo, 151
Taylor, Thomas Jefferson, 151
Taylor Grazing Act, ll5
Teller, Edward, 223
Tennessee Valley Authority, ll5, 126
Test-ban Treaty, Partial, 25
Tet offensive, 42-43, 47
Thomas, Albert, 232-33
Thomas, Helen, 154
Thomas, Norman, 25, 36
Time, 247
Tobriner, Walter, 156, 163
Tocker, Phillip, 168
Tonkin, Gulf of, incident, 17, 36
Torrey Canyon, 138
Townsend, Thomas, 195
Trade Expansion bill, 97
Trail Blazers, Project, 161
Train, Russell, 171
Truman, Harry S., 40, 186; Library, 184
Truman Doctrine, 80
Turner, Kathleen J., 16
Udall, Stewart, 165, 146n. 50, 171-72;
and administration of environmental
policy, 125-26; and beautification of
Washington, D.C., 155, 158, 163;
early career of, 120; influence of,
123, 140-41, 153; on Lady Bird
Johnson, 154, 156, 167; and land-use
policy, 128-31; on LBJ, 132; and New
Conservation, 117-18, 120-21; and
wildlife protection, 133-34 ·
Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education
Policy in the Kennedy and fohnson
Years, The (Hugh Davis Graham),
19n. 15
United Nations, 25, 228
United. States Geological Survey, 114

US. News and World Report, 157, 165
Unraveling of America: A History of
Liberalism in the 1960s, The (Allen
J. Matusow) , 10-11
Urban America, 162
Urban Renewal Administration, 139
Valenti, Jack, 38, 184, 237
Vance, Cyrus R., 43, 221, 224
Vantage Point: Perspectives on the
Presidency, The (Lyndon Baines
Johnson), 58, 63, 183, 217-18
Vietnam, North, 15, 24-25, 36-39,
43-44, 98, 103, 105
Vietnam, South, 25, 27, 43-44, 84, 99
Vietnam: A History (Stanley Karnow), 3
Vietnam Information Group, White
House, 40
Vietnam War, impact of: on
beautification, 165- 67; on credibility
gap, 16; on environmental policy,
123, 130, 140; on fiscal policy, 58-59,
60-65, 70-72; on foreign economic
policy, 79, 84, 88-91, 93, 97-106; on
historians, 9-10, 13-17; on LBJ,
30-33; on medical-research policy,
208; on Regional Medical Plan, 195,
198; on Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 28, 35; on space policy,
217, 233, 236, 238-43, 245, 247; on
War on Disease, 198, 208; on War on
Poverty, 11. See also Antiwar
movement; Vietnam, North;
Vietnam, South
Voting Rights Act, 19 n. 21
Wallace, Henry A., ll4
Wall Street Toumal, 193
War on Disease: and American Medical
Association, 194-97; and
Commission on Heart Disease,
Cancer and Stroke, 189-94; under
Eisenhower and Kennedy, 188-89;
historical assessment of, 183-84,
208-12; LBJ enlists in, 187-88; LBJ
on, 183, 190-91; and medicalresearch policy, 201-8; and Medicare,
183, 189, 204; origins of, 186-87;
public reaction to, 193, 208; and
Regional Medical Plan, 193-200; and
scientific community, 201-2, 207-8;
sources on, in LBJ Library, 184-85,
191, 2ll-12n. 3; and Vietnam War,
208. See also Heart Disease, Cancer
and Stroke, President's Commission

INDEX
on; Johnson, Lyndon Baines; Lasker,
Mary W.; Regional Medical Plan
War Resisters, 25-26
Washington, Walter E., 159, 160-64,
172
Washington, D.C., condition of, in
1963, 155. See also Beautification
campaign
Washington Daily News, 193
Washington Post, 40, 155, 156, 195
Washington Star, 158
Water Pollution Control
Administration, 125-26
Water Quality Act of 1965, 137
Water Resources Council, 124
Water Resources Planning Act, 124
Weaver, Robert C., 163
Webb, James E.: appointment of,
229-30; and Manned Spacecraft
Center, site selection of, 232-33; and
NASA budgetary politics, 238-46;
and post-Apollo planning, 236-37
Weis!, Edwin L., Sr., 221, 225, 227
Weis!, Edwin L., Jr., 221
Welsh, Edward, 246
Westmoreland, William C., 39-40, 43

I

267

White, Edward H ., III, 243
White House Diary, A (Lady Bird
Johnson), 174n. 9
Why We Were in Vietnam (Norman
Podhoretzl, 20n. 40
Wiesner, Jerome, 229
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 130-31
Wilderness Act, 129, 131
Wilderness Society, 129
Wilson, Cynthia, 157
Wilson, Dagmar, 25
Wilson, Woodrow, 18
Wirtz, Alvin, 8
"Wise Men" of foreign affairs, 41-43
Wolfe, Tom, 229
Women Strike for Peace, 25
World Bank, 104
World War II, 30-32

Years of Lyndon fohnson: The Path to
Power, The (Robert A. Carol, 4-5
Young, John W., 235
Zahniser, Howard, 129
Zero Population Growth, 116
Zwick, Charles J., 57, 67

